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STUDIES 
Lajos LŐRINCZ Public Administration: 
Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 
1. Public administration evolves where public affairs arise, problems that the entire 
society considers to be their own, the solution of which calls for the concerted action 
of every member of the society. One might think that on this basis public administration 
evolves in every society where the level of development is beyond that of hordes. But 
it is not so, hence for a long time a great share of social efforts that are now regarded 
as public activities have been integrated with the aim of satisfying personal needs. 
Therefore we can state that the first type of public administration, which was in 
many aspects similar to the twentieth century, came into existence in the ancient 
societies of irrigation-based economic systems, in China and Egypt in the first place, 
but also in the valley of the rivers Tiger and Euphrates. In these empires the basic needs 
of the constantly growing population were met by communal works comprehending to 
the totality of the society. The reason for the greatest, richest and most powerful states 
of ancient times to become so was that they were governed by a group of leaders who 
had been carefully selected for the leading position on the basis of their personal 
abilities instead of bom privileges (today we would call them managers). The permanent 
existence and the specific character of the Chinese civilization is due to the early 
developed state bureaucracy; but this statement refers to all other long-lasting ancient 
empires.1 
1 My primary sources for the outlined presentation of the universal history of public administration were: 
HEADY, F.: Public Administration: a Comparative Perspective. Second Edition, New York-Basel, 1979; 
GLADDEN, E. N.: A History of Public Administration, Vol. H I . London, 1972. 
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The first prerequisite for establishing a public administration system is that it be 
recognized at every level of society, but especially at the top of social hierarchy, that 
private and public matters are different and public matters shall prevail. According to 
the studies by Weber, Wittfogel2 and their follow-ups, state officials in the ancient 
empires, including also the Roman and Byzantine Empires, who under different names 
fulfilled substantially the same functions, all complied with the rule of segregating their 
private fortunes from the public funds, their private aims from public goals. This creates 
the theoretical basis for the second characteristic of public administration: formation of 
a hierarchic structure of government and administration, both vertically and horizontally. 
Vertical hierarchy ensured order and unity for the executive branch of power in the 
great empires, whereas horizontal hierarchy served as basis for the division of labor 
among the departments responsible for most important groups of state affairs, such as 
finances, defense, economic affairs, housing, etc. 
Resulting from the hierarchic structure, in the ancient empires public administration 
was centralized. The power to make decisions and issue directives was vested in those 
at the top of the hierarchy. The well-organized and effective public administration was 
usually, with very rare exceptions, combined with despotic governing methods, such as 
the concentration of all the power in one hand, and implementing such a style of 
government, which was not that much concerned about the balance between the stated 
aims and the personal and material costs it took to reach them. 
Those societies, where the above described model of governing public affairs was 
accepted, are referred to by Eisenstadt as centralized historic bureaucratic empires or 
historic bureaucratic societies. He states that in contrast with the other models, such 
as—using his terminology—the primitive political systems, the nomadic or conquering 
empires, city-states, or the feudal system, this model is much more successful, it has 
reached much more long-lasting results than the others, for only due to the setting up 
of the system of public administration was it possible to reach the necessary level of 
control over society and to reach a progressive increase in social resources. Institu-
tionalization of the system of public administration also helped to stabilize the relations 
among the various groups of society.3 
Up to the 17-18th century, European feudalism created an entirely new situation in 
the history of administering communal affairs. In its early phase, it freed itself 
drastically of the practice of centralized public administration, that is it eliminated the 
system. The number of communal affairs was decreased to the minimum, and it was the 
task of the smallest units of society to administrate them. As the concept of public 
administration vanished, the organizing state disappeared, too. The feudal system was 
not able to produce more than half of what was necessary for the society in order to 
survive. The political power itself was divided among numerous small communities that 
2 WITTFOGEL, K. A.: Oriental Despotism, a comparative Study of Total Power, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1957. 
3 EISENSTADT, S. N.: The Political Systems of Empires, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 
Public Administration: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow 3 
constantly fighted against each other for the material resources. As it is well-known, the 
consequence was that the number of population continued to decrease as long as until 
the 19th century, productivity of the agriculture declined, and the level of social 
cooperation in general was reduced to the minimum. 
As a result of a slow development that lasted for four centuries, the situation was 
about to change, when some European states took the form of absolutist monarchy by 
the 16-17th century. Relating to the subject of the present paper, the "newness" of these 
monarchies was that they again introduced the notion of communal affairs and thus 
created the basis for modern public administration. In France, the names of Richelieu 
and Colbert, in England, Henry the Eighth and Elisabeth the First, in Prussia, the Prince-
elector of Brandenburg and his son, William Frederick the First, in the Austrian Empire, 
Marie Theresa and Joseph the Second signed the new concept of public administration 
and the formation of the new system. This system can be characterized—besides that it 
is centralized—, so that it is highly active, a new slogan was formulated saying: 
everything for the public, even if, when it is necessary, against the will of the public! 
Mercantilism got adopted as the economic policy of the state and it increased the 
state's incomes, improved the living conditions for the people, resulted in the 
construction of roads and canals—and also a series of offices were set up what lead to 
the adoption of rules and regulations, and to the employment of officials drafting and 
implementing these rules. Comparing with feudal administration, the changes are 
tremendous. Medieval kings were busy with the defense and enlargement of their 
territories, their major concern was to safeguard their privileges against the church and 
the nobles who always challenged them. The monarchs of enlightened absolutism 
wanted the welfare of their state, of their empire. In the medieval times, the officials 
of royal councils were common members of the royal court, they were in the same rank 
as cooks, tasters and footmen. In an unfortunate way, public service was not separated 
from the private service of the royal court. The officials of enlightened absolutism 
attended universities, where they studied administrational sciences, with the con-
temporary expression cameralist sciences. At the end of their studies they were required 
to take an exam and on condition of their results, the best ones were admitted to public 
administration, where they made a career they could count on in advance.4 
From the aspect of public administration, the period when nation-states were bom, 
that is the period of bourgeois transformation can be characterized as the age of radical 
change in ideologies, but without any changes in the structure of public administration. 
The country is no longer the king's property, but it belongs to the nation, and state is 
the machinery with the help of which the nation is able to create its government and to 
organize public services. The official is not the servant of the crown any more, but it 
serves the state. Public power is no longer the means of one person. Public officials 
proceed in compliance with law, instead of following the instructions given by a single 
person. They are protected by law because law is the manifestation of the nation's will. 
4 HEADY: ibid. 151-163. 
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In other aspects changes in public administration appeared in the form of the still 
existing phenomena that institutions were constantly renamed: Napoleon, for example, 
called the former Royal Council as State Council, without the slightest changes in its 
functions, since every fundamental principle, order, hierarchy, specialization and 
registration had already emerged centuries, or even thousands of years earlier. 
Approaching the present, it becomes possible to extend the scope of study to the 
administrational sciences, and from that moment it is impossible to describe the develop-
ment in a single structure any more, although public administration remains the same. 
I have already mentioned cameralism above: this discipline is in fact a systematic 
description of the practical tasks of public administration. It has been left out of 
university curriculums without any particular comments. The situation is different with 
regard to jurisprudence. From the beginning of the 19th century, in Europe, but 
especially on the Continent, in the early stages of the rule-of-law state, the needs of 
society were transmitted more and more and exclusively by jurisprudence. It thus 
strengthened and of course at the same time it was strengthened by the classical 
interpretation of free competition. If a fundamental principle is transmitted by law, it 
can only appear in the form of a legal norm. Public administration is only entitled to 
act in accordance with law and only in a way that is in accordance with the applicable 
legal norms. This concise requirement expresses the idea of social control, the 
supremacy of representative organs, that means, of politics over public administration, 
the separation of public and private laws, which refers, in a way, to the separation of 
public morals, and the attempt to restrict the rule of the state. Those times, legal 
regulations were drafted by the representative organs, membership of which was more 
and more conditional upon joining one of the political parties, that all represented a 
particular layer of society. The laws enacted by parliaments reflect the fiction of the 
sovereignty of people. Public administration, that is submitted to the rule of law, 
accomplishes—according to jurisprudence—a democratic way of administering public 
affairs through public participation. Continental Europe—as it will be demonstrated, 
England and especially the United States have a different standpoint—implement another 
rule in the field of private law: everything is possible what law does not prohibit. The 
capacity of public administration of the rule-of-law state is hamstringed, nevertheless 
trade, business, the totality of what is called today the sphere of competition is free. 
According to the contemporary theory adopted by jurisprudence—and this harmonized 
with the prevailing views of philosophy and economic theories—, public administration 
shall merely play the role of a night-watchman, that is to keep public order and defend 
the territorial integrity of the state against eventually occurring external attacks. 
Prevailing views, however, do not necessarily reflect reality; instead, they either 
constitute the observations full of wit and wishes of theorists, or express the interests 
and aims of certain layers of society. In the case concerned, for example, there is no 
hint of any substantial changes in the social role, nor in the nature of public 
administration. It is equally active, it interferes in every country, though for different 
reasons, with the decisions on questions relating to trade, education, social welfare. One 
of the signs remarkable of the process is further differentiation of the structure of the 
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organs of government. Another one is that within the concept of the night-watchman 
state, in addition to the list containing five departments that originate from Rome of the 
period of the emperors (department of foreign affairs, internal affairs, defense, financial 
department, and department of justice), central administrational organs are established 
for the administration of matters relating to social welfare, education, industry and 
commerce, and agriculture. Selection of public officials is further on based on personal 
abilities, like in every severe and effective public administration system. Decisions are 
made in a reasonable decision-making procedure. 
The situation is different in the same historic period—during the 18—19th centuries—in 
England, and especially in America. America differs the most from the solutions 
characteristic of continental Europe, therefore I will present the American system. The 
difference in this period between America and Europe is that America does not really 
possess a public administration system, and it does not even intend to create one. The 
settlers in America lived under such conditions, that they did not have any state, thus 
they had to solve every problem themselves or within their smallest environment, the 
settlement. In the absence of public affairs, that is matters affecting large parts of 
society that longed for urgent solution, public administration could naturally not evolve. 
Therefore, for a long time America did not have a different type of public administration 
than Europe, but the difference was that it completely lacked any. (The public 
administration evolving later on has no substantially different characteristic.) 
The hostile emotions towards the state, the fears that central power may become too 
strong, felt by the Drafting Fathers of the American Constitution which is, to a certain 
extent, still present in the conservative segments of society, incredibly increased the 
significance of voluntary associations, self-organized groups of the citizens, and local 
governments. It almost seemed that the Greek police-system could be restored and 
extended to a whole continent, as alternative to the model of bureaucratic administration. 
(Thus the archaic style of public buildings does not coincidentally but on purpose 
remind of the Greek traditions.) Local governments or municipalities as a modern form 
expressing the wish and ability of the inhabitants for self-government requires in the 
first place that every member of the society have equal chances to participate in the 
administration of public affairs, and that no privileged layer of society take the 
monopoly of assertion of rights. Therefore examining personal abilities, fulfilment of 
educational criteria have no place in this system, positions can only be filled for a short 
time in order to create the highest possible rotation. As political parties gain more 
significance, rotation becomes unavoidable, since election campaigns are organized in 
every year and part of the officials in public service will be changed and together with 
them all their relatives, friends, those whom the officials give some kind of an 
assignment as a gift. A distorted version of patronage system was created, that by the 
1880's made it absolutely impossible to fulfill the fundamental public functions and this 
convinced the American society itself that the spoil-system, that is the structure of 
administration subjected to politics was a way leading to dead end. 
As a result of the 1880's, all over the then developed world uniform changes 
occurred in public administration. Disadvantages resulting from the unrestricted freedom 
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of competition became more apparent and social tension increased and it was almost 
unequivocal believed everywhere that the solution of these problems is to strengthen the 
state, strengthen public administration and make order in the anarchic state of economy. 
Some social researchers describe this period as the age of imperialism or state capitalism, 
some state that this is the time when state interventions were first set through, others call 
it the period of administrational revolution. All of them are right regarding one thing: 
distrust in state bureaucracy disappears all around the world, and for the first time in the 
history of mankind, people start looking for the means that could make bureaucracy more 
effective and sufficient on a large scale. In addition to these phenomena, an opposite 
tendency can be recognized, too, that only gains acceptance after the first world war and 
at the time concerned it only appeared in rarely read works: this is the growing concerns 
in relation with the trend felt by anarchist, social democratic, socialist and Christian-
democrat theorists. 
Among the efforts taken in order to increase sufficiency, the measures adopted in 
America seemed most original. Since this country alone lacked real public administration 
until as late as the end of the last century, they tried to form it so as it evolved in the 
very effective large-scale industries. On top of that, this was the time when the book 
written by Taylor was published on the traditional management of industrial work,5 
which contained a lot of general statements regarding management that seemed applicable 
in the field of public administration, such as specialization, coordination, fulfilment of 
orders, detailed planning of the separate stages of the production process, etc. From that 
time on, in the opinion of observers who considered industrial management as the only 
good and applicable way, that is the single acceptable model, at the beginning only in 
America, but later also in other countries, all dysfunction of public administration 
originated from the fact that it differed from the model, and quickly became a properly-
functioning big industry, once it had complied with the management principles that were 
supposed to possess a general scope. According to the basically economy-concerned 
theory, whereas the major characteristics of the market are competition, dynamism and 
freedom of choice, public administration can be characterized with monopoly, stagnation 
and binding force. Society becomes dynamic to the extent as every organization functions 
according to the rules of the market. 
Continental Europe that was based on a system separating public and private spheres 
received the new solutions coming from America with grimaces, and apart from a few 
exceptions, it did not take cognizance of them at all. When the American ideas first 
gained sympathy and support, between the two world wars, then already the New World 
has changed its model. In Europe the legal system will be more elaborated, the theory 
of administrational legal norm is worked out, the institution of administrational act, that 
means they look for an instrumentality to expand the power of administration. Administ-
rational law becomes an equally important field of law beside civil law and penal law 
5 TAYLOR, F. W.: Scientific Management, New Yort;, Harper, 1911. 
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which used to prevail so far, but now administrational law even becomes predominant 
as regards its extent and significance. 
In the real sphere the situation is the same thorough the entire developed world: the 
importance of public sphere keeps on growing, both in America that still cannot escape 
from the magic circle of free competition and in Europe that further on emphasizes the 
difference between public and private spheres. For example in the United States of 
America in the year 1924 9.9% of the GNP was spent on government expenditures, but 
in 1938 this number was already 19.7%.6 
World War I, the subsequent restoration programs, the world economic crisis, then 
preparations for World War II. made it more and more obvious that the executive power, 
the activity of the government and public administration needed to be strengthened. This 
universal process was, however, rooted in completely different philosophies. The soviet 
state could point to its plans of social reconstruction on the one hand, the realization of 
which required a strong central power and the greatest-ever extension of the category of 
public affairs. On the other hand, the soviet state was bound by the ideological thesis 
according to which the final aim of the socialist society is to annul the structure of state 
bureaucracy that had become estranged from the people and to realize total self-
government instead. Stalin formulated the solution, in a rather inexplicable manner: the 
way to the annulment of the state leads through its strengthening, i. e. the stronger it 
becomes, the closer it gets to the end. During the dictatorships of that period, not only 
in the Soviet Union, but also in Italy and later in Germany, but even in the United States 
implementing the policy of New Deal, public administration was strengthened against 
legislative power, what referred both to the fruitless debates characterizing legislation 
controlled by political parties, and to the wickedness of democracy. Every country set up, 
or at least demanded a strong government, concentration of power, and unconditional 
obedience towards the president, the leader of the party, of course with tremendous 
differences in the procedures and measures implemented. The idea of rule-of-law state 
and its variation applicable to public administration was pushed into the background all 
over in Europe, the requirement of sufficiency prevails over that of lawfulness, which is 
exactly the way it has always been in the United States, because of the prestige of the 
model of industrial management. A new branch of this science, however, after having 
studied the experience derived from the implementation of magical management thesis 
in practice, arrived at the conclusion with astonishment, that these have no effect in 
public administration. It is completely irrelevant, whether the functional leadership model 
or the model of general stuff is implemented, the outcome is neither better nor worse, for 
a twofold reason: firstly because informal human relations influence sufficiency in 
organizations much more than formal administrational measures, and secondly because 
the protection awarded by politics to public administration makes the rules elaborated in 
private management inapplicable, or at least almost inapplicable.7 With other words 
6 STRAUSSMAN, J. D.: Public Administration, Longman, New York, 1990. 
7 SIMON, H. A.: Behaviour of Decision Making, New York, Macmillan, 1945. 
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America finally recognized—in the years preceding World War II—the consequences origi-
nating from the dichotomy of private and public administration, which was discovered 
in Europe three centuries earlier, in China three thousands of years before that. 
After World War II, despite of what could have been expected, the role of public 
administration in social decision making kept on growing, and this phenomenon has not 
been distorted since then. Specialization further continued, fields that used to be free of 
administration before, such as science, technical development, sports, protection of the 
environment come under the scope of public administration. The number of public 
officials was radically arisen, they are much more well-trained, it becomes impossible 
to get a decision making position without university degree, nevertheless the most inte-
resting aspect is the expansion and increase in its functions. If at the middle of the 19th 
century the most significant characteristic of public administration was the activity of 
the police, then from the turn of the century it was rather influencing and intervention, 
and from the fifties on it can be described as caring public administration. This means 
providing balanced and tolerable life conditions, including health care and social aid, 
education, housing, protection against industrial, environmental harmful impacts, 
providing the conditions for resting, rehabilitation and amusement, etc., that is fulfilling 
all tasks usually connected with the notion of welfare-state. A few data representative 
of the above outlined tendency: in Belgium in 1965 32,3% of the GNP was made up 
by government expenditures, in 1984 already 55,4%, in France during the same period 
the numbers changed from 38,4% to 52,7%, in the United Kingdom from 36,1% to 
47,8%.8 As it is well-known, in the Anglo-Saxon world the process culminated in the 
1980's during the Reagan and Thatcher era-a "revolution" based on a neoconservative 
ideology took place, which was expressly aimed at the abolishment of the welfare-state 
functions and restraint of public administration, therefore it is also referred to as a 
"counter-revolution". Unfortunately, it is less well-known that denationalization only 
happened in words, not in reality. For example, the number of public employees in the 
United States grew from 13 million to 18.5 million between 1970 and 1991, that means 
an increase with more than 42%. The increase was 8% in federal organs, 64% in state 
organs, 48% in local bodies. It is necessary to present the political and theoretical 
streams separately from the trends in reality, since in the last decade Hungarians could 
receive hardly any information about the latter, although virtual processes aim at 
completely new directions. 
The period after World War II cannot be described solely with the development of 
caring administration that is, by the way, a process extending to universal social 
systems, but also with the development of an international, transnational bureaucracy. 
The United Nations and the similar organizations have so many employees that they 
could form an entire armed forces, their number—limited to the employees working in 
the administration, only—exceeds 150 thousand, and the number of employees of the 
European Union is also more than 17 thousand. International administration is a new 
8 STRAUSSMAN: ibid, at 11. 
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phenomenon not only because it did exist before, but also because internationalization 
was generally believed to collide with the substance of public administration, for its role 
has always been limited to the management of the functioning of a particular state. 
Public administration became suitable for fulfilling transnational functions due to the 
internationalization of politics. 
Synchronized with this process, it was noticed that there are only limited chances 
for implementation and adaptation of administrational systems, structures and pro-
cedures. Attempts to transplant an administrational structure already embodied in one 
country to another already started after World War II. The intention was presented either 
in the form of humanitarian intervention, or protection of democracy and human rights, 
or it was sold as the selfless internationalism of proletariat, but in fact it aimed at the 
forceful of peaceful transformation of the institutional structure of the state concerned. 
From this point of view the United States of America and the Soviet Union were most 
helpful, since the analysis of their failures lead to the formation of a new discipline, the 
comparative administration. Its major statement can be summarized as it follows: 
changing the sector of bureaucracy is useless without any changes in other factors, such 
as cultural, political, economical and other factors. In order to prove the correctness of 
this statement, a series of examples could be demonstrated. Instead of referring to the 
obvious failures or blunders, let us mention the resistance on behalf of the Western-
European states concerning the introduction of the American business-orientated system 
after World War II, or the case of the center in Speyer. As Speyer belonged to the 
French military zone, it was given as a present a center of elite-training which was the 
equivalent of the ENA founded by de Gaulle. Today the Speyer Academy of Administ-
ration, absent any central German corrections, is equals to a typical German university, 
and nobody really knows about the French origins, except for the historians and the 
French supporters of de Gaulle. Now the examples brought by the opponents can be 
seen clearly: how superficial and insignificant influence the Soviet expansion exerted, 
in its own military zone, although they are generally more totalitarian and aggressive. 
2. This was the history of public administration in the most developed regions of the 
world in a nutshell, what alone creates a distortion. Now I will present the major turning 
points of the development of Hungarian administration, in a similarly short form. 
As a summary it has to be said about Hungarian administration that it has never 
possessed any original features that would be worth reminding of, like the characteristics 
of the above mentioned great empires. Such characteristics were only discovered by 
historians lacking the relevant expertise in the history of other nations. Hungarian 
administration has always been adaptive; in more lucky periods the model to be 
followed was chosen deliberately, whereas in unlucky periods we were forced to adopt 
a model, and we still cannot properly answer whether which was more profitable for us. 
Hungarian administration always followed a model, however it was never significantly 
left behind of that. Let us examine the beginning right away. As it is well-known, the 
foundation of the Hungarian state was the work of Géza and Saint Stephen. Hungary 
had two options: its Southern neighbor offered a highly elaborated model of administ-
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ration which was the most regulated at that time, The Western neighbor, the Bavarian 
prince of the Frank empire which was just about to falling apart, suggested a model 
characteristic of early medieval times, where no real communal affairs existed, only 
private matters of the king. The difference between the two models was five hundred 
years: Byzance was so much more developed. It could not be doubtful, that our 
ancestors who looked with shiver at the hierarchic administrational structure of 
Constantinopol, the elaborated system of registration and control, the regularity and 
consistency of punishments and the lengthiness of the code put together by Justinianus, 
the content of which was completely impossible for them to comprehend, chose the 
Franco-Bavarian model instead, which was stemming from the 10th century and had just 
got rid of the administrational basis. Thus they chose a European model which was very 
under-developed, and therefore it could be successfully adapted and it was applicable 
in the Hungarian society just leaving the system based on ties of blood and customary 
law of nationalities.9 The main point was, however, that we became assimilated to the 
West instead of the East, for by that time the society in Byzance was already full of 
oriental and despotic elements, too, and thus it was a lucky choice, even if the heads 
of the Árpád dynasty were not quite convinced of that, not even centuries later. 
The second choice between models took place after the year 1526. The Turkish 
model was implemented on the occupied territories of the Hungarian Lowlands, the 
Austro-German model of the Habsburg Empire that had just gained the form of a well-
organized empire was compulsorily introduced on the Northern territories of the country. 
The Austrian model declared the requirements of strong centralized power, that is 
centralization and a body of professional officials, the Turkish model allowed much 
more decentralization and self-government. The impacts of the Turkish model have not 
been fully analyzed yet, but it is an informative sign that as a result of the one-and-a 
half centuries long Turkish occupation 800 Ottoman-Turkish words remained in the 
Hungarian language and a great part of them is in connection with public administration 
and its functions10 (interpreter, brigand, marauder, field-guard, shackle). 
After all, the attempts to coerce Hungarians to adapt the Habsburg model lasted for 
almost four hundred years, unfortunately enough, only with partial success. Public admi-
nistration, as I indicated in the section dealing with universal history, public administ-
ration in Europe only started to reach the level of the Roman empire in the 16th—18th 
centuries. That means, we could have joined the leading trends at the best time. But the 
events of Hungarian history starting from the insurrections in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, through the freedom fight lead by Rákóczi, the reformist movements at the 
beginning of the 19th century, the events of 1848, the homogeneous hatred towards to 
so-called Bach-hussars lead to the conclusion that Hungarian society did not praise the 
attempts to modernize administration in the efforts of the Habsburgs to annex Hungary. 
9 HÓMAN, B. and SZEKFtJ, Gy.: Hungarian History. Volume I, Budapest, 1935. Királyi Magyar Egyetemi 
Nyomda, 228 ff. 
10 The History of Hungary, 1526-1686, Volume I, Budapest, 1985. 473. 
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Although numerous modernizing attempts originating from France could be reported, 
that would have reached Hungary (which came, by the end of the 17th century, fully 
under Habsburg domination), through Prussia and Austria, had they not been halted by 
the resistance of noble counties. Still, there was one area left, and two other accessories 
were attached to it, that could be regarded basically as the results of the Austrian 
empire, that were modern and effective and thus after the compromise of 1867 it could 
serve as basis for winding up the totally anachronistic centers of noble resistance, for 
modernization of public administration and, after 1920, the undisturbed functioning of 
the fully independent Hungarian state. This field is financial management. The 
constitutional government took over financial administration from the absolutist regime 
in an unchanged form it did not change the system of accounting, and cash services, and 
also the system of administration." That may be where the still existing difference 
between money management and all other branches of Hungarian public administration 
comes from. Let me mention only for the sake of interest that in the capital during the 
battle—apart from the troops collecting and executing people—financial directories were 
the only functioning institutions, they continuously mailed the orders to pay taxes. 
After World War II—since public administration goes on its own way—no real 
exchange of models occurred. Naturally, everything changed entirely at the level of 
words, slogans, ideology and aims: instead of government the council of ministers was 
set up, local governments were transformed into councils, mayors became presidents of 
councils, public administration became state administration, secretary of state became 
vice-minister, but the principle of competence that at the beginning had been 
implemented only in the field of financial management and later it was extended to 
every branch of administration was not hurt, and the hierarchic and centralized system 
of administration was not destroyed. The stated aim of the socialist period was to create 
an executive power resting on the principles of effectiveness and sufficiency, consented 
planning and cooperation that works in a predictable and uniform manner implementing 
large-scale measures, provides with social security and complies without delay with the 
instructions of the highest power which was, in the case concerned, a political party. It 
should have been an executive power Frederick the Greatest, Bismarck, Taylor, and 
Fayol dreamed about to create, but sparing the requirements of democracy and legality 
as obstacles to sufficiency, speediness, the effectiveness of the instructions of the 
highest power. It is the peculiarity of this period that the reason why the external model 
could not be adapted in Hungarian society was not that it possessed higher cultural 
values, nor because of the hidden intention to dominate but it was caused by its 
lower-or allegedly lower—level of development. 
In 1989/1990 legality was reestablished in Hungarian public administration that 
again had to choose between several models. For the first time since Saint Stephen we 
could freely determine which waistcoat we put on. Owing to the researchers studying 
this subject the variety was well-known, and thus with the active help of the politicians 
11 MAGYARI, Z.: Hungarian Public management, Budapest, Egyetemi Nyomda, 1942. 
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a system of public administration was set up integrated to the new democratic system 
that combines the outcomes of the American, French, Italian, German and Austrian 
development completed with the best Hungarian traditions. It is too early to speak about 
the real values of this, nevertheless the characteristics can probably be summarized. 
First of all it has to be mentioned that the requirements of effectiveness and 
speediness can hardly be found in the arguments supporting the setting up of any pre-
sently existing institutions of public administration. There are many examples for the 
opposite. The Act on Local Governments expressly and on purpose omitted every consi-
deration regarding reasonable management. The following words: decentralization, rule-
of-law state, independence almost gained a mystical significance. Under this spirit were 
Hungarian local governments accorded autonomy to the extent no other municipality 
possesses in the world, and it is another consequence that the honorarium of local 
representatives is so high that in smaller places it takes half of the state subsidy given 
to the village. In the name of legal fundamentalism the Constitutional Court arrived at 
a decision that superciliously annulled the possibility to weigh the extra expenditures 
of the executive in value of more billion HUF. The Parliament enacted an Act on the 
Legal Status of Public Employees and Public Officials so that the minister of finances 
only took cognizance of the part concerning tens of billions half a year before its 
coming into force. Decisions of administrative authorities will be supervised within the 
framework of such a judicial system that could not be longer and more expensive, and 
there are many other examples. 
Ten years ago, researchers of management-science had to work for improving the 
legality of Hungarian public management, for the reasonable narrowing of the scope of 
its activity, and now they worriedly experience that the interpretation of legality 
originating from the last century that has become the scale of functioning of modem 
public administration completely incapacitates it and makes it unable to fulfil the 
functions of providing services. The criteria of legality and expediency shall form a 
balance in the functioning of modern public management; the history of public 
administration so far has provided many examples demonstrating the dysfunction that 
were caused by disregarding any of the above criteria. 
It is not only disregarding expediency that weakens our public management. It is 
also the dilemma that follows from the difference between the American-type, rather 
business-orientated interpretation of public administration wishing to make use of the 
rules of business and the other view that is rooted in Western-European traditions of 
public law and political science and still wants to protect the particular values and 
integrity of public administration. The dilemma comes from the necessity to choose 
among them. 
According to management- and administration-theories, management or administ-
ration rests on the same principles regardless whether it concerns a state or industrial 
works. As it has been and in a few more sentences it will be further demonstrated, 
political sciences and sociology has disproved the above statement, but it has again 
gained support recently, as a possible way to solve the economic and social crisis. If 
there is no difference between public and private management, and private management 
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is more flexible and more cost-sensitive, why not shift the tasks of public administration 
over to private companies, or at least, as a minimum, why could state administration not 
carry out its functions implementing the methods of private companies? The new public 
management movement is especially popular in Great-Britain, New-Zealand and 
Australia. The movement promotes an economic program: rationalization within the 
organization, privatization towards outside. Internal rationalization follows the principles 
laid down by Taylor, many call the movement new taylorism, since the basic elements 
of the concept are as it follows: measurement of productivity, standardization of the 
stages of the working process, discovering the sources of losses, employee-transfer and 
cutting down, competition among the individual units of organization. Administration 
shall be financed not exclusively from the budget, but it shall find other sources, if 
necessary it shall collect stamp-duty, it shall make profit and shall not take more 
obligations, in a word, it shall become an enterprising state serving delighted clients. It 
is a great plan that the Congress approved in the United States upon the proposal of the 
vice-president with tremendous enthusiasm. They never started to realize the plan 
though, because in the meantime things have changed in the Congress. Still, in Hungary 
the plan is presented as if it was already realized. 
The theory of organizational management that is rich in concepts and urges the 
change of paradigms forced many unsuccessful attempts in the field of financial 
management and aiming at the improvement of productivity, nevertheless many think, 
taking into consideration the high level of enthusiasm that it receives orders from 
politicians and state officials in high positions, since the orders are suitable for showing-
off, they can serve for winning the sympathy of entrepreneurs with its all consequences. 
The rhetorics of "new management" belongs to the market and competition, and 
anybody turning against it might end up with a label: "incapable bureaucrat, incapable 
resistance fighter". 
Western-European doctrine-especially the German, French, Italian and Spanish—em-
phasizes its serious doubts regarding "new" management, and it sets against it the 
classical principles of administration: the principle of hierarchy and that it is restricted 
by the rules of law. The principle of expulsion generally accepted in economy is abso-
lutely unacceptable in state administration; the services provided by state administration 
cannot be made conditional upon payment of counter-value. That means, consumption 
by one individual cannot deprive others from the same possibility. While distribution 
of private goods is regulated by the market, the decision concerning production of 
public goods is the result of a political-administrative process. Entrepreneurial manage-
ment operates with services connected with production of solely material goods, public 
good as a general aim does not motivate it. Scarcity of resources in public administ-
ration cannot be eliminated with business measures, say many experts. Its own internal 
system has to be developed instead, the budget system, state accounting, the controlling 
measures over the expenditures. I would like to quote Klaus Köning, the dean of Speyer 
word for word: "We have to get rid of the rhetoric of the entrepreneurial spirit, 
entrepreneurial culture, entrepreneurial management.. . There are common features (in 
public and private administration, L. L.) but there are no generally applicable receipts. 
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Historie starting points and the cultural environment are too much different for that, 
especially considering the differences between the civic-culture administration of the 
United States of America and the classic administration of Europe.'"2 
In relation to public management in Hungary, beginning from the end of the eighties 
the first task was to abolish the democratic deficit of administration, and in connection 
with that public management was reconsidered from the aspect of constitutional law, 
which effected strong administrative courts, a detailed legal regulation and depolitici-
zation of the body of officials. The second phase is just about beginning: determination 
of the economic-effectiveness strategy, through settling matters of detail, such as the 
transfer of responsibility for decisions of social problems from the zone of state activity 
to the sphere of private activity, the extent and timing of this transfer. The process 
started in the most important field, in privatization of possessions, but in the field of 
privatizing tasks, contracting out, deregulation, elimination of subventions, cutting off 
only the first steps have been taken. Exactly as the one-sided law-orientated view may 
constitute an obstacle for the balanced functioning of public administration, the 
business-orientated view that considers the adaptation of entrepreneurial methods as the 
only admissible way to improve the effectiveness of public administration, may hinder 
the promotion of really effective methods. The spirit of competition creates advantageous 
environment for the operation of the strong, but it throws the weak on the mercy of 
entrepreneurial management that implements cruel measures and different behavior in 
order to gain profit. Public management providing social services, on the other hand, 
implements the principle of equal treatment and the rule of positive discrimination for 
those who are down and out. It means that instead of expulsion and victory this type 
of public management implements the traditional criteria of social justice, reasonable 
treatment and legality, all formulated long ago in Europe. 
I only mention briefly the different nature of moral norms applicable in the entre-
preneurial sphere and in public administration, and the conflicts originating from this 
difference. The moral norms of public figures and officials are much stricter and much 
more bound and closed than morals in private management. There are considerably less 
prohibitions limiting the actions and procedures of entrepreneurial management. In 
accordance with the formal rules of business life, the latter may give presents to each 
other, they may modify the conditions with mutual consent, may cancel deadlines, 
swallow up their competitors, etc. In public administration, already a promise for gifts 
counts as bribery, the conditions are binding for the administration, as well—by force of 
law-and the obligation of cooperation expressly prohibits the execution of any decision 
that might endanger the living conditions of the client. In the past few years quite a few 
successful businessmen got into high and the highest and positions in the administration 
in many countries from the United States to France, Italy, Austria and Hungary, with 
the aim of demonstrating the applicability of the new, more successful philosophy and 
12 KÖNIG, К.: "Neue" Verwaltung oder Verwaltungsmodemisierung, Verwaltungspolitik in den 90er Jahren, 
Die Öffentliche Verwaltung, 1995, No 9, 356. 
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ethics in public management. From the viewpoint of the present paper it is less 
interesting that they failed to reach this aim, and it is more important that the moral 
values and ethics represented by them proved to be everywhere intolerable for the 
politicians as well as for the population, the society. The reason for their rapid 
retirement from the government was that their ethics attained in entrepreneurial 
management proved inadmissible in public life, rather than the lack of success, although 
that was also the case sometimes. 
3. Beside the question of necessity of legal regulation, notwithstanding that over-
regulation is unnecessary, the fact that the applicability of economical methods in public 
administration has come into the forefront, beside the critical evaluation of the 
aggressive organizational management that is directed at other aims, the third element 
to study is, which also forms a border area between necessary and unnecessary things, 
how to constitute proper relationship between public management and politics. 
Politics, political parties see clearly the social significance of public management. 
They know that the state is to the most part consisted of administration, and that every 
political aim can only be realized with the help of administration. It can also be pointed 
out that the real aim of every political fight is to get the executive power. It has been 
proved, though, that if politics gain too much power over public administration then it 
will either result in the vanishing of state administration, or in the bureaucratization of 
politics. Therefore as a result of common efforts, a borderline was set up, one side of 
which is accorded to the empire politics without any conditions, but on the other side 
the technical, internal rules of public administration are in force. Of course, the line is 
being pushed towards one of the two territories depending upon the time and the nature 
of the relevant political system. But in every system and at every time commonly and 
exclusively applies that leading positions are distributed on the basis of political loyalty 
or service. It seems so that this is an expression of modesty and reservedness of politics, 
but considering that the person or group of persons on top of the hierarchy has influence 
over the entire administration, than the significance of this solution can be more 
realistically judged. 
This hidden greediness, because that is what the above mentioned modesty should 
be called, constitutes at the same time the sole guarantee for integrity of public 
administration. Politics prevent that the dangers envisioned by several generations of 
sociologists from Marx and Max Weber become grave: the danger of bureaucracy 
becoming l'art pour l'art, the impossibility to cease the growing of power, the birth of 
an enstrangered caste of bureaucrats. Politics, while intending to retain its supremacy, 
keeps a tight hand on public management and thus it prevents the administration from 
setting its own aims, and it also prevents that any social organization other than public 
administration exercises public functions. Bearing in mind the untamable greediness of 
private administration, one can be happy to know that there is a power in society, 
politics, that even if only for the sake of its own interests, precludes the extension of 
another danger, that is, the danger that state organs start to function in order to reach 
private aims. 
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4. About the future of public management, about the rest of its history only so much 
could be said that the basis of its existence, the need for settling public affairs keep on 
strengthening. Communal functions, the dangerous growth of population, further 
improvement of the internal complexity of production process, creation of international 
administration above the national framework that is in accordance with the urges of 
globalization, continuing urbanization require that public management be strengthened, 
and the quality of its work improved. The desire for a small state is an illusion, since 
it would result in, although it would have certain advantages too, social anarchy. Only 
a public administration fulfilling strong organizational and serving functions, subjected 
to strict social control, and in active cooperation with self-governing civil organizations 
can solve the problems faced by the states, federations of states and mankind in the 
close and far future. 
The other question is, whether to what extent public administration will differ from 
the one presently existing. This question has been discussed at numerous international 
conferences, but the answer was almost the same each time: it will be better, that is 
more accurate, more speedy, more understanding, more ready for cooperation, it will 
count much more on the contribution of citizens, etc. This aim will be reached through 
that its structure will be more clear, the internal division of labor will be more rational, 
the officials will be better trained. If one goes into details in interpreting prophecies, one 
recognizes that this is in accordance with the statement at beginning of the present 
paper, that I tried to prove in the course of the whole writing, namely that public 
management remains basically the same also in the future. This statement can be proved 
also with the lack of success of the planned reforms aiming to establish a matrix 
organization instead of the hierarchic structure of public administration and trying to 
fulfil public functions with nonprofessional members of civil organizations instead of 
capable and well-trained officials. The history of public administration seems to prove 
the view represented mainly by zoologists, ecologists, cultural anthropologists that 
change is not the sole guarantee of survival; sometimes it can be stability, as well. 
However, it would sound exaggerated to claim that there will be no significant 
differences between the presently existing system of public administration and those 
existed in past historic periods. The electronic information systems implemented in 
public management, the so-called electronic files stored in computers make the work 
quicker and more accurate than it used to be, when at the beginning work was done on 
silk ribbons, papyrus-rolls, clay-boards, later on they used sheets of paper with quill, 
then with ball-point pen, then with typewriter. Documents used to be stored in dark, 
musty rooms where it was extremely hard to find them if needed. Discussions connected 
with the rare research of future conducted in this field have not yet discovered whether 
the progress of the technical background ever results in any improvement in quality. It 
is a fact though, that the new era of administration predicted around the tum of the 
century has not arrived yet. The completely different system of public administration 
characteristic of postindustrial society that was about to develop between the world wars 
did not present itself, either. Thus it is probably reasonable to claim that it is really hard 
to imagine, that instead of the four or five thousands of years old institution of human 
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culture that had evolved in an organic manner and then for a short period it was 
organized consciously, a completely different system of managing communal affairs 
could be established. 
Public management is the same everywhere it has evolved since ancient times, and 
it is not likely to change in the future, either. Differences are rooted in the different 
points of view applied in several writings on public management, in the differing 
judgments of communal and individual values. Virtual processes indicate that where 
common interests prevail—regardless whether because of economic needs or for any 
other reason—strong public management evolves (see Egypt, China, later the states of 
enlightened absolutism). In societies preferring individual values either no public 
management was created (states of early feudalism), or only in imperfect form (Greek 
city-states, America in the 17th—19th centuries). By today, world has become uniform 
in this aspect: despite of all wishes, demands and conscious actions formulated and 
supported by literary, political, intellectual and entrepreneurial interest groups and 
international criminal gangs, exactly because of globalization of the world and because 
of the growing complexity of social problems, in reality the role of public admi-
nistration, that is the administration in the interest of the public keeps on growing 
continuously. 
Hungary follows the general line of development also in this aspect. This is a 
positive phenomenon that shall not be judged differently, with regard to the blustering 
of the above mentioned groups, lead by selfish motives. 
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In its decision on capital punishment the Constitutional Court has made the following 
points: 
The Constitutional Court should continue its work of interpretation in order to 
predicate the conceptual bases of the Constitution and of the rights embodied in it and 
to frame a coherent system of its judgements intended to serve as a sure measure of 
constitutionality, as an "invisible constitution" standing above the Constitution still often 
amended out of daily political interests, and therefore expected not to come into conflict 
with the new Constitution or any other constitutions to be adopted in future. In this 
procedure the Court will have freedom of action as long as it remains within the bounds 
of the notion of constitutionality. 
Under this concept, the decision of the Constitutional Court is deliberately subjective 
and is historically determined; even if the Court declares absolute values, it lays bare 
the meanings they convey for its own era, and its judgements on question of, e.g., 
capital punishment or abortion have no claim to eternal value even in principle.1 
In the course of preparing the new Constitution it is inevitable to take into account 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court, because they bring strong influence to bear 
on the exercise of the State's criminal jurisdiction despite the fact that the questions 
considered by the Court are not covered, or are treated inconsistently, by the text of 
Hungary's Constitution. On the other hand, it is a requirement for questions of criminal 
law to be governed by express provisions of the new Constitution, to be addressed not 
only by the invisible constitution. I believe that this desideratum is not in conflict with 
rule of law. 
1 Decision No. 23/1990. (X. 31.) of the Constitutional Court, 2180. 
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In this study I shall discuss two aspects of the relationship between constitution and 
criminal law. One concerns the relationship between international crimes and domestic 
law, while the other relates to the question of how the fundamental rights as set forth 
in the Constitution are protected and restricted by criminal law. I shall not address the 
provisions of the current Constitution on the right of asylum, as in their present wording 
they amount to a political declaration stating a legal absurdity. According to the current 
text, a person once granted asylum may never be extradited to anyone. The need for 
modification is obvious, but its modality calls for detailed analysis in connection with 
refugees.2 
I. International Crimes and Domestic Criminal Law 
1. That the courts apply the domestic criminal law was a doctrine treated as an axiom 
for centuries.3 Acting in international criminal cases, too, the courts applied the rules 
of internal criminal law (in judging piracy, for instance). Similarly treated as an axiom 
was the principle that international law governed relations of States inter se and with 
international organizations and that the individual was not a subject of international law. 
With the recognition by international law of the category of human rights and especially 
with the admissibility of individual action against violations of such rights, this 
proposition treated as an axiom is being challenged in several aspects. If the individual 
can have rights in international law, it is no longer an absurdity to trace criminal 
responsibility to international law. 
In another study of mine I have enlarged upon the arguments for distinguishing two 
categories of international crimes.4 The conclusion drawn in the summary was based 
on internal law in connection with one category of international crimes and was directly 
grounded in international law in connection with the other category thereof. Criminal 
responsibility for the latter crimes may be established by either an international or a 
domestic court. In view of Art. 57 of the Constitution in force, the question arises of 
how the legal material relating to international crimes can be fitted into the internal law. 
For this question to be answered it is necessary to review the positions about the 
sources of international law. 
2. For centuries, custom and treaty were the sources of international law. Treaties 
rested on the consensus of subjects at international law, with the common will expressed 
by the internal law of each contracting party. The operation of treaties was ensured by 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. The international law were once traced to natural 
2 Cf. WIENER, I. A.: Nemzetközi bűnügyi jogsegély (International Assistance in Criminal Matters), 
KJK-MTA ÁJI, Budapest, 1993, 25 et seq.; TÓTH, J.: Menedékjog - kérdőjelekkel (Right of Asylum, with 
Question-Marks), KJK, Budapest, 1994. 
3 WIENER: Op. cit., 130 et seq. 
4 WIENER, I. A.: Büntető joghatóság és nemzetközi jog (Criminal Jurisdiction and International Law), 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, XXXIII/3-4, 165 et seq. 
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law, but that concept was later replaced by the positivist approach; this was decisively 
influenced by the concordant will of States, which in turn was viewed in the context of 
international legal. Additional categories are found in the viewpoint making a distinction 
between constitutional principles, customs and conventions, which are typical sources 
of law, with the general principles of law constituting a supplementary source of law.5 
Accordingly the constitutional principles of international law form part of the 
international legal order, which is independent of the different subjects' own systems 
of law. The constitutional principles include the equality of sovereign States, the right 
to self-defence and such other basic principles as prevail without regard to the will of 
States. 
Customary international law is made up of two elements. One is actual practice and 
the other is the opinion (opinio juris) that this practice is legally necessary, giving 
normative force to customs. Customs is a source of law which binds any new subject 
of international law as well, with its operation requiring neither express declaration nor 
observance by every member of the international community. The practice of States has 
no limitation as to time, and even lack of response on their part means acceptance, 
whereas their objection is of relevance only when motivated by momentous interests. 
The practice of international courts plays an important role in moulding the shape 
of customary law, and their decisions are often accepted more widely than is the 
practice not supported by such decisions. The existence of customary law is not a matter 
of procedural law, so it is not subject to proof, but appears as part of the decisions 
given. The source of customary law is practice rather than pactum taciturn, as was 
professed by the socialist theory. Again, it is not a point at issue that the norms of 
customary law per definitionem may be strengthened by the content of treaties. 
The view is also held that treaties take precedence over customary law, with the 
exception of jus cogens rules, in the relationship of parties.6 Bernhardt maintains that 
the general principles of law are secondary to customary law, but this statement does 
not mean, even in his view, that the sources of international law are subject to a strict 
hierarchical order. He admits that numerous issues are in dispute and that the traditional 
views he sets out do not always conform with new opinions, but he does not consider 
the new categories to be generally accepted. Such a new category is what he calls soft 
law and conceives to be the forerunner of customary law. He classifies in this category 
the resolutions of different international organizations. 
In the Supplement for 1991 Bernhardt refers to the 27 June 1986 judgement of the 
International Court of Justice, in which the Court classes the decisions of international 
organizations among the sources of law and considers that its jurisdiction exists under 
customary law even if ruled out by treaty law. 
5 MONACO, R.: Sources of International Law (in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. I, North-
Holland, Amsterdam-London-New York-Tokyo, 1992, henceforth EPIL), 424-434. 
6 BERNHARDT, R.: Customary International Law (in: EPIL), 61-66. 
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Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes the general 
principles of law of civilized nations as constituting a source of law. These general 
principles may be stronger than the rules of treaty law or customary law because they 
formulate norms binding on all.7 By contrast, in Monaco's classification referred to 
above, the general principles of law are but a subsidiary source of law and serve to fill 
gaps in law. He considers that the non-retroactivity of legislation, the right of injured 
persons to damages, the prohibition of unjust enrichment, the guarantees of procedural 
law and responsibility for crime under criminal law are such general principles. 
Among the general principles Mosler distinguishes the principles of the logic of law, 
such as lex specialis derogat legi generalis, lex posterior derogat legi priori, nemo plus 
juris transferre potest quam ipse habet, which are generally accepted rules of inter-
pretation. He holds that the boundary between the rules of customary law and the 
general principles cannot always be drawn clearly and that bilateral and multilateral 
treaties are not superior, in the hierarchy of the sources of law, to customary law or the 
general principles. Prominent in the hierarchy of the sources of law are the rules of jus 
cogens, which, however, are present both in the general principles and in customary law. 
In 1951 the International Court of Justice pointed out, without mentioning the notion of 
jus cogens, that the principles set forth in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide are binding on States even in the absence of a 
commitment undertaken in the Convention to that effect.8 Although the practice of the 
International Court of Justice is not deemed to constitute a source of law because its 
decisions do not bind but the parties involved in a case, such judgements play an 
important role in the formation of customary law. Hence the source of law is 
constituted, not by the judgements themselves, but by the customary law as enforced in 
the judgements. 
The term general principles of law is used in various senses and is less susceptible 
of clear definition than a treaty or customary law as a source of law. These general 
principles may derive from both internal and international law. More recently they have 
tended to appear also in resolutions of international organizations, particularly in those 
of the United Nations General Assembly. Therefore, as regards the sources of law, a 
further problem is posed by the normative function of international organizations. Every 
international organization has its own system of law, and such systems do not generally 
form part of international law. The lawmaking power of international organizations is 
exercised within the organizations and their rules are binding for members. In more 
recent times, however, a growing role has been played by the rule-making function of 
the United Nations, which is yet to be assessed by international law. Also, still to be 
clarified is the relevance of different declarations (such as those on human rights, 
colonialism, environmental protection) to the sources of law. 
7 MOSLER, H.: General Principles of Law (in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. I.), op. cit. 
89-105. 
8 MOSLER: ibid., 96. 
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3. The jus cogens rule has been a disputed problem of our time since the adoption 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The force of jus cogens is equivalent 
to that of constitutional principles, and occasionally the term fundamental rule is also 
used in connection with them. Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides that a treaty is invalid from the moment of its conclusion if conflicts with the 
mandatory rules of general international law. This provision means the recognition of 
jus cogens. The position that the will of States was the most important and that the rules 
of customary international law might be annulled by that will was prevalent in 
international law in the first part of the 20th century. Earlier, known in literature on 
international law had been jus strictum and jus humánum as categories which had also 
governed the treaty-making practice. According to Heffter, treaties that are contrary to 
the moral order of the world and, in particular, to the mission of States to contribute to 
the development of human freedom are null and void.9 After World War Two the 
international community has realized the need for any legal order to be based on 
fundamental values which cannot be subjects of dispute within legal systems. In the 
practice of international courts this idea was expressed in the concept of erga omnes 
obligations. National courts have similarly recognized the existence of jus cogens. Thus, 
for instance, the Constitutional Court of Germany and the courts of the United States 
likewise invoke the jus cogens rules recognized by international law.10 
The norms that may be regarded as jus cogens rules of international law apply to 
cooperation between States, but the fundamental norms of international criminal law 
(e.g. the rules prohibitive of the slave trade, piracy and genocide) are also considered 
as such. These prohibitions are extended by the practice of international courts to racial 
discrimination. In Frowein's view, the rules on the criminal responsibility of the State 
are also jus cogens." 
4. The sources of international law regarding international crimes can be of basically 
two types. One is international treaty, in which a State undertakes to punish a certain 
course of conduct, and the other is customary international law (which may also be 
called the basic or general principle of international law), which deems it necessary for 
certain activities to be prosecuted under criminal law. The customary law relative to 
piracy, the slave trade and war crimes was traditionally one of this type. 
According to Schwarzenberger, the law applied by the Tribunal in the Nuremberg 
Trial was customary international law with respect war crimes and was a new treaty law 
with respect to crimes against peace and humanity.12 
The Statute of the International Tribunal set up pursuant to a decision of the 
Security Council sums up in four articles the crimes within the Tribunal's jurisdiction: 
9 HEFFTER, A. W.: Droit international public de l'Europe (1883), 192. 
10 FROWEIN, J. A.: Jus cogens (in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, VoL I.), op. cit.. 327-330. 
11 YILC 1980 II, 232. 
12 SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: The Problem of International Criminal Law (in: Current Legal Problems, 
1950), 291. 
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Art. 2 enumerates grave violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949 committed 
against persons and property protected by the relevant articles of the Convention; 
Art. 3 instances violations of the usages or laws of war; 
Art. 4 qualifies as genocide acts committed against a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group with the purpose of exterminating such a group wholly or in part; 
Art. 5 qualifies as crimes against humanity certain acts committed against the 
civilian population in an international or internal armed conflict.13 
While the decision of the Security Council may impose obligations on the Tribunal 
thus established as well as on States, it may not violate the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege. Therefore, from the point of view of individual responsibility, the decision of 
the Security Council represents no new law, but the compilation of conducts are 
punishable on the basis of customary international law.14 
The International Law Commission of the United Nations has for decades been 
dealing with preparations for the establishment of an International Criminal Court. In 
Part III the 1994 draft Statute of the Court covers the crimes within the Court's 
jurisdiction. As is stated in its Preamble, the example of genocide is indicative of the 
difficulty encountered in distinguishing crimes as covered by international treaty and by 
general international law. Notably genocide is defined by the Geneva Convention of 
1948, but it is nonetheless beyond question that genocide is a crime under international 
law. The Court's inherent jurisdiction extends to judging crimes under international law 
as enumerated in Art. 20, namely 
a) genocide, 
b) aggression, 
c) grave violations of laws and customs relative to armed conflicts, 
d) crimes against humanity. 
It is stated in the Preamble that the distinction made in paras, a) to d) is of 
particular relevance to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Although the Draft does 
not use the general category of crime under international law, the emphasis on the four 
crimes does not also mean a general denial of the category, it recognizes that the Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind undoubtedly contains several 
such crimes. According to the Preamble, the Commission, referring to the wording of 
para, a) of Art. 20, shares the widely accepted view that there exists a category of war 
crimes accepted in customary international law. That category is not identical with the 
definition given by the Geneva Convention. The modern view refers to rules applicable 
in armed conflicts rather than to the laws of war, and it uses the term "serious 
violation" in order to avoid confusion caused by the use of "grave breaches". 
13 Security Council Decision No. 827 (1993). 
14 A similar problem is addressed by MOHÁCSI, P .: "Compilation and Human Rights" (in: Finnish-
Hungarian-Estonian criminal law seminar on The New Aspects of the Rule of Law, September 7-9, 1993, 
Helsinki). 
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Para e) of Art. 20 refers to crimes enumerated in the Annex and, in the given case, 
qualifying as particularly grave crimes from the international point of view." 
Also, Art. 39 headed "nullum crimen sine lege" distinguishes two categories of 
international crimes. Accused persons may only be declared guilty if, at the time of its 
commission, the act (action or omission) 
a) was deemed to be a crime under international law in the cases covered by paras, 
a) to d) of Art. 20; 
b) came within the ambit of the relevant treaty in the case covered by para, e) of 
Art. 20. 
As regards para, e) of Art. 20, it is not enough that accused persons violated the 
provisions of the relevant treaty, but the applicability of the treaty as a law to their act 
should also be examined. Thus, for instance, if a citizen of State A committed an act 
violative of a treaty in the territory of that State, but State A was not a party to the 
treaty, the treaty formed no part of the law of that State. If, however, that citizen 
committed the act violative of the treaty in the territory of a State which was a party 
to the treaty, the invalidity of the treaty in the territory of the State of which he is a 
citizen is irrelevant. 
5. The independence of internal law of crimes under international law is recognized 
by the decision of the Constitutional Court along the following lines: Within its own 
system, international law requires that, at the time of their commission, crimes should, 
on the basis of the general principles recognized by the community of nations, be 
deemed to be war crimes or crimes against humanity in accordance with the rules called 
customary international law above. In the case of these crimes it is in fact the criminal 
jurisdiction of the international community that is exercised through the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Hungarian State subject to the conditions and guarantees determined 
by the community of nations. The national law is applicable to the extent expressly 
stated by international law (as is the case with, for instance, the scales of punishment). 
The national law cannot prevail over an express and jus cogens rule, different in 
content, of international law. 
As can be seen, the question of whether the Geneva Conventions were promulgated 
as prescribed or whether the Hungarian State complied with its obligation to enforce 
them before the time-limit set for the Act's application, namely before 23 October 1956, 
IS The relevant articles are contained in the following Conventions as referred to in para, e) of Art. 20. 
1) Grave violations of the Geneva Conventions; 
2) Hague Convention of 16 December 1970 on Highjacking; 
3) Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 on Acts against the Security of Aviation; 
4) Convention of 30 November 1973 on Apartheid; 
5) Convention of 14 December 1973 on Internationally Protected Persons; 
6) Convention of 17 December 1979 on the Taking of Hostages; 
7) Convention of 10 December 1984 Prohibiting Torture; 
8) Convention of 10 March 1988 on the Law of the Sea; 
9) Convention of 20 December 1988 on Narcotic Drugs. 
26 Imre A. Wiener 
is of no relevance. The perpetrators' responsibility under international law existed 
regardless of this, and it may be given effect in its original scope by an eventual 
domestic enactment of a later date. 
The rules relative to war crimes or crimes against humanity undoubtedly form part 
of customary international law, of the general principles recognized by the community 
of nations, or, in the language used by the Hungarian Constitution, of "the generally 
recognized rules of international law". According to the first sentence in Art. 7 (1) of 
the Constitution, these rules are "accepted" by Hungarian law, and they are consequently 
regarded as a part of the "obligations under international law" with no need for specific 
transformation or adaptation as their harmony with the internal law is similarly provided 
for by the second sentence of the paragraph cited above.16 
States have developed two techniques for the application of international in internal 
law. One is transformation, by which international law is made a part of internal law 
through internal law norms adopted from time to time. The other dispenses with concrete 
acts of internal legislation. The preparation of a new Constitution is accompanied by a 
debate on which technique should be chosen by the Hungarian Constitution. The debate 
revolves about only one category of international crimes, namely those covered by 
international treaty. Once criminal responsibility based on international law has been 
accepted no internal legislation to give effect to the principles guarantee of criminal law 
but the operation of domestic jurisdiction requires a sovereign decision of the State 
because criminal procedure is a manifestation of state sovereignty.17 The type of state 
act required for expression of state sovereignty is an internal matter of constitution-
making. It may be decided on by Parliament as the highest repository of state 
sovereignty, by the Government as the organ responsible for domestic crime control or 
by the judicature as an independent branch of power. In Hungary this decision was 
made by Act XC of 1993 in regard to crimes committed in a certain period, and Art. 
2 of that Act did no more than widen the scope within which the Geneva Conventions 
are constitutionally applicable, irrespective of future legislation, through the binding 
force of the Constitutional Court 's decision.18 
While interpretation of the Constitution is a function of the Constitutional Court, it 
is a right and a duty of Parliament with constitution-making powers to resolve 
contradictions between constitutional provisions. These powers cannot be exercised by 
the Constitutional Court." 
It would be necessary, therefore, to amend Art. 57 (4) of the current Constitution 
to spell out that no conduct other than that declared by Hungarian law to be a criminal 
offence may be regarded as criminal. Furthermore, some other article should also 
16 Decision No. 53/1993. (X. 13.) of the Constitutional Court. 
17 GRÜTZNER, H.: International Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in: A Treatise 
on International Criminal Law (M. C. BASSIOUNI and V. P. NANDA, eds., 1973), Vol. II, 180. 
18 Decision No., 53/1993. (X. 13.) of the Constitutional Court. 
19 Ibid., 2178. 
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determine the organ empowered to decide on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in 
regard to crimes under international law. If that organ is the legislature and the form of 
decision is a law, the act of legislation will not, in this case, implement the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege, but will merely resolve a problem affecting the sphere of 
authority at the state level. 
It is hereby proposed that the phrase "under Hungarian law" should be omitted from 
the wording of Art. 57 (4), whereas the provision of the Criminal Code on its scope of 
application should be worded in accordance with the rules of the human rights con-
ventions prohibitive of retroactivity and the rules of criminal procedure should include 
a provision empowering the Metropolitan Court to judge crimes of international law. By 
doing so the State would express its exercise of criminal jurisdiction over crimes under 
international law, while freeing their prosecution from the parliamentary effects of daily 
politics. 
II. Constitutional Fundamental Rights and Criminal Law 
1. The question arises, with respect to all of the constitutional fundamental rights, 
whether it is possible, and under what conditions, to restrict those rights and what 
criteria should be used for establishing priority in case of their collision. 
Art. 8 of the Constitution states that "the Republic of Hungary shall recognize man's 
fundamental rights inviolable and inalienable, and it shall be a prime duty of the State 
to respect and protect those rights. Theerules establishing fundamental rights and duties 
shall be laid down by law", but the essential content of fundamental rights must be 
subject to no restrictions. 
The State may not resort to restricting a fundamental right except when protection 
or implementation of another fundamental right or freedom, or protection of another 
constitutional value cannot be secured by other means. So, for restriction of a 
fundamental right to be constitutional, it is not sufficient for restriction to be required 
by protection of another fundamental right or freedom, or in the interest of another 
constitutional goal, but restriction should meet the criteria of proportionality, namely the 
importance of the desired goal and the extent of prejudice caused to a fundamental right 
in pursuit of the former should be duly proportional. In imposing a restriction the 
legislator must use the softest means best suited to attain the given goal. Restricting the 
content of a right is unconstitutional if done without an imperative cause or in an 
arbitrary manner, or if the extent of restriction is disproportionate to the desired goal.20 
The Hungarian Constitution uses the expression "fundamental rights" as the generic 
term of the rights referred to in the European Convention as human rights and 
freedoms.21 Member States thus have a certain margin of appreciation concerning the 
20 Decision No. 31/1992. (V. 26.) of the Constitutional Court, 1910. 
21 BÁRD К.—BÁN, T.: Az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezménye és a magyar jog (The European Convention 
on Human Rights and Hungarian Law), Ada Humana. 1992, No. 6-7, 9. 
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need to restrict them in a democratic state. The European Court of Human Rights 
controls the need for restriction by using the so-called necessity test.22 Application of 
a criminal sanction necessarily means restriction of a fundamental right. The framework 
for protection by criminal law is therefore created as a result of deliberation. In using the 
necessity test it should be examined whether there is a need for restriction, namely for 
regulation by criminal law, whether restriction is proportional and appropriate to attaining 
the purposes of punishment. In this context, judgement is influenced by the existence or 
absence of social consensus in declaring an act to be a criminal offence, by the group of 
people affected by and opposed to criminal responsibility. On the international plane, it 
should be examined whether there is a generally held view in this respect and whether 
the related community interests are similarly protected at least in a similar cultural 
environment. It is necessary to examine the moral content of an act, which may differ 
from the average in respect of, say, professional negligence. It is necessary to consider 
the extent to which restriction is apt to achieve the puipose of punishment under criminal 
law (e.g. abortion, alcoholism, drug addiction). Finally, it is necessary to consider the 
ultima ratio nature of criminal law (whether other means are sufficient).23 
2. While the Constitution in force does not expressly formulate the obligation to 
prosecute crime, several of its provisions refer to the obligation to protect values, even 
by exercising criminal jurisdiction: 
— under Art. 35 (1) the Government must protect the constitutional order, protect 
and ensure the rights of citizens; 
— under Art. 50 (1) the courts must protect and ensure the constitutional order as 
well as the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and must punish the perpetrators 
of criminal offences; 
— under Art. 51 (1) the Chief Prosecutor and the Prosecutor's Office must be 
concerned to protect the rights of citizens and to consistently prosecute any acts 
violating or endangering the constitutional order and national security and independence. 
These brief provisions of the current Constitution are counterbalanced by the 
invisible constitution's explanations about the sanction of criminal law. Accordingly the 
role and function of criminal law sanctions consist in upholding the integrity of legal 
and moral norms when the sanctions of other branches of law are insufficient: 
— the punishment intended to protect the integrity of law has a symbolic function, 
notably the commands of criminal law must not be violated even if one has a cause to 
do so or if the punishment fails to achieve, or is unfit to achieve any particular purpose. 
The purpose of punishment is in itself, namely in the public declaration of the integrity 
of law, in relation regardless of purpose; 
— the principle of proportional punishment is the only possible one in a constitutional 
state for the added reason that it alone is consistent with the idea of equality before the 
22 BÁRD-BÁN: ibid., 125-126. 
23 KREMNITZER, M.: Constitutional Principles and Criminal Law (Israel Law Review, Volume 27, No. 
1-2), 87 et seq. 
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law. Any other consideration would mean the declaration of inequality, for the individual 
would perform regard his personal status, rather than the act, as the yardstick for punish-
ment—stated in a parallel opinion.24 
In another parallel opinion, the criminal jurisdiction of the State undoubtedly 
restricts man's freedom of decision, thus operating as a limitation upon human dignity 
in a certain measure, while it allows scope for a new positive moral established norm 
may be freely accepted and observed and that such a decision has a moral value. It is 
nevertheless a fact that just as human freedom is both a limit to and a precondition for 
social existence, a State-protected norm is a limitation to a moral value and is therefore 
in place only where necessary, and to the extent required, for protecting the life and 
freedom of individuals (life being understood here as comprising all preconditions for 
social existence). Therefore according to this parallel opinion, that punishment is 
acceptable only in this goal-directed sense and loses justification as soon as it becomes 
unsuitable for achieving its purpose. 
Since the criminal jurisdiction of the State is not uniformly interpreted even by the 
members of the Constitutional Court, this in itself or the limitations of jurisdiction do 
not lend themselves to deducing the admissibility or inadmissibility of capital 
punishment. For centuries it has been an implicitly accepted principle, a constitutional 
one, of criminal law that punishment has a preventive purpose serving to suppress 
attacks on protected social values. Punishment can only be effective where, and to the 
extent that, it is suited to its purpose, and it loses its legal basis when unable to serve 
that purpose or able to serve it at the price of a greater injury than the one it is meant 
to prevent.25 
What has been stated in connection with the purpose of punishment, regardless of 
whether there is a consensus among the members of the Constitutional Court on this 
issue, can at most be considered as a scientific opinion seeking to assist the transition 
to a constitutional state, but I do not believe in the existence of a principle of 
punishment serving as the basis for "the only possible punishment in a constitutional 
state". There is a voluminous literature on the purposes of punishment, and the 
proportional or educational trends are changing by place and period.26 Indeed, Art. 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights is concerned with the quality of 
punishment applied rather than with the purpose of punishment pursued, and it gives no 
positive wording of punishment, but merely prohibits acts of inhuman and degrading 
punishment. Therefore I am of the view that formulation of the purposes of punishment 
is not a question for the Constitution to cover. 
24 Decision No. 23/1990. (X. 31.) of the Constitutional Court. 2186. 
25 Decision No. 23/1990. (X. 31.) of the Constitutional Court, 2187. 
26 Interesting studies on this subject are contained in Criminal Law Theory in Transition. Finnish and 
Comparative Perspectives (edited by R. LAHTI—K. NUOTIO), Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company, 
Helsinki, 1992. 
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3. In one of its decisions27 the Constitutional Court uses the term constitutional 
criminal law, and the use of this term has also probably made for the failure to duly 
separate questions of constitutional and criminal law in analyzing the problems that have 
emerged. Yet it is necessary for both constitutional and criminal law to resolve problems 
of codification and interpretation of law by using terms of their respective systems. 
During the period of transition it may be acceptable that in the course of its work the 
Constitutional Court takes a broader view of interpreting the Constitution, and such 
interpretation may be of help in elaborating the concept of a new Constitution, but once 
the new Constitution has been adopted, it will be necessary to interpret that Constitution 
instead of the invisible one. Delimitation of problems affecting constitutional and 
criminal law assumes particular importance for the added reason that the Constitutional 
Court has recently handed down decisions addressing questions of criminal law not only 
from the standpoint of constitutional law. 
In examining restriction by means of criminal law of the freedom of expression the 
Constitutional Court has maintained that constitutionality should be considered in 
conjunction with observance of the constitutional precepts relating to the entire system 
of criminal law. The source of those precepts is in the concept of constitutional 
criminal law and in the set of requirements deriving from a constitutional state as a 
fundamental value for the exercise by the State of criminal jurisdiction, including the 
limitations on substance and the formal requisites of criminal legislation. In this 
context the Decision referred to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights-adopted by the 21st Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 16 
December 1966 and promulgated by Law-Decree No. 8 of 1976—, which embodies the 
freedom of thought [Art. 18 (1)] and the right to the freedom of expression [Art. 19 
(2)]. It pointed out, furthermore, that exercise of the rights contained in the freedom of 
expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Hence it may be subject to 
certain limitations, but these must only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others or b) for the protection of 
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. Again, the Decision 
quoted para. 2 of Art. 20, under which "any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law". Then it referred to the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which carries a legal obligation for the 
Hungarian State and was promulgated by Law-Decree No. 1 of 1969; under Art. 4 of 
the Convention, States Parties must declare propagation of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred to be an offence punishable by law. 
To sum up the position of the Constitutional Court, limitations on the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of the press are required and justified both by the 
historically proven harmful effect of hatred against specific group of people and by 
protection of constitutional fundamental values and fulfilment of the international 
27 Decision No. 42/1993. (VI. 30.). 
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obligations of the Republic of Hungary.28 Consequently the conduct penalized by Art. 
269 (1) of the Criminal Code29 threatens individual rights, too, which thus give such 
weight to the public peace as the direct object that restriction of the freedom of 
expression can be viewed as necessary and proportional. 
The Constitutional Court held that in codifying Art. 269 (2) the Criminal Code had 
started from the fact that use of derogatory expressions with respect to national or 
religious communities was generally contrary to the desirable tranquillity of society. 
This definition of the immaterial facts of the offence thus protects public order, the 
public peace, social peace in themselves, in an abstract way. The crime is also deemed 
to be committed when the derogatory expression does not, under the circumstances, 
carry the danger of prejudice to individual rights. Such abstract threat to the public 
peace is an insufficient argument in favour of constitutionally restricting the freedom 
of expression by punishment under criminal law. 
The Decision states that the right to the freedom of opinion protects opinion without 
regard to its content of value and truth, yet Art. 269 (2) places no external limitation, 
but actually qualifies on the basis of the value-content of opinion, to which disturbance 
of the public peace is only linked by assumption and statistical probability. 
Maintenance of the public peace does not inevitably require the law to threaten with 
punishment under criminal law the use in the presence of others of insulting or 
derogatory expressions with respect to the Hungarian nation, a nationality, a people, a 
religious or a racial group (or the commission of other similar act). This statutory 
definition of the pertinent facts restricts the right to the freedom of expression 
unnecessarily and in a manner disproportionate to the desired goal. An abstract, eventual 
threat to the public peace gives insufficient cause for the Criminal Code to place 
limitations, as determined by Art. 269 (2), on the fundamental freedom of expression, 
which is indispensable for the functioning of a democratic, constitutional state.30 
The Decision of the Constitutional Court has stated, furthermore, that "racial" 
incitement is prohibited by criminal law in all democratic countries of Europe with a 
continental system of law and, on the territories of Anglo-Saxon law, in England and 
Wales, Canada and New-Zealand. However, drawing the appropriate boundaries between 
incitement, hatred and the freedom of expression is a source of considerable debates in 
28 Decision No. 30/1992. (V. 26.) of the Constitutional Court, 1912. 
29 Art. 269. (1) Whoever in wide publicity incites to hatred against 
a) the Hungarian nation or some nationality, 
b) some nation, religion or race, furthermore certain groups of the population, commits a felony and is 
punishable with deprivation of liberty up to three years. 
(2) Whoever in wide publicity uses an expressive offensive or degrading to the Hungarian nation or some 
nationality, nation, religion or race, or commits other such conducts, is punishable for a misdemeanour with 
deprivation of liberty up to one year, community service or fine. (This paragraph was abolished by the decision 
of the Constitutional Court [30/1992. (V. 26) AB határozat)]. 
30 Decision No. 30/1992. (V. 26.) of the Constitutional Court, 1913-1915. 
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the international arena as well.31 For this reason, too, it is not certain that Art. 269 (2) 
will stand the necessity test. In point of fact, the Constitutional Court proceeds from the 
assumption that the right to the freedom of expression protects opinion without regard 
to its content of value and truth. 
This statement—in my opinion—not only runs counter to the provisions of Covenant 
Art. 20 (2), but para. (1) thereof spells out that any propaganda for war must be 
prohibited by law. In my view, then, the freedom of expression is not independent of 
value-content. Moreover freedom without a content of truth is open to doubt on the 
basis of the arguments advanced in the following decision of the Constitutional Court. 
4. Manifestation of opinion expressing a value-judgement apt to injure the honour of 
an authority or an official, or a politician acting in the public view in its/his capacity as 
such is not constitutionally punishable. Allegation or spreading of facts fit to impair 
honour or use of a term directly referring to such facts is punishable only if the person 
alleging or spreading facts fit to impair honour, or directly referring to such facts was 
aware that his allegation was untrue in content or was unaware of its untruth because, 
under the rules of his profession or occupation, he failed to show the diligence that could 
be expected of him with respect to the object, means and target of his allegation.32 
According to the Decision, the constitutional boundaries of the freedom of ex-
pression should be established by taking into consideration, along with the subjective 
right of the person expressing opinion, the interest attached to the formation or free 
creation of public opinion and indispensable for democracy. The right to the freedom 
of expression is not only a fundamental subjective right, but also recognition of its 
objective, institutional aspect, while serving as a guarantee for public opinion as a 
fundamental political institution. 
Although the distinguished role of the right to the freedom of expression does not 
imply that this right is unrestrictable, as are the rights to life and to human dignity, it 
certainly means that this freedom actually has to yield to very few rights, namely the 
laws placing limitations on the freedom of expression should be interpreted restrictively. 
A restrictive law, when considered against the freedom of opinion, carries a greater 
weight if it directly serves to ensure observance and protection of another fundamental 
subjective right; it has a smaller weight if it protects such a right only indirectly, 
through the medium of an "institution"; and its weight is smallest when it serves nothing 
but an abstract value in itself. 
The right to the freedom of expression protects opinion without regard to its content 
of value and truth. It is subject to external limitations only. Unless it exceeds such 
external limits constitutionally imposed, it is the very possibility and fact of expressing 
opinion that is afforded protection without regard to its content. In other words, what 
enjoys constitutional protection is expression of individual opinion, public opinion 
shaped by its own laws and, in interaction with the former, the possibility of forming 
3 1 Ibid., 1909. 
32 Decision No. 36/1994. (VI. 24.) of the Constitutional Court, 2511. 
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individual opinion based on as wide a range of information as possible. The Constitution 
ensures free communication (individual conduct and the social process), and the 
fundamental right to the freedom of expression is unrelated to the content thereof. In 
this process there is a place for every opinion, good and harmful, pleasant and offensive 
alike, especially by reason of the fact that the qualification of opinion is itself a product 
of this process. 
The criminal law means of protecting honour restrict the freedom of expression in 
defence of the constitutional values of the rights to human dignity and to reputation. 
Under Art. 54 (1) of the Constitution, every human being has the inherent right to 
life and dignity. Since Decision No. 8/1990. (IV. 23.) [ABH 1990, 42] was handed 
down, the practice of the Constitutional Court has conceived of the right to human 
dignity as a "general personality right". The general personality right is a "parent right", 
i.e. a subsidiary fundamental right which both the Constitutional Court and the ordinary 
courts may always invoke in defence of the individual's autonomy if none of the 
qualified fundamental rights can be applied to the pertinent facts of a particular case. 
This—in my view—statement affects questions of detail explicitly of criminal law and 
is in conflict with the dogmatic system of the relevant part of criminal law. The 
dogmatic system functions well only if free from contradictions. 
5. In this Decision33 the Constitutional Court touches on specifically criminal law 
issues which it will be impossible for it to take concern with not only under the current 
Constitution, but also under the "invisible" and, hopefully, the new Constitution now in 
the making. 
As is stated in the Decision, the perpetrator's acts include alleging or spreading, in 
the presence of others, facts objectively apt to injure honour, or using terms directly 
referring to such facts (henceforth called "statement of facts"), or using terms or 
committing acts objectively apt to injure honour (henceforth called "value-judgement"). 
The act can only be committed with intent: commission through negligence is not 
punishable by law. For willful commission to be established it is necessary that the 
perpetrator be mindful that the statement of facts or the value-judgement is made in the 
presence of others, refers to an official or one representing an authority and is objec-
tively apt to injure the honour of the official or, through insulting him, that of the 
authority. Guilt is not conditional on intent to insult, and the motive of the act can be 
judged, not in establishing guilt, but in meting out punishment. 
In examining the constitutionality of regulation by criminal law it is of particular 
relevance that the untruth of facts apt to injure honour is not a pertinent element of the 
criminal offence, so statement of facts, whether true or untrue, is deemed to be a crime. 
Establishment of guilt does not require awareness of the untruth of facts, so error 
concerning the truth of facts is indifferent to criminal law. Likewise indifferent to the 
commission of the crime is the perpetrator's "good or bad faith", his diligence or 
33 Decision No. 36/1994. (VI. 24.) of the Constitutional Court, 2511-2513. 
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negligence in ascertaining the truth of facts. The perpetrator is not relieved of criminal 
responsibility either by due foresight or by "bona fide" error. 
Protection of the honour of officials is an aspect of the inalienable and unrestrictable 
right to human dignity. Among the fundamental rights relating to the person's social 
appreciation Art. 59 (1) of the Constitution mentions only the right to reputation, but 
there is no doubt that honour as emanating from the parent right to human dignity 
similarly enjoys the protection of a fundamental right under Art. 54. Although only an 
official representing an authority can have human dignity, an authority may also lay 
claim to a favourable value-judgement of or appreciation by society. 
Its consideration, in their interrelationships, of the constitutional protection of human 
dignity, honour and reputation, of the right to the freedom of expression and of the 
constitutional interest attaching to the freedom to discuss public affairs has led the 
Constitutional Court to conclude that the freedom of expression may only be subject to 
a smaller degree of restriction in defence of the exercise of public power. For the 
protection of the honour of authorities and officials the means of criminal law that are 
strictest in the regime of responsibility may not be used constitutionally except in cases 
outside the sphere of the freedom of expression. 
According to the Decision the Constitution makes no express distinction between 
statements of facts and value-judgements in spelling out the freedom of expression. The 
freedom of expression is basically aimed to enable individuals to shape the opinion of 
others, to convince others of their own position. Therefore it generally includes the 
freedom to communicate anything, regardless of the manner and value of communication, 
its moral quality and usually its content of truth. Statement of a fact may be itself 
qualified as opinion, for opinion may also be reflected by the circumstances of 
communication, that is, the constitutional fundamental right to express opinion is not 
limited to value-judgements. In drawing the boundaries of the freedom of expression, 
however, it is justified to make a distinction between value-judgements and statements 
of facts. 
The freedom of expression always includes value-judgements, the personal opinion 
of individuals, irrespective of whether they are valuable or worthless, true or false, or 
arc based on emotion or reason. Nevertheless, human dignity, honour and reputation, 
which are equally protected by the Constitution, may place external limitations on the 
freedom of expression as manifested in a value-judgement, and giving effect to criminal 
responsibility in the interest of protecting them cannot, on the whole, be regarded as 
disproportionate and hence unconstitutional. 
Yet the Constitutional Court maintains that the Constitution accords increased 
protection to value-judgements voiced in conflicting views on public affairs, even if 
such views may be exaggerated and extravagant. 
Again, protection of society's peace and democratic development does not need 
the intervention of criminal law against criticisms of or negative judgements on the 
activities of authorities and officials that are manifested in the form of insulting or 
defamatory statements or conduct. The view, set out in Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 30/1992. (V. 26.), that shaping public opinion and the political style 
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by criminal law penalties is a paternalist approach holds for this case as well (ABH 
1992, 180). 
What has gone before may be viewed and disputed in the way of appraisal based 
on the necessity test, but the points to be made below concern a problem of criminal 
dogmatics which, given the subjective aspects involved, is not a matter of constitutional 
law. 
6. In the view of the Constitutional Court the freedom of expression does not 
include statements of untrue facts apt to injure honour if the person uttering a libel is 
positively mindful of the untruth or if, under the rules governing the exercise of his 
profession or occupation, he could have been expected to ascertain the truth of facts, but 
he failed to use diligence in his responsible exercise of the freedom of expression. 
The Constitutional Court has held that the unconstitutionality of the criminal law is 
not ruled out by the possibility to prove the truth of statement.34 Regulation by 
criminal law is based on the presumption of untruth. My comment on this line of 
reasoning is that regulation by criminal law is based, not on the presumption of untruth, 
but on the objective, not subjective, criteria of aptness to injure honour. 
The Constitutional Court maintains that the admissibility of defence with the truth 
under the burden of proof not only means prohibition of deliberate utterances of 
falsehood, but is also apt to discourage persons from criticizing the activity of those 
exercising public power. The possibility to prove the truth does not counterbalance 
unnecessary and disproportionate limitations on the freedoms of expression and the 
press, does not substitute for constitutional protection in case of stating facts, either true 
or reasonably believed to be true, but apt to injure the honour of an official. 
In case of proving the truth the general rule for evidence, following from the 
presumption of innocence, a constitutional basic principle of criminal law, turns round, 
that is, the burden of proof is borne by the person against whom proceedings are taken. 
The perpetrator's punishability is excluded by nothing but the proven truth. His guilt 
must be established if the proceeding authority has not satisfied itself that the fact stated 
is true in content. The consequences of the impossibility to prove the truth of facts are 
suffered by the person against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted, and the 
presumption of innocence does not prevail in this case. 
The Decision has stated that, with respect to exercise of public power or to actors 
of public life, disclosure of true facts should always be deemed to be in the public 
interest even if such disclosure is apt to damage the social appreciation of those persons, 
and appraisal thereof cannot be left to the authority proceeding in criminal cases.35 
34 Proving the Truth 
Art. 182 (1) The perpetrator can not be punished for the crimes defined in Aits. 179-181 (Libel and 
Slander, Defamation, Profanation of the Memory of the Deceased) if the fact fit to impair the honour proves 
to be true. 
(2) Proving the truth is admissible where the assertion, spreading of facts or the usage of a term directly 
referring to such was motivated by public interest or by anyone's lawful interest. 
35 Decision No. 36/1994. (VI. 24.) of the Constitutional Court, 2516-2518. 
36 Imre A. Wiener 
7. The statement made in the dissenting opinion about the question of consti-
tutionality points out the following: the ordinary courts may, by relying on the present 
set of conditions for proving the truth, constitutionally decide whether a particular case 
involves the freedom of expression or an act offending the private sphere and dangerous 
to society. The content of "public interest" and "anyone's lawful interest" is evolved by 
the practice of ordinary courts; under it, the closer the sphere of civil relations affected 
by a statement of facts is to public life the wider is the protection of the public interest 
or of lawful private interests, on the basis of which the truth can be said, and the closer 
it is to private life the smaller is the possibility to prove the truth. 
Moreover it is for the system of criminal law to regulate the objective and subjective 
elements of responsibility and for criminal procedure to judge individual cases. The 
unlawfulness of defamation (and insult) may be excluded on an objective basis if social 
appreciation attaches greater importance to the statement of fact or the expression of 
opinion than to the protection of the injured person's honour. The provisions of Art. 17 
of Statute XLI of 1914 provided a statutory example of this.36 In our days judicial 
practice has excluded the unlawfulness of defamation and insult in connection with 
numerous circumstances (e.g. expert or scientific opinion, giving evidence for 
authorities, fulfil educational duties).37 In these cases the only limit to statements of 
facts or expressions of opinion is set by the punishment of the use defamatory terms, 
because use of such terms, insulting in themselves, is punishable in these cases as well. 
If the Constitutional Court wishes to attach similar importance to public or political 
activities, it would have had to invite the legislator or the ordinary courts to regulate the 
causes excluding similar cases of unlawfulness, because the causes excluding unlaw-
fulness come into play in the stage preceding the institution of criminal proceedings. 
Aptness to injure honour as well as the circumstances in which facts are stated or opinion 
is expressed can be objectively considered before the institution of proceedings, such 
consideration needing no hearing. 
Failure to show diligence, or negligence as indicated in the Constitutional Court's 
Decision can only be examined within the framework of criminal proceedings. Since 
proceedings in such cases are usually instituted by private indictment, effective 
protection to the critic can only be accorded by a criminal law solution that does not 
allow criminal proceedings to be taken against the critic, for, as is commonly known, 
what in a case liable to prosecution by private indictment is important for the private 
prosecutor is not the punishment, usually minimal, meted out by the court, but the fact 
36 "(1) Establishment of defamation or insult shall be excluded if the statement of a fact or the use of a term 
directly referring to a fact occurred orally or in a document during the hearing of the case before the authority 
in relation to the case and the party thereto. 
(2) This same rule shall apply to other similar declaration made by the party to Ute case or by his 
representative orally or in a document during the hearing of such a case, provided that the declaration is related 
to the case and was necessary in the interest of the party." 
37 Cf. A Büntető Törvénykönyv magyarázata (Comments on the Criminal Code) KJK, Budapest, 1986, 
532-533. 
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that the critic can be brought into a defendant's position. Since that position is by itself 
necessarily an injury to the personality right—which is conditional on the particular 
conduct being a criminal offence—, the rules of criminal law should be formulated in 
such a way as to prevent such injury as well. It is this objective situation for which a 
circumstance excluding unlawfulness can be created by applying the necessity test. 
In my view systematizing and operating the conditions for criminal responsibility 
in substantive and procedural law is not a matter of constitutional law. It would 
therefore be advisable to separate problems affecting constitutional law and the internal 
systems of other branches of law. As such separation applies to both legislation and 
jurisdiction, it would seem reasonable to empower the Constitutional Court to examine 
the constitutionality of jurisdiction as well. Such practice might prevent an intermix of 
matters pertaining to constitutional and criminal law and ensure reversal of the 
proportion of majority/minority views in the decisions handed down by the Court. Given 
its lack of competence, the Constitutional Court may not examine the constitutionality 
of decisions taken by jurisdiction, but this is no sufficient cause for its annulling a law 
or regulation that may be applied harmony with or contrary to the Constitution. 
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Imre TAKÁCS Second Chamber of the Legislature 
The assertion that the constitution's function transcends the boundary of regulating 
public power appears to be a commonplace in the literature on the subject. In a legal 
sense the constitution is a fundamental law, but in a sociological sense it is also a basic 
law which governs the order of society, has its roots in the past and forms part of the 
public mind and consciousness of national identity. The constitution's regulatory, 
organizational, protective and educational functions are not fulfilled by serving the 
present, but, by expressing the fundamental values of society, they also promise the new 
generations the predictability of the future. Rising to poetic heights, the authors on this 
field go so far as to spell out people's desire to see in the constitution a guarantee for 
the realization of their hopes. 
We should not be deceived by the nationalism of our age and the international 
process of integration apparently working against national constitutions. Although the 
legal systems are "blended" by the harmonization of laws, a limit to such interference 
is set by the degree of necessity. In contrast to "Frederick the Great of Brussels", 
today's self-conscious miller of Sansouss may invoke the principle of subsidiarity 
before the court of Luxembourg. 
Among the branches of law it is constitutional law that has the closest attachment 
to national traditions. Nothing is derogated from its value if, while being capable of 
changing in substance, it preserves public-law "relics" of the past, even though such 
relics are often confined to maintaining certain forms of organization or certain 
designations of merely symbolic significance. Every society moulds the shape of its 
constitutional institutions on the basic of its own internal development, under the 
guidance of politics, but by forming a consensus of opinion with the help of cultural 
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and spiritual factors that are at work in society, yet seeking to learn and to rely on 
the experience of the other countries, while striving for progress and modernization, 
preserving and transmitting those of the traditions which have proved their worth. 
I have made these preliminary remarks in order to substantiate the argument that in 
the presentday process of Hungarian constitution-making the endeavours to establish a 
second chamber of the legislature cannot dispense with a comparative and historical 
analysis, which is attempted by this study. 
I. On the Second chamber of the Legislature 
I believe it would be mistaken to look on the case for establishing a second chamber 
of the legislature simply as an emotional need for adherence to national traditions. A 
second chamber within the legislature based on the principle of popular representation 
was generally regarded as a conservative element in the aspirations to democratization 
during the great periods of constitution-making in the wake of revolutions and wars. It 
was increasingly difficult, even within the framework of gradual transformations 
preserving the continuity of constitutional law, to justify limitations on the competence 
of the first chamber materializing political representation. 
This is well illustrated by the example of the British Parliament. The upper house, 
existing as a separate entity from the middle of the 14th century, came to lose its weight 
in government by comparison to the lower house, which was growing in importance. 
The role of the legislative body as a whole is unaffected by the fact that the highest 
judicial organ is built into its organization and functions under the same name. After the 
rise of bourgeois society in England the House of Lords acted as a counterweight of the 
conservative elite to the elected House of Commons. Under the Parliament Act of 1911 
the House of Lords cannot act as a brake in legislation, yet its mere existence serves to 
bar the way to the emergence of the dictatorship of the majority. Not even the fact that 
the King's/Queen's speach opening the Parliament's session is delivered in the House 
of Lords may be considered to be a simple act of ceremony. 
The trend to abolition (or further restriction) of second chambers has emerged 
after World War Two. The unicameral system is mainly characteristic of smaller 
states. 
The legislature is unicameral in Malta (from 1947), New Zealand (from 1950), 
Denmark (from 1953), Sweden (from 1970), Sri Lanka (from 1972), Portugal (from 
1974). It was originally unicameral in Costa Rica (1821), Luxembourg (1814), Greece 
(1864, except in 1927-36), Finland (1906) and Israel (1948). In Luxembourg the rights 
of the traditional chamber are exercised in part by the Council of State. 
In view also of the size of states, the bicameral system is similarly maintained in 
a considerable number of countries, the most evident reason lying in federation, on the 
basic of which the second chamber in the United States, Germany, Canada, Switzerland, 
India, etc. serves to ensure the representation of constituent states in the legislature. 
However, the bicameral structure of constituent states cannot be correlated with the 
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principle of federation. The legislature is unicameral only in Nebraska of the United 
States, whereas it is bicameral in Queensland of Australia, in 7 of India's 22 constituent 
states and in Bavaria of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Georg Brunner distinguishes three models of establishing the representation of 
constituent states: 
— the principle of direct election (in Australia, from 1913 in the United States); in 
Switzerland the Federal Constitution referred the regulation of elections to the 
competence of the cantonal legislature, which gradually led to the prevalence of this 
principle; direct election gained general currency in 1977; 
— the principle of indirect election is more difficult to substantiate in theory; this 
procedure prevails in Australia and India; in the latter, 12 out of the 243 members of 
the House of States are appointed by the Head of State from among representatives of 
cultural life; 
— the composition of the Federal Council in Germany is fully based on executive 
power under the Constitution, which gives effect to the principle of federation through 
this representative organ of the provincial governments (doubly indirect election). 
The principle of equality of constituent states is consistently implemented in the 
United States, Switzerland and Australia, where each constituent state may delegate an 
equal number of representatives to the second chamber. In Italy, Austria and India the 
ratio of representatives varies with the size of the population, with some preference 
given to provinces with small populations. 
The composition of the House of Lords in England is not based on the principle of 
representation, but a specified quality is the criterion of membership. Recent develop-
ment has placed increased emphasis on life appointment. Candidates are appointed for 
life peerage by the King/Queen on the proposal of the Prime Minister. Since the Life 
Peerages Act of 1958 was passed, peerage by hereditary right has only been granted 
in exceptional cases. Therefore, apart from the membership of the 26 bishops by /irtue 
of office and from Law Lords, appointments may also be motivated by political 
considerations. 
Most closely akin to the British second chamber was in all certainty the Hungarian 
Table of Magnates up to 1918. The reform in 1926 of the Upper House introduced some 
elements of senate in the second chamber. The establishment in 1867 of the Canadian 
Senate, which was to follow the British model, was but a vague attempt at the adoption 
of that model. 
Delegation based on election may grouped by the following criteria. 
The principle of selection by party politics was constitutionally accepted in the states 
of the West Indies, but the mandate is limited to the legislative cycle and right to make 
proposals is shared by the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, while the 
government party's majority is secured in the senate as well. In Jamaica, of the 21 
senatorial seats, proposals may be made by the Prime Minister for 13 and by the leader 
of the opposition for 8. In Barbados the distribution of the same number of seats (21) 
is 13:2, with the Governor-General appointing senators to the remaining 6 seats in 
exercise of his discretionary right. In Bahamas appointments to 16 seats may be 
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proposed at a ratio of 9 to 4, with proposals for 3 seats to be made by the Prime 
Minister with the involvement of the opposition leader. 
The representation of regional interests is not consistently implemented despite 
external appearances, not even in case of election by the regional legislative bodies. 
This is evidenced by the example of the French Senate. In 1875 the idea of the central 
state, which had been based on the involvement of the aristocratic elite, shifted 
emphasis to a regional basis secouring a greater role for the communes. The election 
of senators was also governed by this procedure. The ratio at which more than half the 
electors came from communes with less than 1,500 inhabitants was maintained even 
during the period of the Fifth Republic. 
Regionalism finds a direct expression in the election of members to the Dutch first 
chamber (elected by the provincial councils). In Belgium the autonomy of linguistic 
communities is at the same time a territorial autonomy, with the multilingual autonomy 
of Brussels organized as a separate unit. 
The establishment in 1977 of the Spanish Senate ensures the representation of 
regionalism and autonomous communities. On the basis of the principle of quality, each 
province directly elects 4 senators, who constitute the majority (208). The legislature of 
each autonomous territory may elect 1 senator and an additional 1 for every 1 million 
inhabitants. 
The second chamber based on the idea of equality is subject to direct election in 
Italy, Japan, Turkey, Venezuela and Columbia. These countries try to avoid duplication 
of the first chamber, the completely formal character of the controlling function, by 
using electoral techniques to encourage a modified distribution of party politics seats in 
comparison with the composition of the first chamber. Such techniques include 
eligibility subject to a higher age-limit (Italy, Turkey, Columbia) or a higher age-limit 
for suffrage (Italy), a longer term of mandate (Columbia), rotation (Japan, Turkey), ex 
officio membership of e.g., former presidents of the republic (Italy, Turkey, Venezuela 
and lately Croatia), the head of state's right of appointment in recognition of merit 
(Italy, Croatia, Turkey). While all these supplementary devices or methods make but a 
small contribution to the operation of the principle of qualitative selection, they are 
intended to ensure a more objective and more professional atmosphere in the second 
chamber, which may exert a positive effect in critical situations. 
Electors in Norway and Iceland elect one parliament, which divides itself into two 
bodies. The Storting of Norway elects one-fourth and the Althing of Iceland one-third 
of representatives to the upper house. This model, as it observes the mandatory party 
proportions, hardly differs in substance from a unicameral parliament. 
The Senate of Ireland provides a specific exception. When established in 1937, it 
was governed by the principle of vocational representation. As is known, this is an 
application of the state-building principle based on the social teaching of the Catholic 
Church and recommended by Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical Letter beginning with Rerum 
Novarum. That principle was also partially applied by the reform of the Hungarian 
Upper House which introduced membership in the Upper House for chambers and other 
representative organizations. The Austrian Constitution associated with Dolfuss went 
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even further, and, by copying the corporative legislature of Italian fascism, it alienated 
for a long time all political currents from the idea of organization on a vocational basis. 
The endeavour of the Irish Republic is motivated by the intention of breaking with the 
British model as well as by the corporative concept, which has gained currency in the 
Labour Party as well. Of the 60 members of the Senate, 43 are elected from panels of 
candidates representing five vocational groups (e.g. 11 for agriculture, 9 for industry and 
commerce, 7 for public administration and social services, 5 for culture and education); 
senators are also elected by the two universities, and the remaining senators are 
nominated by the head of government. 
II. Relationship between the Two Chambers 
The political processes outlined above have run their course in specific environments 
of constitutional law varying by country. Regulation by constitutional law cannot be 
reduced to a question of constitutional technique because the constitution-maker, in 
regulating powers and in balancing procedures to meet cases of dissensus, deliberately 
creates balances in the interest of averting any possible one-sided or biassed coup or one 
that might be staged by constitutional procedures. 
Ever since the British Parliament broke through the principle of the equality of the 
two chambers, the principle of the larger weight, or priority of the first chamber based 
on general elections has become a general rule. Such is the case even in countries 
where the constitution formally declares the equality of chambers. Formal equality is 
expressed in the constitutions of Italy, Belgium, Columbia and Venezuela. Restriction 
of powers is perceptible both in participation in legislation and in giving effect to the 
responsibility of the government. Laws may only be proposed by the first chamber in 
the majority of cases, while eventual disagreement of the second chamber can at best 
act as a brake equivalent to the right of suspensive veto, which may be eroded by a 
two-thirds majority in the first chamber. Adoption of the budget is within the 
competence of the first chamber, and the estimates may not be altered by the second 
chamber in most countries. 
Compared with the rights of the House of Representatives, the Senate of the United 
States plays an important role in government as a counterweight to presidential powers. 
Through ratification of treaties and approval of presidential appointments it controls 
essential acts of the executive power. Again, the six-year term of mandate adds to its 
weight, so it is not accidental that membership in the Senate is regarded as being of higher 
standing on the ladder of political career than membership in the House of Representatives. 
In summary, the second chamber performs a function of slight restriction or restraint 
by using its right to preserve traditions, exercise control and give its consent. Nearly all 
countries have devised schemes of their own. The composition and powers of the second 
chamber are strongly influenced by traditions that survive also in the prerogatives of the 
head of state, by the specifics of the electoral system, and by the various patterns of 
decentralization. 
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This notwithstanding, the legislative process shows up tendencies clearly perceptible 
in international comparison and summed up below: 
(a) the first chamber usually has a stronger status in proposing laws; in many 
countries the government may submit bills to the first chamber only; 
(b) in more recent times, mainly in countries where the second chamber in the 
nature of a senate practically repeats the political composition of the first chamber, the 
government may present bills to the senate as well or may raise the question of 
confidence (Italy); 
c) the negative experience of conciliation committees set up to settle disagreements 
has led to more frequent recourse to faster channels of decision-making, namely to 
conclusion of a debate by majority decision in joint session, this solution tends to 
strengthen the position of the first chamber; 
(d) the general effect of the British reform of 1911 was in referring items of the 
budget to the first chamber for decision; the strong powers of the U.S. Senate, which 
prevent the second chamber being reduced to a role secondary to the House of 
Representatives, are an exception; 
(e) finally, where the conciliation procedure fails, the British Parliament Act of 1911 
gives force to the will of the first chamber on the general plane as well. If the House 
of Commons upholds its position by three successive votes against the objections of the 
House of Lords, the King/Queen will promulgate the law as adopted by the House of 
Commons. However, the third vote must be taken within two years, so the will of the 
House of Commons may happen to be broken nonetheless under the opposition of the 
second chamber. 
III. Bicameral Parliaments in Europe 
Bicameral arrangements have similarly gained wide currency in other than European 
countries. According to a survey made by the Interparlamentary Union in 1985, 28 out 
of 83 countries had bicameral legislatures and 12 of these had a unitary state 
organization, so there must be some special reason for the bicameral device. In case of 
a unitary state organization, however, the argument frequently advanced against a 
bicameral legislature is that it operates as a limitation upon decisions by the first 
chamber, which is based on democratic elections and thus has broad legitimacy, and 
unnecessarily complicates the legislative process. The reforms in the Skandinavian states 
were probably influenced by these considerations, too. Denmark and Sweden have 
switched to the unicameral system in this century. Indeed, countries with smaller 
territories retaining the second chamber have almost always invoked historical heritage 
as a motive for the bicameral system. 
The ideology behind the exercise of monolithic power in the former socialist 
countries preferred the unicameral solution except for the bicameral devices in the 
federative states (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and, from December 1968, Czechos-
lovakia). 
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Country Names of 
Chambers 
Term of 
M a n d a t e 
Number of 
Members 
Austria National Council 4 years 183 
Federal Council 6 years 63 
Belgium House of Representatives 4 years 150 
Senate 4 years 71 
Croatia House of Representatives 4 years 100-160 
House of Counties 4 years 3 by county 
and 5 nominated 
Czech Republic House of Representatives 4 years 200 
Senate 6 years 81 
England House of Commons 5 years 650 
House of Lords continuous 1185 
France National Assembly 5 years 577 
Federal Senate 9 years 317 
Germany, Federal Federal Assembly 4 years 518 
Republic of Federal Council variable 45 
Iceland Lower House 4 years 40 
Upper House 4 years 20 
Ireland House of Representatives 4 years 250 
Senate 5 years 60 
Italy House of Representatives 5 years 630 
Senate 5 years 323 
Netherlands House of Representatives 4 years 150 
First Chamber 4 years 75 
Norway Odelsting 4 years 116 
Storting 4 years 39 
Poland Sejm 4 years 460 
Senate 4 years 100 
Romania House of Representatives 4 years 387 
Senate 4 years 150 
Russia State Duma 4 years 450 
Federal Council 4 years 178 
Spain Congress 4 years 300-400 
Senate 4 years variable by 
territory 
Switzerland National Council 4 years 200 
Council of States (Cantons) 4 years 46 
In England the government presents bills of high political importance to the House 
of Commons, but complicated ones requiring long deliberations are submitted to the 
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House of Lords in order to save time. Bills with financial implications and particularly 
those affecting the budget are first considered in the House of Commons and, once the 
House of Commons has agreed on them, are laid before the House of Lords, where 
numerical figures may not be changed, and the government may, even in case of 
rejection, present them to the King/Queen for promulgation. Royal sanction is formal, 
and since 1707 there has been no denial of signature. 
The scheme under which adoption of law on certain subject-matters like statutory 
regulation of a federation is made subject to the consent of the second chamber or the 
right of the second chamber to protest against decisions is intended to avoid the merely 
formal status of second chambers. The German Basic Law vests such powers in the 
Federal Council, but, on the other hand, it sets time-limits in order to rule out eventual 
obstruction by the second chamber. 
It should be mentioned that even a unicameral system allows constitutional devices 
for preventing the emergence of "parliamentary absolutism", or the "dictatorship of the 
majority". Such external constraints or balances are created by the jurisdiction of the 
constitutional court, referendum and the head of state's right of veto (or returning 
statutes). Within parliament, on the other hand, every procedural rule guaranteeing rights 
for the parliamentary minority — including qualified (three-fifths, two-thirds or four-
fifths) majority of votes required for decision, roll-call vote and standing orders leaving 
mandatory scope for initiatives by the minority — falls into this category. These devices 
may add up to virtual revision by a second chamber. Thus the final result of the present 
comparison may be summed up in that, for the most part, second chambers are no 
longer relics of the historical past, but much rather organs with powers extending to 
territorial representation and often to that of other forms of self-government, while their 
function is more than one of acting as a brake because they bring special consideration, 
socially recognized interests and values into the process of legislation. 
IV. The Hungarian Table of Magnates 
In the 15th century, with the emergence of the right of the lesser nobility to delegate 
deputies, the Table of Magnates formed a separate body in the Hungarian national 
assembly. That configuration was expressed in Statute I after the coronation in 1608. 
The prelates listed among the magnates were also mentioned in that Statute. 
The second chamber functioned with the participation of magnates. At the sittings of 
the upper table of the feudal Diet during the Reform Era there was a liberal group 
(Széchenyi, Batthyány) acting in opposition to the conservative majority and stating their 
case with consistent arguments for a bourgeois transformation of society. The bicameral 
national assembly, which had come to stay, continued in existence after Statute IV of 
1848 had introduced the constitutional principle of popular presentation in the course 
of bourgeois transformation. 
Art. 34 of Statute III of 1848 on the Responsible Hungarian Ministry increased the 
weight of the Table of Magnates by providing that a minister impeached by the House 
of Representatives was to be judged by a court composed of members of the Table of 
Magnates. That power was extended by post-1867 legislation to the President of the 
Audit Office (Statute XVIII of 1870) and was widened (by Statute VIII of 1871) to 
include disciplinary authority over the presidents and vice-presidents of the courts of 
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appeal, the President, Vice-Presidents and trial judges of the Supreme Court Judicature 
and the Attorney General, and later over the judges of the administrative court. 
The reform of the Table of Magnates was covered by Statute VII of 1885, which 
did not abolish its feudal character and was therefore unable to fit the second chamber 
of the national assembly into the operation of bourgeois parliamentarism. The traditions 
of the Table of Magnates thus allowed scope for respecting the historical past, 
cherishing the memory of historic personalities and drawing into legislative work the 
strand of conservatism represented by magnates and the churches and serving as a tool 
of control and correction. Its eight years of recess from 1918 were sufficient for the 
introduction of new basic principles governing its composition at the time of its 
reorganization. 
V. The Hungarian Upper House 
The Upper House was regulated by Statute XXII of 1926, breaking with the Table of 
Magnates, which presented elements of feudalism, membership in it was generally based 
on election, but there was no switch to a senatorial system based entirely on election. 
The return to a bicameral legislature served political purposes in the first place, but 
reorganization was highly important from the point of view of public law as well. 
Politically, it created a possibility for the compromise between Regent Miklós 
Horthy and the Hungarian aristocracy. The participation of church dignitaries was a no 
negligible element. Apart from the numerical weight of the prelates of the Catholic 
Church, one should not disregard the pioneering role played by the Upper House Statute 
in applying the principle of vocational representation as recommended in Rerum 
Novarum. The Upper House reaffirmed the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of the 
historical classes. At the same time, by introducing the representation of representative 
organizations and the county self-governments, it ensured against probable reactions by 
broader masses of people. 
From a public-law point of view, the Upper House demonstrated the end to the 
provisional state of public law and the return to legal continuity. It sought to adjust the 
participation of the aristocracy to the requirements of the "democratic Zeitgeist" by the 
election of members from the ranks of bearers of aristocratic titles. 
As regards its composition, however, it had two very noteworthy elements which 
brought new factors into legislation by the second chamber. One was membership 
subject to election by municipal committees, which ensured the representation of 
regional interests. The other was the representation of selfgoverning public institutions, 
which allowed the involvement of representatives of science and culture. Finally, the 
political configuration as reflected in the first chamber based on popular representation 
was supplemented by the representation of representative organizations in the second 
chamber. I think it is these factors among those constitutive of the Hungarian Upper 
House that can be supposed to be organizations with a social weight and values whose 
participation in the legislature might be realized through a switch to a bicameral 
national assembly. 
We have drawn up a list of legal titles to membership in the Upper House. It shows 
that the legislature was moving toward continuous expansion and its membership came 
to surpass the number of MPs. 
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Legal title to 
membership 
Stat. XXII of 
1926 
Stat. 
XIII 
of 
1928 
Additional 
members 
Stat, of 1940 Stat. 
XXI 
of 
1942 
StaL 
X X of 
1941 
Total 
for 
1942 
possible actual X X V I xxvn 
MEMBERS OF THE HAPSBURG 
DYNASTY 2 2 3 
DIGNITY OR OFFICE 
The ensigns of the country 9 4 
The two keepers of the crown 2 2 2 
The chief justices of the 
country 5 5 5 
The Attorney General 1 1 1 
The President of the 
Hungarian National Bank 1 1 1 
The President of the National 
Institute of Social Insurance 
1 1 
The Commander-in-Chief of 
the Hungarian Army 1 1 
-1 Stat. IX of 
1940 
The Chief of Staff of the 
Hungarian Army 
1 Stat. II of 
1939 1 
The senior general of the 
Hungarian Army 
1 StaL IX of 
1940 1 
Heads of the Catholic 
Church 15 14 12 2 29 
Heads of the Calvinist 
Church 6 6 4 10 
Heads of the Lutheran 
Church 5 5 
Heads of the Unitarian 
Church 1 1 1 1 
Heads of the Orthodox 
Church 1 1 2 
Heads of the Israelitic 
Church 2 2 2 
ON THE BASIS OF ELECTION 
Bearers of aristocratic 
titles 38 38 6 44 
Representatives of 
municipalities 
+ called in 
76 76 3 Stat. 
XXXVII 
of 1938 
47 
3 
126 
3 
Hung. Acad, of Sciences 3 3 3 
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Legal title to 
membership 
Stat. XXII of 
1926 
Stat. 
XIII 
of 
1928 
Additional 
members 
StaL of 1940 Stat. 
XXI 
of 
1942 
S t a t 
X X of 
1941 
Total 
for 
1942 
possible actual XXVI xxvn 
Universities/colleges 15 15 2 17 
Hung. National Museum 1 1 1 
National Board of the 
Decorated Ex-Servicemen 1 1 
1 
Commercial and Stock 
Exchange 1 1 
1 
Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 6 6 -2 4 
Chamber of Agriculture 6 6 1 7 
Chamber of Notaries 
Public 1 1 1 
Chamber of Lawyers 2 2 2 
Chambers of Engineers 2 2 2 
Chamber of Physicians 2 Stat. I of 
1936 2 
National Federation of 
Manufacturers; nominated 
by head of state 2 2 
National Union of 
Agriculturists; nominated 
by head of state 
2 StaL XLII 
of 1930 2 
Federation of Physicians; 
nominated by head of state 1 t 
-1 Stat. I of 
1936 
NOMINATED BY HEAD OF 
STATE 40 40 4 Stat. 
XXXVII of 
1938 
12 4 25 87 
TOTAL MEMBERS 244 238 2 Stat. VI 
of 1939 
369 
TOTAL REPRESENTATIVES 245 360 
The reform of the Upper House was the most successful decision concerning the 
consolidation in public law of the Horthy regime. The legitimist opposition did not achieve 
its purpose, but lost a large part of its arguments. The "provisional state of public law", 
a term used in the pertinent literature, gradually passed into the background and vanished. 
The Horthy regime, born under the hallmark of the counter-revolution, was forced 
by international pressure to hold democratic elections and to establish a new legislative 
organ. The restoration and reform of the Upper House, which followed the British 
model in terms of its prerogatives, not only made "good score" for the regime, but also 
resulted in a truly system-specific organ, as it referred to in the current usage of 
political science. 
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The Upper House of Hungary reinforced the specifically Hungarian conservatism 
in public life. Its composition ensured the affirmation of the interests of the class of 
big landowners, while opening a forum of high prestige for the representation of the 
interests of industrial and commercial capital. 
The further role of the Upper House, which attained internal autonomy, was defined 
as a counterweight to the introduction of secret ballot. The modifications of 1937, 
coupled with the extension of the Regent's powers, enlarged the role of the Upper 
House in legislation. 
Statute XXVII of 1937 ensured the predominance of the House of Representatives 
solely in adopting the budget. Where differences of views on other issues arose, the first 
thing to do was to attempt an accommodation of disagreements. In case of failure, either 
House had the right to propose conventing a joint session, which decided by secret 
ballot without debate. 
One-third of seats in the national committees were filled by the Upper House and 
two-thirds were reserved for election by representatives. 
VI. Conclusions 
1. Representatives of counties and municipal boroughs had filled seats in the Hungarian 
Parliament for centuries. The reform in 1926 of the second chamber revived this tradition 
by giving force to territorial representation in the Upper House characteristic of senates, 
while restricting the feudal vestiges. 
Today's "rational" approach rejects out hand the second chamber, which is considered 
unnecessary in the absence of federation. However, tradition must be invoked on this 
point. Municipality had been a very special institution of the old Hungarian public law, 
a guardian of national independence for a long period of time. From 1926 the 
participation of counties in the Upper House was a modernized version of the counties' 
right to send deputies, and it became a dominant element of the pattern of composition, 
for the representation of the historical ruling classes, which came to be based on election, 
was only half that of the counties. 
2. The representation in the Upper House of autonomous public bodies may, on the 
basis of historical experience, be brought into line with the democratic basic principles 
by making the additional remark that it was supplemented by the representation of 
representative organizations (chambers) based on compulsory membership and by the 
participation of elected representatives of representational organizations (trade unions, 
cooperatives) based on free, individual membership. 
3. The pertinent literature refers mostly to ideas rejecting the bicameral legislature. 
The second chamber is undoubtedly a counterweight to the first chamber based on 
political representation. This is in itself no reason for ruling out its establishment, since 
it is precisely in the legislative process that the possibility of creating balances is sought, 
relying not exclusively on the President of the Republic, the Constitutional Court or 
referendum, i.e. external factors. The approach and considerations of a second chamber, 
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specific to its composition, not only act as a brake, or do not simply have the effect of 
the first chamber taking a priori into account the requirement of consent, but include 
a new qualitative element, namely the control of constitutionality and expediency, the 
possibility of correction in addition to reconsideration, thus building a constitutional 
safeguard into the decision-making process. 
4. Given their ideological determinism, their role in upholding values of their own, 
political parties are unable, despite their best intentions, to articulate and give effect to 
criteria which a second chamber of a mixed composition is able to bring into the 
process of legislation. 
5. Constitutional law allows political representation to be supplemented with 
territorial-self-government and corporative elements in such a way as to ensure smooth 
elimination of "frictions" arising in the course of exercising powers, prevention of 
constitutional crises. Participation of self-governments and representative organizations 
in the legislature does not amount to discrimination, because settlement and territorial 
self-governments embrace each and every citizen and other forms of self-government 
are equally open or, through compulsory membership, encompass a particular trade or 
profession as a whole. 
6. Representation of nationalities poses a separate problem. What is involved here is 
positive discrimination, assurance of which is required by the recognition and protection 
of national or ethnic identity. It is this form of representation that would allow fulfilment 
of the "state-creating" role of nationalities as laid down in the Constitution. 
7. On the basis of votes obtained at democratic elections the political parties share 
the parliamentary seats proportionally, with some corrections like a threshold of 5% as 
fixed at present. The government is formed on the majority principle. From that moment 
the Parliament cannot play its real role, for its control of the government and its 
initiatives may lead it into labyrinths of complicated considerations. This is why it is 
necessary to recognize extra rights for the minority in democratic parliaments. The related 
rules should not stop at governing the exercise of control, for the requirement of a 
broader consensus serves as a safeguard. A high degree of maturity is therefore shown 
by the Act which, promulgated on 1 June 1995, requires a four-fifths, as against the 
current two-thirds, majority for Parliament's adoption of the new Constitution. In 
addition, we deem it necessary for the segmentation of society along dividing lines 
(territorial principle, nationalities, self-governing vocations and representative 
organizations) to be taken into account in determining the composition of a second 
chamber. 
There is one question on which the existence of consensus is easy to ascertain from 
rather widely expressed views. It is generally agreed that the membership of Hungary's 
present Parliament is oversized. I would not, even in case of a bicameral structure, 
favour any increase in membership. A first chamber of 200 members and a second 
chamber of 100 members, with ceilings to be put on these figures, would be just and 
practicable. 
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KALEIDOSCOPE 
Comparative Legal Cultures: 
Attempts at Conceptualization 
The notion of legal culture is obviously a function of the direction taken by analysis within 
and for the realization of which one holds some interest in the components and connections 
of the given legal arrangement(s). 
1. Within the frame of the Dartmouth series "The International Library of Essays 
in Law & Legal Theory", I have edited the introductory volume to the sub-series "Legal 
Cultures" under the title Comparative Legal Cultures} Through my selection and editorial 
presentation I tried to substantiate the claim for an investigation attempting to describe 
different legal arrangements characterizing nations and times in the history of human 
culture (conceived as a way and style of thinking, as well as the social practice institu-
tionally expressing it), separating them from one another by features characteristic to 
their individual nature, especially by their spirit, inventiveness, and ability to respond. 
According to the underlying idea, every component and colouring element (from problem-
sensibility to the practice of naming, conceptual classification to operational ability, 
presuppositions to final ideals) falls within the domain of the discipline called Comparative 
Legal Cultures. As to its composition and basic structure, it is mainly an interdisciplinary 
knowledge and a want for synthesis that stands in its background, composed of legal-
anthropological description, law-historical conclusion, comparison of law, legal-sociological 
investigation, as well as generalization of legal-philosophical analysis providing a 
theoretical frame (primarily gained from the doctrinal study and methodology of law). 
* An enlarged version of the paper, presented at the workshop dedicated to the conceptual delimitation of 
comparative legal cultures by the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (Onati) in the Summer of 1996. 
1 Comparative Legal Cultures (ed. & introd. VARGA, Cs.) Aldershot—Hong Kong—Singapore—Sydney: 
Dartmouth & New York: New York University Press 1992. xxiv + 614 [The International Library of Essays 
in Law & Legal Theory, series ed. Tom D. Campbell, Legal Cultures 1]. 
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The purpose of launching such a volume was just to awaken an interest strongly missing 
in our day, which can lay the foundations of a particular subject of teaching and literary 
production2 rather than create a new scholarly field and research profile which surfaces 
as a result of a new methodology. This is all the more true because it does not approach 
its subject through a systematic survey following objectively determined criteria, but 
focuses on specifically manifested abilities (i.e., the general spirit, geniosity and 
inventiveness of a given legal culture), and these can mostly be exemplified in various 
fields and through embodiments which differ from one legal culture to the other in a way 
characteristic to the given legal arrangement. 
Such an approach may have the advantage that it treats legal culture as a systematically 
organized unity of cultural responses given to situations crying for adjudication. In the 
analysis of such situations, it recognizes a variety of possible cultural responses, and 
approaches them without the strait-jacket (or taxonomy) of paradigmatic preconceptions 
and previously developed notions. At the same time, it makes legal culture to be seen 
as the carrier of social values, and in case of the misuse or overuse of its instruments 
it also counts with the conceptual possibility of a degenerating legal culture. In this century, 
such inhumane examples as the Socialisms and National-Socialisms in Europe, or the 
hard-to-treat products of crises caused by stretching the poverty such as the Jeito (which 
appears at the periphery of the Brazilian megalopolis), still prove to be worth analysing 
from the perspective of Comparative Legal Cultures. We may think of either the 
potentialities latent in statutory positivism (Das Recht ist das Recht!) or the norm-
generating effect of the pressure imposed by any overwhelming accumulation of facts, 
it is the extreme cases that can clearly show what the farthest limiting values of the 
potentialities latent in everyday normal situations are. For it is only normal values that 
can be stretched to extreme limits, that is, only normal entities are manifested in them. 
Individual legal cultures show a certain condensation of directions and final ideals worth 
investigation as well. That is to say, besides a few individual traits of inventiveness, the 
common denominator of the responsiveness of individual legal cultures can be found in 
the way of thinking (i.e., referring, arguing and concluding) which leads the judge to propose 
a standardizable solution relying on some previous patterns. By doing so, he/she has to 
channel the argumentation in a pathway that can relevantly and justifiably refer to, as 
normatively concluding from, some previously set patterns. At least such a conclusion 
can be reached by the reconstruction of the logical jump and creative transformation (taken 
as a black box), which leads from the information procedurally fed into the official 
processing of the case (as input) to the decision finally taken in the name of law (as output). 
Within the discipline of Comparative Legal Cultures, the Comparative Judicial Mind has 
2 After long preparations the Universiteit Brabant (Tilburg, The Netherlands) proved to be the pioneer by 
launching a project of Research Chair for Comparative Legal Cultures a few years ago. Professor Pierre Legrand 
being the chair-holder has experience from his hometown, Quebec, and Lancaster (United Kingdom), and dedicates 
a number of magisterial papers to the perspectives of the European future of common law and civil law. At Péter 
Pázmány Catholic University, re-founded in 1991, the Institute for Legal Philosophy plans to introduce Comparative 
Legal Cultures as a compulsory subject having its own chair within the Institute. 
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to deal with questions related to it.3 According to the concept outlined above, legal culture 
is a phenomenon equally shaped by cultural-historical and institutional development. It 
shows continuity and stability to a considerable extent within its established framework. 
It is open to receive new impetuses. Its change can be slow and gradual at the most. 
2. Within the framework of the TEMPUS "Textbook Series on European Law and 
European Legal Cultures" (initiated by Professors Volkmar Gessner and Armin Höland), 
as the result of a three-year co-operation we have published the opening volume of 
European Legal Cultures4 which testifies to a strong legal-sociological tradition according 
to editorial intentions. Legal culture is treated as a descriptive notion in it. It marks a 
real practice which can be taxonomically mapped out in every culture but can only be 
said to exist without being bound to any values. Consequently, whatever form or operation 
it displays, it must be described as a legal culture in action. That is, talking about its 
distortion and degeneration is excluded by definition. 
Within a legal culture conceived like this, formal or formless components can gain 
equal importance throughout its characterization. This is why we may have included its 
most varied manifestations in the discussion of European Legal Cultures, e.g., the travaux 
préparatoires and their normative reference as a source of law (especially in the Nordic 
countries, by the inclusion of the judicial body responsible for future application), the 
established way of normative reference and quotation injudicial practice, or the problem 
of (un)translatability (even in case of apparent nominal identity of a mirror-translation 
in neighbouring countries). 
Comparative Legal Cultures as a discipline has to surpass both the dichotomy dividing 
civil law and common law cultures of Europe and the trichotomy resulting from adding 
the Byzantine, the Nordic, or the Socialist law to this dichotomy. Considering its influence 
on the foundation of civilization, no trend in Comparative Legal Cultures can ignore 
European developments. For instance, it is of an enhanced interest even from a 
methodological point of view to foresee whether the gap between civil law and common 
law (i.e., between statutory law and judge-made law, that is, the deductive-systematic 
and the inductive-pragmatic traditions respectively) will deepen further or, also pushed 
by the European harmonization, will be somewhat balanced. 
Taking Comparative Legal Cultures seriously, it is important to separate the East from 
the West in Europe as well as the in-between zone from both. Historically and for today's 
3 Under the title 'Comparative Legal Methods' in the volume of Comparative Legal Cultures, Part IV, 333-447, 
and under the title 'The European Legal Mind' in the volume of European Legal Cultures (see the next note), 
Part II, 89-168. As to its legal-philosophical treatment, cf., from the author, Theory of the Judicial Process The 
Establishment of Facts. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1995. vii + 249 and 'The Nature of the Judicial Application 
of Norms: Science- and Language-philosophical Considerations' in his Law and Philosophy Selected Papers 
in Legal Theory. Budapest: Loránd Eötvös University Project on Comparative Legal Cultures 1994. 295-314 
[Philosophiae Iuris]. 
4 GESSNER, V,—HÖLAND, A—VARGA, Cs.: European Legal Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1996) 586 
[Tempus Series: Textbooks on European Law aod European Legal Cultures, series ed.: GESSNER, V.—HÖLAND, 
A. I.] 
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generations this primarily means the realization that the borders which divide Central 
Europe from Eastern Europe have remained unchanged for the fifteen centuries since 
Charlemagne. Despite the 1945 settlement at Yalta which, acknowledging WWII territorial 
conquests, placed the major part of Central Europe at Soviet Russia's mercy. This made 
the new status quo accepted and prevented eventual remorse, cynically calling (as a false 
ideology) every ceded territory Eastern Europe. These borders coincide with the ones 
between Byzantium and Rome. Seen from the West, these are the borders up to which 
the waves of the Renaissance and Reformation extended and the Romanic and Gothic 
styles can be encountered,5 for example, at the Eastern borders of the Baltic countries, 
Galicia and Transylvania, the Southern borders of historical Hungary, as well as the Eastern 
borders of Slovenia and Croatia. Whatever states may have been artificially set up in 
terms of the WWI and WWII peace treaties, the cultural heritage of one and a half 
thousand years still outweighs the conceited naivety staring at us in wide-eyed astonishment 
(not even forgivable from a detached Atlantic point of view). This naivety would like 
to exclusively count the distance between Pécs (the Mediterranean intellectual centre of 
Southern Hungary) and Belgrade (the Serbian Orthodox capital), barely two hundred 
kilometres along the Danube, as if it were about two neighbouring American settlements 
and not about the dividing line between two civilizations.6 
Obviously, however, the genuine question is not the relative difference of Central 
Europe. One must of necessity differentiate Central Europe from Eastern Europe because 
(despite the post-modern ahistorical simplicity and ethno-centric utopianism, characteristic 
of liberal universalism) the East proper, that is, the sovietized tsarist and imperial heritage, 
is not likely to please us by melting into the West. Neither does the East reach the West, 
nor does it become its poorhouse (with hundreds of millions of inhabitants), but starts 
at the point from which it may have continued: to live the Russian past again by raising 
the dilemma of making the choice between Western European assimilation and remaining 
different, barely unresolvable for the upcoming few generations. This is so because there 
is no superior lord with whose cane the ones who want to separate should be taught a 
lesson. Furthermore, there is no panacea which could help jumping over centuries' belated 
development without violence or deus ex machina intervention. Actually, each player 
plays his own game, and one has to forepian the sharpening growth of differences and 
the building back of the paths of culture which have usually diverged from one another 
for the reason of different traditions. 
3. Cultural comparison raises further dilemmas primarily related to the question of 
how much longer the instruments can serve as instruments. Do we fall in the trap of 
overgeneralization and unjustified universalization if we are bound to transform instruments 
5 Cf., for example, SZŰCS, J.: 'The Three Historical Regions of Europe' Acta Historica Academiae Sdenliarum 
Hungaricae 29, 1983, 2-4, 131-184. (reprinted in European Legal Cultures, 14. et seq.). 
6 It was Samuel P. Huntington who largely broke this wall of ignorance, shown in the international (first 
of all American) settlement of conflicts in the recent Yugoslav war, in his essay rediscovering the old truth, cf. 
'The Clash of Civilizations?' in Foreign Affairs 72, Summer 1993. 3, 22-49. 
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into goals by forcing everyone (using the rigour of the law and the spell-words of 
'constitutional democracy and rule of law') to apply them, or when we intend to conform 
them, but ignore the environment originally conditioning them and forget about the 
challenge that has initially been responded to while creating the instrument? One has 
to revoke Engels' rather convincing thesis (in his The German Ideology) on the ideological 
overgeneralization and universalization of the winner's interests at any given time. For 
more than half a century the luckier part of the world has been living peacefully without 
wars, upheavals or crises bound to raise the tormenting dilemma of life or death. Although, 
this might be the result of the coincidence of complex effects, and certainly not a reward 
for merits, we cannot be surprised if this part of the world considers it to have been 
deserved and substantive enough to justify its path. It will be no wonder if the underlying 
experience will be sensed as universal and even its boundaries will be forgotten. We should 
realize that this affords one of the reasons and ways why and how the world has become 
a global village—by the force of the omnipotent facts of the market, and also in terms 
of normative expectations transcending all local boundaries. The global village is both 
a sociological fact and the fulfilment of a Utopia which does not recognize local 
particularities and historical dimensions (i.e., hie et nunc concrete and individual 
determinations) any longer. 
Market economy, the multi-party system, parliamentarism, constitutional democracy, 
rule of law and human rights: all these magic formulae echo unison in the whole Eurasian 
region, from Reykjavik to Vladivostok. Still, despite the fact that the slogans and 
instruments are apparently the same, they bring prosperity and security under Western 
conditions, but through their contradictory effect they produce further destruction among 
the ruins of the Soviet-type Communism. What do we mean by all this? There are countries 
and regions as big as a continent in Central Europe's threatening neighbourhood. Here 
the state is impotent and anarchy with a disintegrating community constitutes the frames, 
and the Mafia, eager to seize the power organizes (even by political means) the black 
market, corruption and crime into one entity practically embracing the whole population. 
Blind selfishness, personal commitment, the rule of fist-law and violence raise their heads 
again and prove that only re-feudalizing autocracy can result from any inconsiderate, 
irresponsible and/or summum ius, summa iniuria type application of postmodernism's 
alluring siren-voice.7 
We have to keep in mind that culture is bound in its blessings as well. It is historically 
shaped, therefore, it cannot serve as a panacea or Jolly Joker in any of its components. 
It is not by mere chance that sensitive viewers have recalled the memory of past failures, 
especially the one of the American programme on "Law and Development" (set up decades 
7 Eg., Vladimir Shlapentokh cries out starting from this recognition in his Russia Privatization and legalization 
of Social and Political Life (Michigan State University Department of Sociology, 25 Sept. 1995) 44. [CND (95) 
459]. Similar recognitions are slowly becoming a commonplace among the Russian emigrants. See, e.g., 
BUHARAJEV, R.: 'Az esztelenség logikája: Kísérlet a csecsen konfliktus értelmezésére [The Logic of Folly: 
Attempt to Interpret the Chechen Conflict]' Magyarság és Európa [Hungarians and Europe] III. 1995. 1, 43-51. 
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ago to join up third world countries), when watching the American democracy-experts 
and other miraculous healers show up in Central and Eastern Europe.8 We could learn 
it from the example of Western intellectuals once having sympathized with Stalin and 
the revolutionary posers seeking shelter from their frustration in Eastern hopes that the 
intellectual is a kind of personality who proudly claims to have been ever led by his/her 
own conviction but sometimes despises facts and common sense as a drag on this inferior 
mundane life.9 There is some historical irony10 in the fact that the last occasion when 
today's Atlantic powers genuinely took the responsibility for a foreign cause (after WWII 
when the victors occupied Germany and Japan and reigned over them by military 
administration, thusly ruling the two countries for their masters' responsibility), they 
succeeded in disentangling themselves from their everyday routine and tried to find sensitive 
solutions with empathy, moreover, staffed with considerable intellectual forces." In our 
days, when the Atlantic world, by its verbal participation and self-interest, has become 
the bare voyeur (or outer observer at the most) of the transformation in Central and Eastern 
Europe, an army of dandies, arrivists, fantasizers, dreamers and easy experts of international 
agencies have flooded the region to give hope for remedy through hammering in magic 
words.12 In almost a comical way, unknown 'civilizators', who arrive uninformed of the 
region with a few weeks' commission and leave still uninformed, without having even 
learnt about its varied historic past and culture, customs and potentialities, fall for the easy 
happiness of the sheer translation of laws taken out from their pockets and return home 
with the epoch-making news: "By giving them a (New) World I acted as their trans-
formation's Madison!'.13 Everything having become so simple, the liberal Utopia seems 
8 E.g., HÖLAND, A.: Évolution du droit en Europe centrale et orientale: assiste-t-on à une renaissance du 
"Law and Development?" Droit et Société, 1993. No. 25, 467-488. 
9 Cf. CA UTE, D.: The Fellow-Travellers Intellectual Friends of Communism [1973] rev. (New Haven—London: 
Yale University Press 1988) iv + 458, as well as Paul Hollander Political Pilgrims (New York: Oxford University 
Press 1981). 
10 In its first formulation see, from the author, 'The sui generis Nature of the Challenge' in his Transition 
to Rule of Law On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary (Budapest: ELTE Project on Comparative 
Legal Cultures 1995), 71-77 and 'Transformation to Rule of Law from No-Law: Societal Contexture of the 
Democratic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe' Connecticut Journal of International Law 8, Spring 
1993. 2, 487-505. 
11 Taking the work of only one author as a basis, see, e.g., Bradely F. Smith Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg, 
New York, Basic Books, 1977., The Road to Nuremberg, New York: Basic Books, 1981. and The American 
Road to Nuremberg The Documentary Record, 1944-1945, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1982. 
12 E.g., BRIETZKE, H. P.: 'Designing the Legal Frameworks for Markets in Eastern Europe' The Transnational 
Lawyer 7, 1994. 35-63. Claus Offe has shown the practical impossibility of the task in his 'Capitalism by 
Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe' Social Research 
58, Winter 1991. 4, 865-892. 
13 WAELDE-GUNDERSON [in 'Legislative Refomi in Transition Economies: Western Transplants—A Short-Cut 
to Social Market Economy Status?' International Comparative Law Quarterly 43, 1994. 360] emphasise with 
the ideological narrow-mindedness and the professional self-interest in the push for quick legal octroi, instead 
of carrying out genuine legal reforms. 
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to have been completed.14 As a counter-balance to all this, also historicity and the 
concreteness of Toynbee's challenge-and-response paradigm (which sets history in motion) 
will fade away, and universal panels imposed from above will start starring instead.15 
By generalizing timely experiences in the region we can conclude that (1) law is a 
living system presupposing relative integrity and stability. Every rule or regulatory 
principle, to be introduced into or interpreted within the system, preconditions a working 
law and order and a relatively complete legal system. It only comes to surface when 
systems collapse, or radically change, that whatever new element we may build in, this 
element will remain unviable without background regulations, conventions, living skills 
and established practices, or its life will be exhausted in disintegrating dysfunction. Law 
is a living culture with specific rules, and by replacing some of them we can change its 
structuring skeleton at most. Consequently, we are bound to fail if we fill the regulatory 
vacuum with mechanisms designed to achieve final goals directly, without taking into 
consideration the genuine character, integrity, gradualness, and security of the trans-
formation. Democratizing and liberalizing upon the ruins left behind by the social 
destruction of the socialist law and order (especially in the Soviet Union) can easily result 
in libertarian anarchy and the total failure of any public cause. Privatization and market 
economy can amount to pillage, corruption and black markets. The call-word of human 
rights becoming the main appeal in amoral nihil can undermine public security, frustrate 
law and order, and disorganize the functions of state regulation and governmental policing 
and control. Moreover, (2) the introduction of any new legal solution presupposes a living 
legal culture in the background, and itsYuture working will be the function of its socially 
and culturally conceivable and reachable interpretation. Well, if our enlightening zeal 
makes us blind to this realization, this may ensue in the rituals of the rule of law re-
vitalizing and re-legitimating former totalitarian practices instead of a new start. This 
way, the freedom of press can easily give way to former press monopolies, and the 
summum ius, summa iniuria type rigour of statutory positivism and the ensuing incapability 
to think in principles can easily block the way to successfully face (by drawing a caesura 
on) the criminal past and restore its justice.16 
14 FUKUYAMA, F.: The End of History and the Last Man. London, Penguin, 1992, xxiii + 418. 
15 E.g., AJANI, G.: 'La circulation des modèles juridiques dans le droit post-socialiste' Revue internationale 
de Droit comparé 46,1994,4, 1087-1105 and 'By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern 
Europe' The American Journal of Comparative Law, LX1II, Winter 1995. 1, 93-117. 
16 See, from the author, as an early formulation (concerning the law's definition and shapeability both by text 
and textual environment), 'Is Law a System of Enactments?' in Theory of Legal Science ed.: PECZENIK, A.: 
Lars Lindahl & Bert van Roermund, Dordrecht-Boston—Lancaster: Reidel 1984,175-182 [Synthese Library 176] 
and in Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 26,1984.3-4,413-416; (concerning the exclusive inter-
pretability of law from a cultural and socio-historical perspective) 'Law as History?' in Philosophy of Law in the 
History cf Human Thought (ed.: PANOU, S.-BOZONIS, G.-GEORGAS, D.-TRAPPE, P.), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag Wiesbaden, 1988.191-198 [ARSP, Supplementa 2J; as well as (as a summation of theoretical conclusions 
by distinguishing the system of positive law from the living legal system) 'European Integration and the uniqueness 
of National Legal Cultures' in The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education (ed.: Bruno De 
Witte & Caroline Forder), Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1992. 721-733 [METRO], 
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Legal culture is a concept full of interest and not only from a theoretical perspective. 
Revealing its connections from a philosophical, sociological or comparative-historical 
point of view can become vital to our practical efforts directed towards provoking effects 
in our unifying world. Therefore, any casual miscarriage of practice can often be attributed 
to the actor's eventual insensitivity towards the complex social determinations that work 
for and lurk behind living legal cultures. 
Csaba VARGA 
The New Croatian Maritime Code* 
1. Introduction 
After promulgating the Constitution in 1990 (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Croatia—hereafter OGRC, No. 56/90) and after declaring its independence by the 
Dissolution Act of 8 October (OGRC, No. 31/91), the Republic of Croatia embarks upon 
the task of regulating numerous issues, thus creating a genuine legal constellation and 
legal system. Part of the above are the rules which govern the field of maritime navigation. 
So the Croatian Maritime Code (hereafter-CMC) was passed on February 2, 1994, and 
came into force on March 22, 1994 (OGRC, No. 17/94).1 The new Code regulates 
maritime navigation and encompasses all law of the sea, administrative law, property 
law, contact law, incident of navigation and conflict of laws rules.2 
2. Structure of the CMC 
The CMC extensive text is divided into thirteen parts and has 1.056 Articles. 
Part I (Articles 1-5) of common provisions and contains 38 definitions some of which 
call for certain comments (e.g. ship, boat, ship operator...). 
* To our regret in our previous issue (Vol. 36. [1994] pp. 232-235) we published an article by Dr Dragan 
Bolanca under a mistaken name. We tender our sincere apologies to the author and the readers and publish here 
again the article in question with the correct name of the author. Ed. 
1 The CMC derogated The Maritime and Inland Navigation Law of the Republic of Croatia (OGRC, No. 
53/91) which is still on force only for inland navigation. 
2 For more details see GRABOVAC, I.: Novo hrvatsko pomorsko pravo, Informator, Zagreb, No. 4064,1993. 
1-2. 
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Part II (Articles 6-47) deals with the fundamental institutes of the law of the sea in 
the Republic of Croatia (internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, 
continental shelf and right of hot pursuit) which are regulated in conformity with the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. 
Part III (Articles 48-80) describes the public maritime domain (order and 
consessions).3 
Part IV (Articles 81-192) includes safety of maritime navigation (navigable waterways, 
ports, navigation and pilotage, ship-floating object, boat, ship's crew).4 
In part V (Articles 193-222) the nationality, identification and registration of ships 
are elaborated. In this part the CMC adopts the relevant solutions of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, 1982 and the UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of 
Ships, 1986.5 
Part VI (Articles 223-404) treats law of property matters concerning ships (the rights 
on ships). The CMC incorporates the clauses of the International Convention Relating 
to Maritime Liens and Hypothecs of 1926 so that its provisions conform to the rules of 
the Convention.6 
Part VII (Articles 405-447) regulates the liability of the ship operator and procedure 
for the limitation of his liability. The central person in the Law is the ship operator, who 
is defined as "a natural person or a legal entity who as the holder of the ship is in charge 
of navigation ventures, the presumption being, until the opposite is proved, that the ship 
operator is the person entered in the register of ships as the owner of the ship". Substan-
tive-law provisions on the limitation of the liability of the operator are taken over from 
the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976.7 The procedure 
for the limitation of liability was originally drafted by Croatian law-makers in keeping 
with the rules of the nonlitigious procedure. 
Part VIII (Articles 448-760) deals with contracts (shipbuilding contract, contracts 
for the employment of ships, contract for maritime ship agency services and contract 
3 Cf. STANKOVIÓ, G .: Pomorsko dobro u Pomorskom zakoniku Republike Hrvatske, Informator, Zagreb, 
No. 4197-4198,1994,6-7, ÍIZMIC, J.: New Law on concession of the Republic of Croatia, International Business 
Lawyer, London, Vol. 21, No. 6, June 1993, 287. 
4 In content of part IV the CMC enacted new provisions in the matter of the ship operator's liability for death 
and physical injury of crewmembers (Art. 161). His liability is based on presumed negligence or strict liability-see 
BOLANÖA , D.: Nekoliko pogleda na materijalnu odgovomost pomoraca de lege lala ide lege ferenda, Privreda 
i pravo, Zagreb, No. 5-6 , 1993, 399. 
5 See HODAK, L M . : Hrvatski upisnik pomorskih brodova, Pomorski zbornik, Rijeka, No. 30,1992,259-279. 
See also STANKOV1Ó, G .: Upis brodova i brodica u novom pomorskom zakonodavstvu Republike Hrvatske 
(Informator, Zagreb, No. 4186, 9), Postupak upisivanja brodova i brodica u upisnike (Informator, Zagreb, No. 
4189, 17), Neka pitanja u svezi s postupkom za upisivanje brodova (Informator Zagreb, No. 4190, 14). 
6 GRABOVAC, I.-STANKOVlC, G.: Hipoteka na brodu kao stvamopravni oblik osiguranja traibina prema 
Pomorskom zakoniku, Informator, Zagreb, No. 4192^t l93 , 19-20. 
7 It is the first convention of maritime law ratified by Republic of Croatia (OGRC-Intemational Treaties, 
No. 2, 1992)—see BAKOTIÓ, В.: Biljeska povodom poietka sluibenog objavljivanja medunarodnih ugovora 
u Republici Hrvatskoj, Zakonitost, Zagreb, No. 1. 1993. 23. 
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of maritime insurance).8 In this connection it should be emphasized that under Croatian 
law contracts for the exploitation of ships are divided into two groups: maritime contracts, 
which are contracts for work (locatio operis) and hire of a ship (locatio navis), which 
is a contract of using a ship (the latter contract has been translated as "charter by demise" 
because this is the nearest to the English system of ship exploitation). The maritime 
contracts are carriage of goods (the Croatia received the solutions of the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, 1924,' the 
Brussels Protocol 1968—Visby Rules and the Brussels Protocol 1979), carriage of passen-
gers and luggage (the CMC follows the instance of the Athens Convention on Shipping 
of Passengers and their Luggage, 1974, and the Londons Protocol 1976), towing and push-
ing and other maritime contracts (e.g. biological exploration, pipe and cable laying...). 
In part IX the legislator analyses the incidents of navigation (collision of ships, salvage, 
wreek, general average, tort liability of operator, liability of operator of nuclear ship). In 
the subject of collision of ships the CMC accepts the provisions of the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law in Regard to Collisions, 1910. The 
institute of salvage consists of the rules of civil and administrative law from the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, and the International Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea, 1910 
(with the Brussels Protocol 1970). Also, the new Code adopts some principles from the 
new International Convention on Salvage at Sea, 1989 (e.g. the payment of a special 
compensation to salvors according to established criteria).10 
Part X (Articles 867-988) spells out the legal consequences of the execution and 
measures provisional on the ships and goods." 
Part XI (Articles 989-1009) contains conflict of laws rules.12 
Part XII (Article 1010-1037) describes the maritime transgressions. 
Part XIII (Article 1038-1056) provides the transitional and final clauses. 
8 For more details see GRABOVAC, I.: Neke napomene о posebnostima ugovora о gradnji broda u Pomorskom 
zakoniku, Informator, Zagreb, No. 4204-4205, 13, Drago Pavié Plovidbeno (pomorsko) osiguranje u reformiranom 
plovidbenom pravu Hrvatske, Pomorski zbornik, Rijeka, No. 30, 1992, 237-258. 
9 The former socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) ratified that convention 1959. The Republic 
of Croatia has determined its position as to the treaties to which SFRY was a Contracting Party by the Treaties 
Conclusion and Application Act of 8 October 1991 (OGRC, No. 53/91). According to the transitional provision 
of Art. 33 of this Act, treaties ratified by SFRY, or to which SFRY acceded, will apply in the Republic of Croatia, 
if they are not contrary to the Constitution and the legal order of the Republic of Croatia, in accordance with 
the rules of international law on the succession of states with respect to treaties. According to Art. 134. of the 
Croatian Constitution, international agreements to which the Republic of Croatia is a party and, in terms of legal 
effect, have primacy over internal law. 
10 See STANKOV1Ó, P .: Nova Medunarodna konvencija о spaSavanju na mora, 1989, Uporedno pomorsko 
pravo, Zagreb, No. 2-4. 1989, 296, Ljerka Mintas Hodak: Novi Pomorski zakonik, Pomorski zbornik, Rijeka, 
No. 31, 1993, 35-36. 
11 See GRABOVAC, I.-STANKOVIÓ, G.: Osiguranje Irai bina u svjetlu novog pomorskog zakonodavstva 
Republike Hrvatske, review from Zbornik radova: Zaütita vjerovnika, Zabreb, 1994, 61-71. 
12 Cf. GRABOVAC, I.: Mjerodavno pravo Republike Hrvatske о pomorskoj plovidbi, Informator, Zagreb, 
No. 4143, 1994, 1-2. 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
The CMC has been enacted in order to provide clear and consistent regulations governing 
the most important institutes of the law of the sea and maritime law (particularly its 
administrative and civil aspects). In this field the Republic of Croatia has always most 
extensively respected the provisions and principles of various international conventions 
in creating its own maritime legislation. With respect to the maritime orientation of the 
Republic of Croatia at the time when this recently recognized country is engaged in 
establishing new proprietary and commercial relations based on market economy and private 
enterprise, the CMC satisfies the legal requirements of modern sea transport document. 
The maritime transport is the pillar of the world trade, and for a small economy such as 
that of the Republic of Croatia, the world market is a conditio sine qua non of its 
existence.13 
Dragan BOLANÓA 
13 Compare BOLANÓA, D.: Poloiaj Republike Hrvatske u odnosu na pravo i politiku Europske zajednice 
prema pomorskom transportu, Pravni vjesnik, Osijek, No. 1—4, 1992. 149. 
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1995 Yearbook of Criminology and Criminalistics 
The Yearbook of the National Institute of 
Criminology and Criminalistics has been 
published for the 32Dd time this year. It con-
tains—apart from a single exception—the 
results of the researches carried out by the 
researchers working at the Institute. 
The subject matters are carefully se-
lected, and this ensures that many people 
also outside the circle of lawyers find an 
interesting and instructive reading among 
the articles published in the Yearbook. 
Most authors contributing to the Year-
book represent the field of criminology, thus 
we may find an analysis of the relationship 
between corruption and organized crime, 
crimes against property, crimes committed 
in gangs, etc. 
The other main field of study, crimi-
nalistics, is dealt with in two articles; the 
first examines from a theoretical point of 
view the place and relations of crimina-
listics among the branches of criminal 
sciences, whereas the other introduces to 
the reader the method of "profile-making" 
which is applied as a result of comparing 
sexually motivated violent crimes. The 
balance manifest in editing praises, un-
fortunately for the last time, the sense of 
balance and moderateness of László 
Pusztai. Because of the sudden death of the 
director of the NICC, the fellow authors 
further on may only write about him, but 
not with him any more. 
The article written by László Pusztai, 
with the title 'The dilemma of prevention 
of crimes" submits that beside emphasizing 
the idea of punishment of crimes, prevention 
shall be accorded an outstanding role. The 
author describes the work of the so-called 
crime prevention councils, analyses foreign 
experience and draws the conclusion that 
"where the increase in the number of 
crimes reaches the limits of unbearableness 
and its further spreading would endanger 
the quality of life, conclusions and proposals 
of scientific research will be taken into due 
consideration." 
Analysing the practice of crime preven-
tion, he mentions two trends: first he speaks 
about communal crime prevention, which is 
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formally "a crime preventing strategy for 
local managing of crimes". Its aim is to 
realize the outcome of scientific research in 
practice. 
Secondly, the author introduces to us 
a method originating from the United States 
called Community Oriented Policing (or 
shortly, Community Policing). This is basi-
cally "the magic word used in the new 
police strategy, under which it is understood 
to adjust policing functions to the needs and 
problems of a regionally defined commu-
nity." 
The lesson of COP is that the coope-
ration between the police and the population 
shall be strengthened, because it is only 
possible to continuously maintain public 
order and public security based on a such 
cooperation. 
The article written by Ferenc Irk with 
the title "Changing of the political system 
and crime" is studying the social characte-
ristics of the Central European region, the 
role of the state modified by the changing 
of the political system, and the relations 
between changes in the economy and in 
moral values. 
The author raises the question, while 
analysing the crimes of our region "if there 
was a uniform order of values accepted by 
the entire ruling class?" Hence acceptance 
of a dominant order of values could mean 
social stability. Thus it becomes possible 
that compliance with the legal norms by the 
citizens be not merely an enforced behavior 
but a voluntary conduct. 
Ferenc Irk divides criminal offenses 
into two large groups: one covers crimes 
that raise a feeling of immediate danger and 
that therefore raise fear in the individual, 
because he feels incapable of protecting 
himself against such offenses. The fear 
from the unknown is especially strong 
because one feels weaker and more in-
capable to protect himself, even if the 
objective level of danger is eventually not 
higher than usual. 
The other category includes criminal 
offenses the perpetrator of which "takes 
revenge on the state that had been alienated 
from the citizens". 
The third category of criminal offen-
ses—that remains hidden from the eyes of 
the citizens, anyway—is organized crime and 
bribery, and their subcategories (drog-
dealing, money laundry, etc.). 
The author also searches for an answer 
to the question why does not continue the 
increase in the number of criminal offenses 
as it could be sensed at the beginning of 
the changing of the political system. One 
of the reasons for that is that society did 
not have to face the changes completely 
unprepared but it had developed a certain 
"techniqe of surveillance" already in the 
former regime, and it started to implement 
it in the new system quite successfully. 
Finally, Ferenc Irk deals with the 
reactions to crime. It is interesting that 
whereas with regard to organized crime and 
money laundry the state primarily applies 
the principle of freightening, general and 
specific prevention, with regard to juveniles 
or young adults it attempts to link ex-
pediency with the guarantual principles. The 
aim of the state is obviously to protect the 
society against criminals falling into the 
first category and to rehabilitate the citizens 
that had turned into criminals falling into 
the second one. 
The work by Mariann Kránitz wearing 
the title "Bribers-organized crime" summa-
rizes the results of her research on the 
phenomenon of corruption, states that 
bribery has been connected to organized 
crime already in Hungary too. 
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The study analyses the process of de-
velopment of Hungarian organized crime 
starting from the beginnings. 
The first period was at 1979-80. In the 
period of "soft dictatorship" a social class 
evolved that got more and more wealthy, 
but the prerequisite of its getting rich was 
committing crimes. A group of so-called 
"advisors" joins this class the purpose of 
which is to find out who is wealthy enough 
to be worth of robbing". 
The second period can be dated 
approximately at 1984-85, when criminals 
further developed the formerly existing 
bases, characteristics and adjusted them to 
the economic conditions that had changed 
in the meantime. Of course, the amendment 
of this process with bribery cannot be 
missing, either. 
The so-called "hard core" appears by 
1989-90. The system will be completed by 
that time, and it gains a solid structure 
through which it can function really effecti-
vely. Organized crime forms a kind of 
"quiet coexistence" with power. 
Finally the author describes the present, 
mentioning four typical phenomena in the 
field of organized crime, namely: drug-
trafficking, trading of weapons and nuclear 
materials, trading of cars and money 
laundry. 
The paper written by Klára Kerezsi, 
"Criminal offenses committed by children 
and juveniles and child victims in Hungary" 
analyses in its first part the relationship 
between social integration and criminality. 
The author submits that the chances for 
integration in the society have signficantly 
worsened. 
The proportion of people living within 
a full family has decreased in the past 20 
years from 84.2% to 81.3%. The divorce 
rate has regrettably increased and the pro-
portion of families with only one parent has 
increased. 
In the period of political changes 
psychological burdens have grown and new 
and previously unknown problems such as 
unemployment and financial problems had 
to be faced. These reasons contributed to that 
the rate of crimes against property performs 
a dynamic development. 
The author finds it worrying that the 
number of juveniles among perpetrators of 
criminal offenses keeps on increasing. The 
criminal record of young people is worse 
than that of the adult population and this 
record is worse in the cities than in the 
villages. 
Klára Kerezsi points out that problems 
in advising do not only affect the labor 
market, hence in 1982 11.7% of young 
criminals were not employed and by 1993 
this rate increased to 42.2%. 
According to the author, the opinions 
of legislators differ relating to the treatment 
of juvenile offenders. They usually cannot 
choose between the models of criminal sanc-
tions based on proportionality and resociali-
zation. 
There exists a further school believing 
that the conflicts created by crimial offenses 
may be settled through mediation, recon-
ciliation of the perpetrator and the victim, 
and restitution. 
At the end, the author addresses the 
problem of children criminals, and the child-
aged victims of criminal offenses. 
Tibor László Nagy, in the introduction 
of his article on "Morphology of crimes 
against property" lists the categories of such 
crimes. 
The feudal period of our history was 
characterized by an eventual regulation on 
crimes against property and the priority of 
customary law. István Werbőczy in the 
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Triparti tum declares perpetrators of crimes 
against property as "public haramies". 
The first modem Hungarian penal code, 
the Csemegi Code did not contain the 
general header of crimes against property. 
The high quality of this Code can be de-
monstrated by the fact that criminal justice 
could not exist without it even after 1945. 
Major change was resulted by the Decree 
No. 24 in 1950, which regulated the protec-
tion of social property that has, by that time, 
become the predominant form of property. 
Afterwards, several modifications were 
effected, the most important among which 
are: Law No. 5 of 1960, Decree No. 28 of 
1971, Law No. 4 of 1978, Law No. 18 of 
1993. The latter has introduced a new cate-
gory of criminal offenses, namely negligent 
embezzlement. 
The author further deals with the 
structure and dynamics of offenses against 
property. He states that during the seventies 
the rate of accumulated crimes was stag-
nating, but from 1980 a gradual, from 1989 
radical increase could be measured. 
Beside the increase in the number of such 
offenses, a change in their quality can be 
sensed, too. More and more offenses are 
committed in an outrageous, brutal manner. 
Nowadays there is nothing special any more 
in the news on robberies committed in under-
ground stations, or gas-spray attacks. The 
offenders caught at the event of committing 
the crime often resist their persecutors. 
Tibor László Nagy deals further on with 
theft, stating that this is the most typical 
crime against property. One of the most 
well-organized form of criminal offenses is 
robbery, and the number of robberies into 
living houses is especially high. It is not 
rare that offenders unreasonably destroy the 
apartments they have entered, or even set 
them on fire. Similarily to the Western-
European situation, the number of offenses 
concerning cars is also increasing. 
Frauds are also common. Most typical 
are the so-called advertisement frauds, and 
the illegitimate claims for reimbursement 
of VAT. Crime insurance is also common, 
as well as false robbery and self-robbery is 
fashionable. 
The relatively frequent armed robberies 
are usually directed at post offices, financial 
institutions and petrol stations. 
Robbery is the most serious among the 
crimes against property, thus investigation 
in these matters is more intensive than 
usually, as it is indicated by detection rate 
of unknown perpetrators. 
The paper written by Zsolt Németh, 
Iván Münnich and József Kó with the title 
"Some characteristics of gang criminality 
in Hungary" submits in its introductory part 
that "the phenomenon appeared in a special 
period of time, after the events referred to 
as contra-revolution, when the status of 
power was, even expressing it with a cautious 
formulation, uncertain, insecure". 
Research concerning Hungarian gang-
criminality is based on the experience 
gained in the 1960-ies. At that time, in the 
composition of gangs, juveniles were repre-
sented with 50-60%, whereas adults with 
30-35%. There were more boys than girls 
in these groups, but it is an interesting fact 
that the rate of those having successfully 
finished primary school is surprisingly high 
among these young people. Those studying 
the personality of gang members often meet 
intelligent youngsters whose failure to have 
good marks in school is not due to the lack 
of their capacities but rather to the lack of 
their motivation. 
Then the authors summarize the results 
of their research conducted among those 
punished for offenses committed in gangs. 
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The studied "gang Z" consisted of 50 
members. The members met almost daily 
between 1968 and 1972, and committed 
several criminal offenses during this 4-year 
period. 
The authors describe the offenses 
committed by and the living conditions of 
each gang member individually. M.J. was 
sentenced for rape to 2 years in prison, 
suspended. Since the sentence he leads a 
normal life. Before his crime, M. J. was an 
average person. His opinion on his father 
was positive, his mother meant a mental 
shelter for him. Still, his life was full of 
deliquences, such as failing to go to school. 
He did not intend to get good marks in 
school, for he was not interested in studying, 
thus he found amusement in sports. He "does 
not remember" the offense, he considers the 
sentence to be unjust. According to the 
results of the frustration-test, he does not get 
aggressive in conflict situations; he rather 
tends to blame himself. It can reasonably be 
asssumed that he has learnt the lesson from 
his violations of norms committed at young 
age, and he would not continue his way 
towards a "criminal carrier". 
It becomes slowly an established tra-
dition of the Yearbook to publish an article 
written by a foreign scholar. This time it is 
a work by Ilans Heiner Kühne having the 
title: "New tendencies to avoid enforcement 
of the punishment of imprisonment". In the 
author's opinion, the future reform of 
criminal sancüons in Germany will have to 
follow two purposes: "first is the higher 
variability of available sanctions in order to 
increase the possibility for criminal punish-
ments to be adjusted in accordance with the 
individual characteristics, the second is a 
decrease in the level of sanctions in order 
to declare enforced imprisonment a rare 
exception in practice." 
The author points out that money sen-
tence is the primary form of punishment 
with its 83%, the reason for which is the 
simplicity of its enforcement and its positive 
fiscal effect. 
Although probaüon has proved to be 
effective, yet it sometimes overrides its 
success. Therefore it would be important to 
create an opportunity in the future to provide 
small groups of probationers with an inten-
sive advising service by probation officers. 
Of course, such opportuniües are not 
satisfactory yet, although the relevant German 
rules and regulations in force do enable an 
exchange and combination of available 
forms of sancüons within broad limits. 
Thus, for example, termination of the 
proceeding may be connected with an ob-
ligation to compensate or payment of a 
certain amount, or even with a duty to carry 
out public works. 
Interestingly enough, German law in 
force does not only offer a choice between 
deprivation of liberty and money sentence 
but "it creates a gradual system of state 
sanctions by resorting to orders and direc-
tives". 
The author analyses the several concepts 
on enforcement of criminal sanctions and he 
believes that it would be advisable to intro-
duce the institution of free leave (Freigang) 
that would enable for the sentenced person 
to carry out regular activities outside the 
penal institution without the supervision of 
the prisoners. 
He recalls the institutions of social 
therapy, under the notion of which such 
institutions shall be understood where 
emphasis is laid on treatment. 
The article written by József Molnár was 
given the title "the science of criminalistics" 
and its starting point is the defmiüon of the 
noüon of criminalisücs. According to the 
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author, "criminalistics, even if not exclu-
sively, is unambiguously practice itself'. 
Previously there existed another theory 
as well, claiming that criminology belonged 
to natural sciences. 
Molnáfs opinion is closely related to the 
statement originating from Belkin according 
to which "the practice of clearing up criminal 
offenses and their investigation indirectly 
constitutes the major and fundamental source 
of knowledge for criminalistics". The most 
significant characteristic of the science of 
criminalistics is not its uniformity but quite 
the opposite: its determiningly significant 
fractional inner structure". 
Hungarian post-war doctrine divides 
criminalistics into three main parts. The first 
major part was criminal strategy that contains 
the functional principles of organs fighting 
against criminality, their procedural and 
organizational methods. Criminal technique 
deals with the implementation of scientific 
and technical methods serving the purposes 
of the fight against criminals and inves-
tigation. The third composing element is 
criminal methodology that means the 
reasonable application of the available tech-
nical and tactical methods for investigating 
the individual offenses. 
The author studies the relationship of 
criminalistics to other scientific branches. He 
submits that "criminalistics is a complex 
science serving the purposes of criminal 
justice that is based as fundamental science 
on criminal law and that forms a linking 
chain between criminal law and other social 
sciences within the system of sciences". 
Anna Kiss wrote a paper with the follow-
ing title "Profile-making as a new method of 
criminalistics". This article introduces to the 
reader the method of profile-making that had 
been worked out for promoting the effec-
tiveness of investigation. Nevertheless, even 
the supporters of this method concede that 
this method is not fully able to name the 
offender, however taking into consideration 
of the profile certainly narrows the circle of 
possible suspects. 
In making the profile of an offender, it 
was the starting point of the FBI that humans 
realize their thoughts in their activities. The 
detectives in the course of viewing the scene 
of the crime identify the place of crime and 
study the so-called key indicators on the 
basis of which one can draw conclusion with 
regard to the personality of the offender. As 
a result of this method, no concrete individual 
is found but certain personal characteristics 
and typical forms of activities of the offender 
are described. 
In making the profile of the criminal, 
several traces can be of help, such as photos 
of the place of crime, pathological results, 
physical characteristics of the victim, the 
crime itself. The Violent Criminals Arresting 
Program (VICAP), which has been worked 
out in the United States and functions world-
wide since May 29, 1985 helps in imple-
menting this method. 
The experts create the profile of the 
offender based on the several data (such as 
motives, the mental status of the offender 
etc.). The strategy of investigation will be 
determined according to this profile. 
In the opinion of the author, only 
practice can judge the effectiveness and 
applicability of profile-making. Despite of 
spectacular successes, no correct assessment 
can be done on the basis of isolated indi-
vidual cases. 
In England, many profiles have already 
been done, however, assessment on their 
effectiveness will only be conducted in the 
close future. It is not likely, though, that 
the need for profile-creation would be 
significant in practice. 
Book review 71 
This Yearbook—similarly to the pre-
vious years—provides the readers with a 
selection of the latest results reached at the 
single research center on criminology and 
criminalistics in the Central- and East 
European region at an unchanged niveau. It 
is regrettable indeed, that the price of this 
volume prevents so many people from plac-
ing this book on the book shelf in their 
homes among the previous volumes of this 
Yearbook. 
Richárd HORVÁTH 
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STUDIES 
Csaba VARGA Patterns of Thought, 
Patterns of Law 
Law is a culture of concepts. It is an aggregate of norms, institutions constituted from 
norms, and of facts considered to be their institutional realisation. All of this is placed 
in a conceptual framework delimiting the law from its environment (called non-law), 
and creating its internal structure as well. Accordingly, law is a self-establishing 
creation, cognisable exclusively through its own concepts. For law names and selects 
itself. That is, the call-words and naming the law provided by itself represent the key 
to its imagination and understanding.1 
In the Euro-Atlantic region, the thought-patterns for law are rooted in the formal law 
of modern statehood,2 inspired by Roman sources. In the past thousand years, the 
continental (civil) law, on the one hand, and the Anglo-American common law, on the 
other, were formed as variations to these patterns. So far, we have been able to conceive 
any kind of law or legal arrangement on the exclusive basis and to the analogy of these 
patterns. For instance, our approach to the Jewish law has been based upon its close 
similarity to them; or the Islamic law, upon the past and extension of its mutual 
1 For the interplay between the self-conceptualisation of law and its professional ideology, taken as an 
ontological factor built in legal epistemology, see VARGA. Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1985, 193 p. For the proper role of formal qualities (concepts and logic) in the 
law's actual working, see VARGA Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process. The Establishment of Facts, 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1995, vii + 249 p. 
2 Cf. VARGA, Cs.: 'Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes formales Recht', Acta Juridica Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae 26, 1984, 1-2, 235-241, reprinted in his Law and Philosophy. Selected Papers 
in Legal Theory, ELTE Project on Comparative Legal Cultures, Budapest, 1994, 201-207 [Philosophiae 
Iuris], 
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relations to them. Yet, one faces problems when the ancient sources of Roman law or 
the very early forms of Greek law are considered,3 as these rely on a basically different 
understanding of the world and creation of worldly orders. This also explains why the 
so-called primitive law, as well as the Afro-Asiatic—especially tribal, Chinese and 
Japanese—legal arrangements have remained mostly inaccessible, inconceivable, and, 
after all, unknown and misunderstood in western scholarship. 
At the turn of the century, the debate between legal positivism and sociology focused 
on the question whether a formalised system of institutions is cognisable and conceptually 
analysable at all, without having the underlying constituting and formalising rules 
posited.4 Today's methodological debates in cultural anthropology argue about whether 
the institutionalised set of facts of a thoroughly socialised world is approachable at all 
from a perspective other than an institutional one.5 While it is the superstructure of so-
called primitive societies (partly institutionalised and formalised at the most) that is at 
stake, its interpretation has already revealed a hardly bridgeable gap in knowledge, with 
the symbolism of "missionaries in one boat", and the scepticism of "I learn your culture 
through mine".6 
This is to say that the openness, free flow and freedom from prejudice of 
information processes necessarily become a foundational social value for the world to 
be cognisable. Only open access to information allows the world arrangement based 
upon differing principles and functioning logic to be learned beyond the reach of own 
limiting paradigms. 
In my paper, I will attempt to flash alternative potentialities for world, order, 
organising principle and logic of operation—potentialities of a world beyond our own 
prevailing paradigms, which could have remained unknown and misunderstood in our 
professional culture, due to traditional Euro-centrism and informational closedness. 
Owing to different conceptualisation, even new disciplines, such as comparative legal 
3 Cf., e.g., JONES, J. W.: The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks. An Introduction, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1956, X + 327 p.; GARNER, R.: Law and Society in Classical Athens. Croom Helm, London—Sydney, 
1987, viii + 161 p.; OSTWALD, M.: Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1969, xiv + 228 p.; as well as MacDOWELL, D. M.: The Law in Classical Athens. Thames and 
Hudson, London, 1978 [Aspects of Greek and Roman Life] and TODD, S. C.: The Shape of Athenian Law. 
Clarendon, Oxford, 1993. 
4 Cf. Hans Kelsen und die Rechtssoziologie. Auseinandersetzungen mit Hermann U. Kantorowitz, Eugen 
Ehrlich und Max Weber (ed. S. PAULSON), Scientia, Aalen, 1992, xiii + 119 p. 
5 Cf., e.g., FALK, S. M.: 'Comparative Studies: Introduction' in Law in Culture and Society (ed. L. 
NADER), Aldine, Chicago, 1969, 337-348; GLUCKMAN, M.: 'Concepts in the Comparative Study of Tribal 
Law', in ibid., 349-373; and BOHANNAN, P.: 'Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology', in ibid., 
401-418. 
6 In its original formulation, see COHN, В. S.: 'Anthropology and History: The Stale of the Play', 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, 1980, 199. For the whole range of problems in a jurisprudential 
approach, including origins in Greek and Roman practice, see VARGA, Cs.: Előadások a jogi gondolkodás 
paradigmáiról [Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking]. Budapest, Osiris, 1996, 1997, 191 p. [Bibliotheca 
Cathedrae Philosophiae Iuris et Rerum Politicarum Universitatis Catholicae de Petro Pázmány nominalae, II 
Dissertationes 1]. 
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cultures7 and comparative judicial mind8, could have arrived by now at the presentation 
and description of 'brute' and 'descriptive' facts at the most in want of anything 
better. 
• 
When in a comparative methodology of the moral and legal mind9 we stated that from 
the words of Jesus Christ, recorded in the New Testament, his teachings cannot be 
"deduced", we meant not to express something shocking, but to confirm an otherwise 
familiar philosophical realisation. Taking the opposite stance, if we stated that the 
teachings of Jesus Christ could be formulated in terms of "conclusions", moreover, they 
could be aligned into a logical sequence of doctrinal propositions with the definitive 
rigour of geometry, and he even enunciated them with axiomatic pretensions, we would 
thereby only declare that although the Master expressed what he intended to with 
unequivocacy, he did it in a manner that prevented us from acting in an autonomous 
way. For if we claim that the Law decides everything in and of itself, thanks to its 
prevalence, there will be no room for doubt any longer, and in return, there will be no 
room for any autonomous decision either. Since, either breaking of the law or its 
subservient observation will be the case; tertium non datur. Well, there is no law with 
Jesus Christ in such meaning. 
On the other hand, what exists and validates itself in Christianity is the accumulation 
and superimposition of individual situations generated in the continuity of life at any 
given time; and we are expected to take an irrevocably personal decision in regard of 
them. No previous example, case or pattern can afford an excuse, relieving one from 
the responsibility of taking a personal stand. This is not so because the examples were 
deficient, or Jesus Christ lived a life too short or too perfect to give examples of 
sufficient variety and subtlety, or perhaps the Apostles did not perform the job of 
committing his deeds and teachings into writing with proper faithfulness and 
completeness. It is simply so-and this is the methodological message—because the 
7 Cf. Comparative Legal Cultures (ed. & introd. VARGA, Cs.), New York University Press, Aide rshot—Hong 
Kong—Singapore—Sydney: Dartmouth and New York, 1992, xxiv + 614 p. (The International Library of Essays 
in Law & Legal Theory; Legal Cultures 1]; European Legal Cultures (ed. GESSNER, V.-HOELAND, 
A—VARGA, Cs.). Dartmouth, Aldershot-Brookfield USA-Singaportr-Sydney, 1996, xviii + 567 p. (TEMPUS 
Textbook Series on European Law and European Legal Cultures 1]; Comparing Legal Cultures (ed. NELKEN, 
D.), Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997, viii + 274 p. [Socio-legal Studies]; Changing Legal Cultures (ed. FEEST, 
J . -BLANKENBURG, E.),Intemational Institute for the Sociology of Law, Onati, 1997, 226 p. [Onati Pre-
publications]. 
8 Cf., e.g.. Comparative Legal Cultures, Part IV on Comparative Legal Methods, 333-447, and European 
Legal Cultures, Part II on The European Legal Mind, 89-166. 
9 Cf. VARGA, Cs.: 'Norms through Parables in the New Testament: An Alternative Framework for Time 
and Law' in Time and Law (ed. F. OST— M. Van HOECKE), Bruylant, Brussels [The European Academy of 
Legal Theory in preparation]), and, in a larger context, VARGA, Cs.: Előadások (note 6), passim. 
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parables are not meant for such purpose.10 Several times more parables could still not 
offer more in such perspective. The pattern of Jesus Christ itself must be taken as an 
instance, and not as a proposition. It ensures the autonomy of man, and it assumes 
personal responsibility in return. Should we be exempt from free choice between 
concurrent alternative decisions personalising the Law, we would have to feel the very 
construction as damaging to human dignity. 
There are cultures in which the freedom of choice and the idea of moral autonomy 
are so deeply rooted that they cannot allow anything different (especially, external and 
enforceable regulation of behaviour) to develop. From such perspective, it is but a 
natural consequence that what we usually (as lead by own cultural presuppositions) call 
law proves to be the exact opposite to any autonomous, responsible personal choice, 
as it is based on heteronomy and the breaking of the own will. We may be aware of 
it, but we are deeply socialised to it. Well, in cultures where such external law forms 
the basis of social co-existence, we can have only one thing to do: to follow its orders. 
Moral considerations will not matter any longer. Law conceived like this, as Kant 
makes clear in a classical way," is built upon a duality in which external and 
internal—moral and legal—are separated. The former is related to matters of conscience, 
to what derives from our personality, from our internal substance. Society is not 
concerned about this directly. What mainly concerns the outside world is that we 
should not hurt our fellow-men, nor take their things, take advantage of the 
community's property, and so on. It is with our exterior that we participate in social 
commerce: this is what we can help or damage society with. In this perspective, it is 
by no means a criterion how our interior is. Of course, it was clear to Kant that there 
is a relation between interior and exterior. However, he differentiated between the 
spheres of morality and legality, knowing that their interaction (its direction or 
character) is not at all shortcut, immediate or unambiguous. Their co-relation rather 
reveals a common tendency. 
Among the above mentioned cultures the most remarkable has developed in China. 
This radiated through Korea to Japan. As it is known, China is one of the oldest states 
in history. Its law is not only developed, but has a long history as well. The Chinese 
empire can claim an experience even older and more challenging than the Roman 
Catholic Church. As it is also known, China has always been an empire due to both 
size and machinery. What we could learn later in Europe as statehood had originally 
operated in China as empire-hood. Yet, what was used as and for law in Europe had 
never been considered law in China. The empire-hood of China, undisturbed for 
10 For an observation from a methodological perspective, see SEGAL, E.: 'Law as Allegory: An Unnoticed 
Literary Device in Talmudic Narratives', Proofiexls 8, 1988, 245ff. 
11 Kant, I.: Die Methaphysik der Sitten, in his Werke, VII, Berlin, 1916, 14. 
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thousands of years, produced instruments of control original both in shape and action, 
differing from the ones in Europe.12 
Sometime in the 3rd century B.C., for a short and transitional period, one of the 
thought trends, legalism, prevailed over the others, supported by one of the reigning 
groups.13 It focused on enforcing as the basis of law one of the components of the 
indivisible tradition of Chinese law, the layer of fa. The dynasty concerned was soon 
abolished, and the former viewpoints of Confucius became prevailing again. Thus, 
China could organise social co-existence undisturbed—all the more, as the next falter 
could lead China into temptation two and a half thousand years later under the 
Communist rule of Mao Tse-tung. In the so-called big-jump period (also called the 
Cultural Revolution) China gave up its modern culture of formal law, adopted by the 
end of the century under European (German and French) imperialist pressure for 
modernisation, later furbished through Moscow mediation in order to meet the 
requirements of power centralisation. Thus, instead of any rule of formal law, China 
allowed a non-formal patriarchal agent to prevail which gave free scope for political-
social influences at any given time and which—at least according to Western 
evaluation-resulted in anarchy, unforseeability and unreliability. Comparative historico-
philosophical analyses have proven that through loosening the framework of formal law 
China has actually returned to her cultural antecedents and own traditions, but in a 
distorted form, artificially leading to a forced path, and with a frightful falter 
indeed.14 
12 For the basic notions of Chinese law, see DORSF.Y, G. L.: 'Two Objective Bases for a World-wide Legal 
Order' in Ideological Differences and World Order. Studies in the Philosophy and Science of the World's 
Cultures (ed. NORTHROP, F. S. C.), Yale University Press, New Haven, etc. 1949, 442-474, and KIM, H. 
I.: Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West. A Comparative Study, Kennikat Press [National 
University Publications], Port Washington—New York—London, 1981, xiii + 175 p. For its complexity, see 
LEE, L. T.—LAI, W. W.: 'The Chinese Conceptions of Law: Confucian, Legalist and Buddhist', Hastings Law 
Journal. 29, 1978, 1307-1329, as well as MELKEVIK, В.: 'Un regard sur la culture juridique chinoise: 
l 'École des légistes, le confucianisme et la philosophie du droit'. Les Cahiers de Droit 37, 1996, 3, 603-627. 
For the flexibility of Chinese law, see BODDE, D—MORRIS, С.: Law in Imperial China, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1967, 21; PEERENBOOM, R. P.: Law and Morality in Ancient China. The Silk 
Manuscripts of Huang-Lao, State University of New York Press, 1993, xvi + 380 p. [SUNY Series in Chinese 
Philosophy and Culture], 
13 E.g., HULSEWÉ, A. F. P.: 'The Legalists and the Laws of Ch' in ' in Leyden Studies in Sinology (ed. 
IDEMA W. L.), Brill, Leiden, 1981, 1-22; and Thought and Law in Quin and Han China. Studies Dedicated 
to Anthony Hulsewé on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday (eds IDEMA W. L.—ZÜRCHER, E.), Brill. 
Leiden-New Yotk-K0benhavn-Köln, 1990, ix + 224 p. [Sinica Leidensia XXIV]; as well as GRAHAM, A. 
C.: Disputes of the Tao. Philosophical Arguments in Ancient China [1989, Open Court, La Salle, 111., 1991, 
para. 3: 'Legalism: An Amoral Science of Statecraft', 267-292; and ZHIYONG, W.: 'Le positivisme juridique 
dans la Chine ancienne' in Legal Systems and Legal Science. Proceedings of the 17th World Congress of IVR, 
VI (ed. PAVCNIK, M.-ZANETTI, G.), Steiner, Stuttgart. 1997, 58-70 [Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie, Beiheft 70]. 
14 Cf. VARGA, Cs.: Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1991, 
239-242, especially at note 73. 
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According to Confucius, only a measurement capable of giving subtle answers, and 
expressing nuances supports man in his moral capacity. Sharp contrasts, extreme 
formulations can hardly go with it. In China it is assumed that we all represent moral 
quality, and hold internal values. Therefore, we have to assume to be able to decide 
what we need to do in various situations. We should act not for others* sake, not for 
gods* or fellow-men's appreciation, and especially not simply to do good or to meet 
requirements set by external norms. The conformity of legality is unknown in this 
culture. Instead, the fulfilment of moral quality has to make us act, that is, to live our 
life in a way, as expressed by the Japanese, "not to lose our face". Anyone forcing a 
judgement on us would surely cause more damage than the eventual moral disapproval 
of our environment. That is to say, experiencing our autonomy comes first, and what 
it suggests comes only after. 
In various practical situations, in the Chinese culture of autonomy the event which 
caused the tension is approached carefully, from a distance, and avoiding all 
formalities; instead of directing the dispute to a forced channel, predefining its 
outcome, or rephrasing it through norms so that the other party should be defeated. 
Conflicts of the past, or considerations and arguments brought up once in their 
resolution are referred to, if at all, as memories only. The discussion is kept among 
such frames that the partners agree on decisive questions by themselves. Their 
approach to the merits should neither lead to extreme and repelling formulations, nor 
harm the other. Not being a polarised opposition between their status, there will be no 
extreme result either. Not having a plaintiff and a defendant, there will be no winner 
and loser either. The participants debate in merits as equal partners, aware of being 
doomed to a common fate both as humans and moral beings. They can only achieve 
their respective goals together. For the peace of society can only be restored if they 
have returned to the everyday life "keeping their face". 
The sides in the dispute are expected to know how to reach a resolution by 
themselves. Their whole community is responsible for it (by no means only indirectly 
or in a symbolic sense). In order to reach it, a third person, mutually acceptable for 
their communities, takes usually part in the resolutions. For China was the statehood 
of an empire of incredible dimensions. The state power relied on winning mutual 
acceptance for and transmitting the tradition of common values, considered by far more 
important than the individual life with a narrow personal perspective. The apex value 
was the empire's life and continuity. Therefore, there was a need (and not on a 
village, town, district, or county level, but on the mandarin-administration level, 
extending to huge regional units) for building in safety valves to ensure that trivial 
everyday quarrels were solved from own sources. The only real empire-level regulation 
was practically born within this circle. For the persons concerned had to know how to 
solve their disputes. They had to do so within such limits that the dispute should not 
degenerate. The respective community had to bear direct responsibility for it. Thus, 
they avoided with apparent success the extreme trap of both personal fall and damaging 
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the community.15 On the other hand, when no resolution was arrived at in the 
community, the case unavoidably went to the mandarin. Instead of administering justice, 
his task was to punish those who proved to be unable to find the ways of a just 
resolution. He proceeded in a manner that the mere fact of turning to him should 
generate a repressive effect, and, next time, the communities would favour prevention 
of dispute-degeneration by effectively resolving it in merits. 
The point here is not simply about the opposition of non-formal and formal patterns 
of conflict-settlements, but also about a legal-anthropological basic situation.16 Namely, 
sometime somewhere a dispute occurs. This situation is considered injurious by 
someone. Somebody ascribes it to somebody else, considering him responsible for the 
situation. Usually, the situation can be solved by those involved. This is the non-formal 
resolution of dispute, avoiding a formal decision, which would declare one party the 
winner and the other the loser. In consequence, the dispute and the underlying conflict 
will vanish completely. Even the memory that once a difference has occurred disappears 
in the mist of the past. In the European culture of the formal settlement of conflicts, 
however, one turns to an outsider to reach a decision. The decision-maker, as formal 
authority, will polarise the disputed terms into one of the exclusive alternatives of "he 
is right" and "he is not right", artificially putting an end to the conflict and formally 
naming one winner and one loser. 
Let us continue the intellectual journey through the so-called primitive tribal practice 
of Papua New Guinea. When an injury occurs and cannot be solved by those involved, 
it will become a case of the community. If not solved promptly, it will affect a 
widening group among the tribe in question. If no solution is presented by the tribe, 
ultimately the tribes (communities) concerned will drift into conflict. Under so-called 
primitive conditions, without institutionalised courts and formal decision-making fora 
available, this can lead to a feud. One of the sides, not tolerating the unresolvedness any 
longer, openly announces breaking off , a process that will irrevocably generate violence 
or cause damage.17 
15 As it is known, the rigid followance of the principle Fial iustitia, pereal mundus.', and the obsessed 
community-deteriorating chase of justice, may equally produce victims. For the classic interpretation of the 
relentless desire of truth, based on the work of Heinrich Kleist, see FINK, A.: 'Michael Kohlhaas — ein noch 
anhängiger Prozeß: Geschichte und Kritik der bisher ergangenen Urteile' in Rechtsgeschichte als 
Kulturgeschichte. Festschrift für Adalbert Erter zum 70. Geburtstag (hrsg.: BECKER, H.-J. & «].), Scientia, 
Aalen, 1976, 37-108, as well as SENDLER, H.: Ober Michael Kohlhaas — damals und heule, de Gmyter, 
Berlin, 1985, 45 p. (Schriftenreihe der Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin, Heft 92]. 
16 For an overview, see Law and Anthropology (ed. SACK, P.), Dartmouth, Aldershot, etc., 1992, xxx + 527 
p. [The International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory: Legal Cultures 3J. 
17 E.g., Law and Warfare. Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict (ed. BOHANNAN, P.), The Natural 
History Press, Garden Ci ty-New York, 1967, and POSPÍSIL, L.: The Anthropology of Law. A Comparative 
Theory, HRAF, New Haven, 1974, 2, as well as POSPÍSIL, L : Kapauku Papuans and Their Law. Yale 
University Department of Anthropology, New Haven, 1958 [Publications in Anthropology 54]. 
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What is broken in such a case is called shalom}* It means peace, the maintenance 
of which is the cardinal issue in a Jewish community,19 for being an indispensable 
prerequisite to its survival. A community drifted into war for whatever reason has the 
chance of its future existence to become questioned or undermined. Hostility would 
even exclude the mere chance of future resolution. It would eventually declare one of 
the parties victorious, and the other defeated. Breaking of the equilibrium, and the 
intention to balance it out can easily lead to the community 's moral or physical 
annihilation. Then the shalom is over, at least for an extended period of time. As a 
natural consequence, brute victory can easily incite revenge, back strike, or renew the 
struggle.20 
Hostility, endangering the whole community, must be blocked, and prevented at all 
costs if possible. Mandarin justice comes into sight under such conditions. The 
mandarin, as the emperor 's representative, can only apply imperial laws. This is the 
emperor 's law. It is not meant to provide just and equitable patterns for individuals of 
the population (constituted by groups of various order and rank), as opposed to the 
Roman-rooted procedural pattern with an individualist life-ideal that does it in Europe. 
The imperial law is not meant for taking a decision for the individual directly 
concerned. In a situation when the shalom is the prerequisite for peace, and peace for 
the survival of the community, the emperor 's law must opt for communal existence, 
instead of caring about justice or equity for the individual person. The subjects 
themselves and their communities have already had plenty of time and opportunity to 
do this. If they could not, the consequences will fall upon them, too. The very fact of 
having turned to the mandarin proves that they undertake the state of unrest. So the final 
goal is that the ones involved in the conflict should resolve it from the very beginning, 
putting all their power into scale, and by no means stretching the strings by increasing 
18 For the source of Jewish law, see DORFF, E. N.-ROSETT, A.: A Living Tree. The Roots and Growth of 
Jewish Law, State University of New York Press, Albany-New York, 1988, xv + 602 p.; and SCHIMMEL, 
H. С.: The Oral Law. A Study of the Rabbinic Contribution to Torah She-be-al-peh, Feldheim, Jerusalem—New 
York, 1971, 170 p.; for its cultural (religious and philosophical) environment, FALK, Z. W.: Law and Religion. 
The Jewish Experience, Mesharim, Jerusalem, 1981, 238 p., and JACKSON, B. S.: 'Ideas of Law and Legal 
Administration: A Semiotic Approach' in The World of Israel. Sociological, Anthropological and Political 
Perspectives (ed. CLEMENTS, R. E.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 185-202; for its moral 
determination, SILBERG, M.: 'Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence' Harvard Law Review 75, 1961, 
306-331 ; for the traditions of making it liveable in a stale environment, see SILBERG, M.: Talmudic Law and 
the Modern State [1961], The Burning Bush Press, New York, 1973, xiii + 224 p.; for its orientation towards 
duties instead of rights, STONE, S. L : 'In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Tum to the Jewish Legal Model 
in Contemporary American Legal Theory' Harvard Law Review 106, 1993, 4, 813-894; for its contradictory 
nature, JACKSON, B. S.: 'Jewish Law or Jewish Laws', Jewish Law Annual 8, 1989, 15ff, especially at 19-23. 
19 E.g., PÁKOZDY, L M.: 'Törvény és igazságszolgáltatás a Bibliában' [Law and Administration of Justice 
in the Bible] in A Biblia világa (ed. RAPCSÁNYI, U), MRT Minerva, Budapest, 1972, 145. 
20 It is remarkable that the "law of the jungle", formulated in Rudyard Kipling's poem The Second Jungle 
Book, is built upon the "judicious mixture of individualism and collectivism" within social co-operation, and 
not on the unlimited and merciless pursuit of individual concerns. See MACKJE, J. L : 'The Law of the Jungle: 
Moral Alternatives and Principles of Evolution' Philosophy 53, 1978, No. 206, 206ff. 
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tensions in the hope that the stronger, more aggressive and persistent will end by 
winning or getting more. 
It is incredibly warning to modesty that this culture, usually called primitive, was 
so much thought-through and consistent, proving great wisdom. Only prejudice may 
qualify this law to have been undeveloped. Yet, in almost every tribal community one 
can find the realisation that there is an optimum, and the resolution of conflict has to 
be done within it. It is the responsibility of every one to find a resolution in their own 
case. If the sides in the dispute cannot reach it, then their community—through the 
mediation of the local sage, priest or teacher-must take the case over, so that the 
situation causing the conflict will be reconsidered, and the dispute resolved. 
In every conflict-resolution arrangement there is a point which defines how far the 
dispute or, eventually, its degeneration into hostility can go.21 If the events transcend 
this, the whole judgement may easily turn over. Beyond this point not the one will be 
right who might have been at the time when the injury was still hidden and the dispute 
latent. Neither will the one with whom the search for truth degenerated into coarse 
shapes. The blame has to be taken by the one who, by over-claiming and relentless 
desire for truth, did not promote acceptable ending still equitable for everyone. 
Responsible will be the one who pushed his personal affair up to an extent threatening 
the community's existence, ignored prudentia, and proved to be incapable of reaching 
a compromise at the right time. 
The ideal of Confucius in China was the li. According to its conception, we were 
all born to be sovereign, autonomous moral beings. All of us must know what we 
deserve, and what is equitable in a given situation. Therefore, the li encourages us to 
resolve any dispute directly as inspired by our human inside, paying attention to the 
dignity and moral integrity of our fellow-men as well. Our moral order is autonomous, 
as it was born with us, and its actualisation depends on us. As opposed to it, the 
imperial law—the fa—has the only task to maintain imperial existence, the security and 
peace of the empire. The moral autonomy presupposed by the li is not simply an 
opposite of the heteronomy represented by the fa, as the latter is not calibrated to 
administer or ponder about justice between quarrelling individuals. It can only be used 
according to its purpose, so that the disapproval of the parties in failing to compromise 
is expressed. Therefore the fa was to deter and punish—in and for itself. Its ultimate goal 
was not to be taken advantage of, and anyone who experienced it should not wish it 
happen again. Anyone once getting involved, even as a witness, with the mandarin's 
fa was surely crushed. It was repressive, since the one who forced external authority to 
remedy the own injury "has lost the face". It had a social preventing force, because the 
poor soul who was just summoned in front of the imperial official as a witness could 
be thrown in jail, his/her properties could be confiscated, even though was only a 
witness, and if questioned, most likely told the truth. 
21 E.g., ROBERTS, S.: Order and Dispute. An Introduction to Legal Anthropology, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 
1979, 117ff [Pelican Books], 
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Thus, the fa is designated to the empire, and not to set imperial machinery in motion 
in petty affairs. Conflicts must be solved when and where they occur, without risking 
their aggravation, causing trouble beyond their own sphere, and plunging imperial peace 
into danger. For even the most personal and insignificant affairs can degenerate into 
hostility of imperial extensions, if the principle of fiat iustitia, pereat mundus! is 
inconsiderately and selfishly followed. 
It is not by chance that either in China and Japan, or in tribal cultures, the notion of 
right and righteousness has not even been invented.22 After all, what is right? The legal 
theory of Marxism, from its own positivist point of view, denied the notional inde-
pendence of ius [right; 'subjektives Recht'], and only recognised the notion of objective 
law, the lex [law; 'objektives, gesetztes Recht'], as an independent component. It 
considered the former to be only a derivative (projection and consequence) of the latter. 
Without taking a stand,23 we can realise that talking intelligibly about right presumes 
a law that serves as a basis, be it enacted or only mentally anticipated. For positive order 
can be assumed as enacted by the free will and absolutism of man, and also as derived 
from godly order. This is natural law, according to the western world concept.24 
Well, one can question whether there was legal order in China at all. For Chinese 
traditional culture was built on the harmony and mutual functioning of morally auto-
nomous beings to an extent almost equivalent to denying any concept of law. At the same 
time, the li presupposes that we are independent islands in the sea of one common moral 
order, creating our laws for ourselves, even if these laws have to promote peace and order 
in the whole community by their action and overall effect Failing to do so, we would have 
to tum to the procedure of the fa, anticipating our own crush and moral breakdown, so that 
the autonomous order of the community could reach its equilibrium again. 
In Japan there exists the giri morality,25 which in relation to law is the equivalent 
of the Chinese li.76 It is omnipresent, indestructible and resistant. Japanese culture 
22 E.g., BÜNGER, K.: 'Entstehen und Wandel des Rechts in China' in Entstehung und Wandel rechtlicher 
Traditionen (ed. FIKENTSCHER, W—FRANKE, H.—KÖHLER. O.), Alber, Freiburg-München, 1980, 465ff 
[Veröffentlichungen des "Instituts für historische Anthropologie E. V.", Band 2]. 
23 Cf., e.g., as a monographic summary, WELLMAN, С.: A Theory of Rights. New Jersey, Tolowa, 1985, 
and in the mirror of studies covering the field. Rights (ed. NINO, C.), Dartmouth, Aldershot, etc., 1992, xxxiv 
+ 466 p. [The International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory: Schools 8]. 
24 Cf., e.g., in the mirror of studies covering the field. Natural Law (ed. F1NNIS, J.): Dartmouth, Aldershot, 
etc., 1991, xxiii + 354 p. [The International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory: Schools 1, 1-2]. Its 
nature-like social bases are revealed by LAMPE, E.-J. in Grenzen des Rechtspositivismus. Eine rechts-
anthropologische Untersuchung, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1988, 227 p. [Schriften zur Rechtsthcorie, Heft 
128 J. 
25 E.g., NÖDA, Y.: Introduction au droit japonais. Dalloz, Paris, 1966, title IV, chapter III, 191-200 [Les 
systèmes de droit contemporains XIX]. 
26 E.g., RAHN, G.: 'Recht und Rechtsverständnis in Japan' in Entstehung und Wandel rechtlicher Traditionen 
(eds FIKENTSCHER, W—FRANKE, H.—KÖHLER, 0.), Alber. Freiburg-München, 1980, 486-487; as well 
as BÜNGER, K.: 'Entstehen und Wandel des Rechts in China' in Entstehung und Wandel rechtlicher 
Traditionen (ed. FIKENTSCHER, W—FRANKE, H—KÖHLER, O.). Alber, Freiburg-München, 1980, 460. Cf. 
also HALEY, J. O.: 'Shearing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law Without Sanctions' in Journal 
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and language are embedded in its idea so much that moral dilemmas in limiting 
conditions, characteristic to the western push for notionalisation and systématisation, 
cannot even be formulated in them." For instance, moral schematism with axiomatic 
pretensions would be unimaginable in Japan, which—as the prototype of confession 
handbooks with entire catalogues of moral sins-tjfi ovo classifies the taxonomy of our 
falling into sin. Thereby it could only triviálisé its occurrence into the mere 
actualisation of a series of previously notionalised, expressed and systematised 
eventualities, as the case of the finite realisation of situations of infinite variability. 
This is why it could be inconceivable in Japan, as it unwillingly suggests that it is not 
enough that I have sinned; it is not enough that I have given account for my sinful 
deed; it is not enough that I do penance for my sin; furthermore, I must also attach a 
taxonomic classification to it (indeed: just as if I were approaching the living world 
as Carl von Linné did, or the elements of nature as Dmitri Ivanovich Mendeleev did), 
so that we can be assured of what subcase and variety, or exception to the case I have 
committed. In such a schematism it is not likely that we will be able to achieve the 
complete catalogue of human sins. It is not likely that we will give way to catharsis 
at the end. It is not likely that finally we will focus the rest of our attention on the 
reparation of its irremediable consequences. For, in ultimate analysis, every 
circumstance we can think of will be conceived as the case of a closed and somewhat 
rigid classification scheme. 
A Japanese never talks about emotions or moral things. As for us, westerners, who 
are used to communicating about our moral wretchedness, fears and anxieties, digging 
deeply into the subconscious remindingly of a vivisection, we all are infected—and 
inasmuch corrupted—by the idea of notional strictness. For we name everything, and 
conceptualise everything. We even notionalise things that are morally unimaginable, 
even what derives from schemes of notional combinations merely as a logical 
of Japanese Studies 8 (Summer 1980) 2, 265-281. For a summary, see HENDRY, J.: Understanding Japanese 
Society. Croom Helm, London—New York—Sydney, 1987, 218 p., especially ch. 12 on 'The Legal System and 
Social Control', 185-201 [The Nissal Institute / Croom Helm Japanese Studies Series], and VOGEL, E. F.: 
Japan as Number One. Lessons for America, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. & London, 1979, 
xiii + 272 p., especially ch. 9 on 'Crime Control: Enforcement and Public Control ' , 204-222. 
27 "In the English manner of writing, the meaning becomes clear, but at the same time it becomes limited 
and shallow. [. . .] We do not make such useless effort, but use those words which allow sufficient leeway to 
suggest various things, and supplement the rest with sensible elements such as tones, appearance of letters, 
rhythms, etc. [ . . .] of the sentence [.. .], whereas the sentence of the Westerners tries to restrict its meaning as 
narrowly and detailedly as possible and does not allow the smallest shadow, so that there is no room at all for 
the imagination of the reader." The novelist Tanizaki JUNICHIRO quoted by Kawashima TAKEYOSHI in his 
'The Status of the Individual in the Notion of Law, Right, and Social Order in Japan' in The Japanese Mind. 
Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture [1967], (ed. MOORE. Ch. A.), University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu, 1987, 263. About the notion of change resulting from thought cycles and not from logical evolution, 
see ABEGG, L : The Mind of East Asia. Thames and Hudson, London—New York, vii + 344 p., especially ch. 
II (Thought without Logic), 23-68. In a strong critical approach, cf. DALE, P. N.: The Myth of Japanese 
Uniqueness. Croom Helm, Iлпdon—Sydney, University of Oxford Nissan, Institute for Japanese Studies, Oxford, 
1986, ch. 7 on 'Silence and Elusion', 100-115 [The Nissan Institute / Croom Helm Japanese Studies]. 
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possibility. Through this we almost challenge the horror-under the pretext of the 
neutrality of logical examples—to become true. We make an advance of everything, at 
least in imagination. At the same time, we depersonalise our most personal things, as 
we tame our most intimate fears we are even afraid to overthink, and our most hidden 
bad dreams, only to transform them into a case of previously formed conceptual 
schemes and classes. After all, ever since notional culture has developed, we seize 
things not in their fallible existence, but break them into a sequence of prefabricated 
schemes built on previous judgements while providing them a taxonomically value-free 
description. 
Communication in the Far East is simply not meant to confer on man's personal 
matters, morals and parables. The Japanese go out into the woods, amongst the flowers, 
watch the stone-garden or the holy mountain, and contemplate. The ornamental garden 
of stones, the majesty of the Fujijama, or the cherry-blooming: all of these bear more 
messages to them (as they make them realise more) than any abstract reasoning. The 
Japanese reason not with casual partners in a smoky café, rather talk to the holy place 
or favourite flowers amidst nature. It is not by mere chance that in Japan the stone-
gardens, taken care of as representatives of human values and natural harmony, have 
been the workshops of spiritual recharging for hundreds of years. 
Thus, taxonomic naming and axiomatic conceptualisation cannot be part of the Far 
Eastern world concept, because they would exclude subtle thinking. Therefore, many 
things resist to be discussed at all. In Japan, modernising effects were intensified by the 
American influence which, through the measures of occupation, also introduced modern 
formal law, such as: laws, contracts, collective agreements, compensation, formal suing 
and courts. Will the new pattern prevail? Society is actually left cold by the question: 
what is hidden in its means and what possibilities they bear. Working place 
identification and other attachments are incorporated into a moral and emotional 
ambience of solidarity, bearing more importance to them than anything else their money 
could buy. At working places—be it small or large—disputes are not characteristic at all, 
not even trade union fights. Bosses direct mainly not by orders or manifestations of 
authority, but rather by setting examples. 
Human organisation has strange varieties.28 Our examples above might seem 
miraculous—if we are unable to make them natural by explaining their circumstances. 
It is another question that relying on the storehouse of different traditions, who and with 
what prospects can step into the 21st century, the roots of which might seem European 
yet are—more and more visibly—dominated by American ideas. It is a further issue 
whether, for the rest of the world, it is feasible to—and especially: worthwhile to—follow 
28 For a cultural comparative-historical approach, see, e.g., MAY, R.: Law <4 Society East and West. 
Dliamta. Li, and Nomos: Their Contribution to Thought and to Life. Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1985, especially at 
118-200 [Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Südasien-Institut, Universität Heidelberg, Band 105). 
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this end-of-century western pattern. We can only remember that the ending of history29 
has always proved to be a Utopia, and the wish to preserve different human and 
civilisational patterns is not an anthropologically romantic vision of getting away, or a 
mere fantasy about the past.30 
* 
As our case-study shows, the intellectual appropriation of a different world may not 
only expand our own horizons, but also enable us to envision our usual arrangements, 
routinised into imperception notwithstanding its excellence, from new perspectives. 
Thanks to openness towards information, we can confirm our own paradigms by 
comparing and confronting them with ones of other systems of thought, and we can also 
repeatedly test its limits and limitations more and more securely by challenging its 
efficiency. 
29 Newly, under a liberal disguise, see Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man. Penguin, 
London, 1992, xxiii + 418 p. 
30 As an influential stimulation, cf. René David 'Deux conceptions de l'ordre social' in lus Privatum 
Gentium. Festschrift für Max Rheinstein, I, Mohr, Tübingen, 1969, 53-66, and DEKKERS, R.: 'Justice bantu' 
Revue roumaine des Sciences sociales: Série de Sciences juridiques XII, 1968, 1, 56ff. Recent literature seems 
to reassure reasonable doubt and openness towards different cultures. See, first of all, SACK, P.: 'Bobotoi and 
Sulu—Melanesian Law: Normative Order or Way of Life?' Journal de la Société des Océanistes XLI (Juin 
1985) No. 80, 15-23 and 'Melanesian Jurisprudence: A "Southern" Alternative' Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie: Supplementa II, 1988, 91-101. 
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It is quite likely that all of you are aware of the present day Hungarian constitutional 
development, of the efforts in this country aimed at adopting a new constitution. These 
efforts for the time being cannot be qualified as a complete success story: you are 
probably informed also about the fact, that Hungary is actually the only country in this 
region (Central and Eastern Europe) which failed to adopt a new constitution following 
the transition to democracy. I have no intention of going into the details of this failure, 
not only because many are of the opinion that it is not a failure at all, but simply 
because in light of the subject of my contribution I have neither time, nor mandate of 
doing it. 
In my contribution I intend to explore briefly a rather specific, relatively well-known 
and seemingly not very complex problem, namely, the problem of limitations and 
derogations from human rights on the basis of international human rights instruments. 
To be frank with you, when I agreed to participate in this meeting of ours I was not 
convinced at all that my contribution would lead to anything useful. Hopefully this is 
not the case, because when I started to examine the problem from the practical point of 
views, that is not simply from the point of normative regulations and formulations, but 
from the point of practical interpretation and application of the relevant limitations, I 
have encountered a plethora of challenging and not very simple issues. For those who 
* Updated version of a contribution made on a conference held in Budapest (26-27 May 1997) and 
organized jointly by the Hungarian Institute of Legal Sciences and SIGMA. 
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participate in and are responsible for the drafting of the new Hungarian constitution this 
practice probably can provide some food for further thinking, can convey knowledge 
and understanding about strengths and weaknesses of law in solving those social 
problems to which it addresses itself. 
The drafters of modem constitutions are not in a position to disregard this practice 
because the issue of the protection of human rights belongs no longer exclusively to the 
domestic jurisdiction of States. There is vast network of international human rights 
instruments, which are not just nice idealistic declarations, but contain specific and 
enforceable obligations. And on the part of the main actors of the international 
community, that is of States, there is an accepted consensus, that many of the related 
international obligations due to their importance for the whole international community 
are obligations in whose fulfillment all of them have a legal interest. The special nature 
of these obligations stems from the special nature and role of these instruments. This 
special character of international human rights instruments has been summarized very 
precisely by the Inter-American Court in one of its advisory opinions: 
"29. The Court must emphasize, however, that modem human rights treaties in 
general, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties 
of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights 
for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the 
protection of the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective of their 
nationality, both against the state of their nationality and all other contracting 
States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to 
submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, 
assume various obligations, not in relation to other states, but towards all 
individuals within their jurisdiction.'" 
Hungary has ratified almost all of the major international human rights instruments, 
which have not only become part of the country's treaty system, but in the latest time 
the judicial bodies have started to apply them directly, like they apply other domestic 
acts. What is fascinating in this process is that these instruments and the related 
decisions of international organs dealing with their interpretation are being refferred to 
not only by the supreme judicial bodies (such as the Constitutional Court or the 
Supreme Court) but by the courts of first and second instance, too. Thus for example 
the Pest County Court (Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság) in its decision of April 24 1997 
has not only stated that the UN Covenant on Civil, Political and Cultural Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights form an integral part of the Hungarian domestic 
1 Inter-American Court Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982, "The Effect of Reservations 
on the Entry into Force of the American Convention", § 29. 
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legal system, but has rendered its judgement on basis of principles established by the 
Strasbourg Court.2 
Following this short introductory remark I shall now to tum to the problem, which 
I would like to address briefly in this morning session. 
International human rights instruments contain several types of limitations on the 
scope of the rights protected. It is necessary to point out, that though there is no 
generally accepted classification of these limitations, the possibility of their application 
is determined by two main factors: by the nature of the right enounciated and protected 
and by the nature of the situation in a given country at a given time (whether it is a 
normal one or an exceptional one, characterized as an emergency situation). 
From the point of view of the nature of the rights protected one can make a 
distinction between the so-called absolute rights which contain entitlement or prohibition 
formulated in absolute terms, that is without any restriction or exclusion and rights the 
scope of which can be limited for reasons of general interests. There is a rather limited 
number of absolute rights, and their list is not completely identical in different 
instruments.3 
A great number of rights and freedoms belong to those the scope of which on the 
basis of a specific procedure and for clearly established reasons can be limited or 
restricted.4 
These limitations are either in-built limitations in the formulation of a right itself, 
or exist in the form of exceptions, that is in the form of express specification of those 
instances, which are not covered by a right. 
2 Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság, 29.P.87.533/1996/4. 
3 Thus for example in the UN Covenant on Civil, Political and Cultural Rights in the list of these rights one 
can find such as the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 7), prohibition of slavery 
and servitude (Article 8), prohibition of imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation (Article 11), prohibition of retrospective effect of criminal law (Article 15), the right to the 
recognition as a person before the law (Article 16). The European Convention enounciates in such a way the 
following rights: prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3), prohibiten of slavery and 
servitude (Article 4, § 1), prohibition of retrospective effect of criminal law (Article 7 § 1), prohibition to be 
tried in criminal proceedings for an offence which one has already been acquited or convinced (Article 4, 
Protocol No. 7), prohibition of deprivation of freedom merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation (Article 1, Protocol No. 4), prohibition to expel a person from the territory of the stale of which he 
is national (Article 3, § 1, Protocol No. 4), the right of a person to enter the territory of a State of which he 
is a national (Article 4, Protocol No. 4), prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens (Article 4, Protocol No. 
4). The American Convention on Human Rights lists the following rights: the right to recognition as a person 
before the law (Article 3), the right to physical, mental or moral integrity (Article 5, § 1), the prohibition of 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 5, § 2), freedom from slavery and servitude (Article 6, § 1), 
freedom from ex post facto laws (Article 9), the right to compensation in case of miscarriage of justice (Article 
10), the right to a name (Article 18), the right to equal protection by law (Article 24). 
4 See, for example. Articles 9, 12, 14, 19, 21, 22 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Articles 
8, 9, 10, 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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On the basis of the concept of derogation one can make a distinction between 
derogable and non-derogable rights. However, there is a clear difference between the 
notion of limitation of human rights and derogation from human rights, notwithstanding 
to the fact, that a derogation or a limitation seemingly might lead to the same end result 
(to the restriction of protected rights). 
The concept of derogation from the point of public international law implies that 
apart from some rights, considered by member states of a particular treaty system as 
rights of great importance, states in exceptional, crisis-like situations can suspend or 
limit the enounciated rights and guarantees on temporary basis.5 The aim of the concept 
of derogation is to secure overriding rights of the State for the protection of democratic 
institutions in cases when there is a serious threat to the nation. An act of derogation 
is always effectuated under the supervision of an international institution concerned 
about the measures of derogation, and this institution has the right to examine whether 
the measures taken are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 
The existing practice of derogations shows that states have a relatively wide margin 
of appreciation in determining those situations when the "life of a nation" is threatened 
by public emergency. Thus for example, under Article 15 of the European Convention 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece and Turkey have derogated from the conventional 
obligations when the respective goverments have percieved the existence of domestic 
terrorist activities.6 The threat which necessitates the derogation, as I have pointed out 
already, should be a real one. The European Court of Human Rights in one of its first 
judgement7 has defined this threat in the following: "an exceptional situation or crises 
of emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the 
organized life of the community of which the State is composed." 
It is necessary to point also, that the so-called absolute rights, that is rights 
formulated in absolute terms without any limitations should not be identified with non-
derogable rights. A non-derogable right might have some in-built limitation8 and an 
absolute right is not always listed among non-derogable rights.' 
There is a few number of rights which are both absolute and non-derogable. These 
rights occupy a special position in the system of international protection, they to some 
extent can be viewed as rights, which are based on ius cogens obligations of states. It 
is rather difficult to specify exactly the list of these rights, but there is some consensus, 
that they are of elementary nature, constitute the foundation of the international 
community itself. One can find opinions that these rights include, for example, the right 
5 See, for example. Article 4 of the UN Covenant, and Article 15 of the European Convention. 
6 See the notices of derogation of the United Kingdom of 27 June 1957 and 28 December 1988; Ireland of 
18 October 1976; Greece of 19 September 1967; Turkey of 23 August 1990. 
7 Cf. Lawless case. Series A. No. 3, 56. 
8 See, for example. Article 2 of the European Convention and Article 4 of the American Convention. 
9 See, for example, Article 10 of the American Convention on the right to compensation in the event of 
miscarriage of justice and Article 24 on the right to equal protection; and also Articles 1, 3, 4, Protocol No. 4 
of the European Convention. 
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to life, the prohibition of slavery and servitude, of torture and racial discrimination.10 
In the practice of international institutions interpreting human rights at least one of jus t 
mentioned rights, namely, the prohibition of torture has been undisputedly recognized 
as an obligation being of absolute and non-derogable nature. Thus, for example, the 
European Court in its judgements related to Article 3 of the European Convention has 
many times observed that this Article "enshrines one of the fundamental values of 
democratic society", and that "even in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the 
fight against organized terrorism and crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment"; this Article "makes no provision for 
exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible ... even in the event of public 
emergency threatening the life of a nation".11 
The practice of some international judicial bodies, inter alià the European Cour t ' s 
practice, provides a very interesting exercise to all those, who wish to have a closer 
look at the problem of limitations. The Strasbourg Court has established a well-
developed set of principles related to the problem. It proceeds with the examination of 
any limitation in the following manner. 
As a first step it usually starts with the examination whether there was an 
interference (limitation) with the individual's right to respect for his or hers particular 
right. If it establishes that there was an interference, then it proceeds with the 
clarification whether this interference was justified. The examination of justification 
includes three types of scrutiny. 
1) The first type of scrutiny is related to the establishment whether the interference 
(limitation) was "in accordance with law" or was it "prescribed by law". The notion "in 
accordance with law" does not mean that a limitation could only be based on an act of 
a supreme legislative body. Regulations of lower bodies, which due to the delegation 
of power have been invested with the right of rule-making, may be regarded as law. It 
is not the form but the quality of a regulation what matters in the Strasbourg practice. 
This quality is presumed, if a norm is adcquatly accessible and forseeable: "a norm 
cannot be regarded as law unless it is formulated with sufficient precesion to enable the 
citizen to regulate his conduct".12 
2) The second type of scrutiny is whether the limitation had a legitimate aim. 
During this examination the Court rules on whether a limitation was based on the 
grounds enumerated in the relevant provisions of the Convention (these grounds for 
example include national security interests, protection of morals and public health, 
prevention of disorder and crime, protection of economic welfare of the country). 
10 Cf. International dimensions of human rights. Vol. 1. Paris, 1982. 44-48. 
11 Aksoy case, judgement of 18 December 1996, § 62. 
12 Silver and others case, Series A. No. 61, 33-34. 
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3) The third type of scrutiny relates to the issue whether the restriction was 
necessary in a democratic society. This is a very interesting type of scrutiny, because 
the notion "necessary in a democratic society" occupies a prominent place in the whole 
process of interpretation,13 and its application produces quite unpredictiblc results for 
the member states. This notion at the beginning was used and interpreted with the aim 
of providing some maneuvering possibilities (that is some sort of discretion or margin 
of appreciation) for national authorities in the domain of limitations. However, it has 
become a notion independent from national legal systems, it functions as a limitation 
of limitations, as a supreme controlling standard, on the basis of which the Strasbourg 
Court is entitled to determine the scope of national discretion in the domain of limitation 
of rights. In other words, even in cases when a restriction is prescribed by law, and 
when it has a legitimate aim, the Strasbourg Court-on the basis of its own perception 
of what is necessary and what is not necessary in a democratic society—can establish the 
incompatibility of a particular restrictive measure with the Convention. According to the 
Court's practice, the essential content of the notion means, that a restriction or a 
limitation should always correspond to a "pressing social need", and it should be 
proportionate to the legitmate aim persued.14 
With the aim of presenting the problem of limitations in a more visible manner, 
more concretly I have randomly selected two recent cases from the practice of the 
Strasbourg Court, which relate also to rights formulated in the Hungarian concept of the 
new constitution. The first case deals with the problem of non-discrimination and 
equality (Article 21 of the Draft), and the second one concerns the protection of private 
life (Article 26 of the Draft). 
Article 21 (§3 ) of the Draft establishes a possibility of differentiation between the 
rights of Hungarian and non-Hungarian nationals without any kind of qualification. This 
possibility in light of the provisions of the European Convention is not an unlimited 
possibility. The facts of the first case15 can be briefly summarized as follows. The case 
was reffered to the Strasbourg Court by a Turkish national, who lived and worked in 
Austria from 1973 until 1987. From 1986 he was provided with unemployment benefit 
(paid to him as an advance of his retirement pension), however, his entitlement to 
unemployment benefit has expired in 1987, following which he applied for an 
emergency assistance. Emergency assistance according to the Austrian law was an 
assistance paid to persons who were no longer entitled to unemployment benefit, in 
order to quarantee a minimum income. The competent Austrian Employment Agency 
rejected his claim to an emergency assistance on the ground that he did not have an 
Austrian nationality. The Austrian Unemployment Insurance Act of 1977 (then in force) 
contained a special provision, which stated that unemployed persons who have 
13 The Court in several of its decisions stated clearly, that its "supervisory functions oblige it to pay the 
utmost attention to the principles characterising a 'democratic society'". Handyside case. Series A. No. 24, 22. 
14 See, Laskey and others case. Judgement of 19 February 1997, § 42. 
15 Cf. the case of Gaygusuz v. Austria, Judgement of 16 September 1996. 
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exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefit may be granted an emergency 
assistance, provided that the person concerned has an Austrian nationality. This Turkish 
national in his complaint addressed to the Strasbourg Court claimed, that the Austrian 
authorities' refusal to grant him emergency assistance on the ground, that he did not 
have Austrian nationality, was a discrimination based on national origin, and as a result 
this fact violated his rights under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol No. 
1 (the right to the protection of possessions). The Court in Strasbourg has stated that the 
entitlement to this social benefit (considering the fact of the payment of contributions 
by the applicant to the unemployment insurance fund while he was working) is of 
pecuniary nature and therefore fell under the provisions of Article 1 Protocol 1. It 
established also, that there had been a breach of the non-discrimination clause of the 
European Convention in conjunction with the above-mentioned Article. The Court 
pointed out in its judgement, that "Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar 
situations justify a different treatment. However, very weighty reasons would have to 
put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively 
on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention".16 
The other case relates to an interference into private life with the aim of protecting 
morals.17 By the way, here I would like to point out, that the text of the Hungarian 
Draft does not contain any reference to such a ground of restriction as the protection 
of morals. The circumstances of the second case are as follows. In the course of routine 
investigations into other matters, the police in the U.K. came into possession of a 
number of video films made during sado-masochistic encounters, involving the 
applicants and a large number of other homosexual men. These sado-masochistic acts 
took place in private houses, in rooms equipped as torture chambers, and were carried 
out in forms of extreme cruelty, including instances of branding and infliction of 
injuries, which resulted in the flow of blood. These acts were conducted in private by 
adult persons, on consensual basis. Video cameras were used to record events, but the 
tapes copied were distributed only among members of the group. There was a criminal 
proceeding against the applicants, who were convicted and sentenced to different terms 
of imprisonment. Those who were convicted brought the case before the Strasbourg 
Court. They complained that there was an unlawful and unjustifiable interference with 
their right to respect for their private life. They alleged, that these activities formed part 
of their private morality, were an intimate aspect of their private life, which should be 
viewed as matters of sexual expression, rather than violance. Moreover, the participants 
were willing adult participants, the acts were not witnessed by the public at large, no 
serious and permanent injury had been sustained, no infection had been caused. The 
Government, on the other hand, insisted, that the State was entitled to punish acts of 
such violance (which could not be considered of a trifling nature) irrespective of the 
16 See, ibid. § 42 of the judgement. 
17 See, the judgement referred to in note 14. 
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consent of the victim, and in addition it was entitled to prohibit such activities on 
grounds of broader moral reasons. The Strasbourg Court has agreed with the 
Government's arguments and has not established the violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention. In its judgement it pointed out, that a State is entitled to regulate (including 
the means of criminal law also) activities, which involve the infliction of physical harm, 
even in instances when these activities occur in the course of sexual conduct In other 
words, not everything that happens behind close doors and on the basis of a consent 
should be accepted and tolerated from the points of public morality and public health. 
Had there been a little much more time, it might have been appropriate to reflect 
in more detail on those issues of the new Hungarian Draft, which according to my 
opinion, seem to be rather strange in light of provisions of international human rights 
instruments. Firstly, I would like to point out, that it does not contain a real habeas 
corpus clause. Secondly, Article 35 of the Draft, which deals with the principle of fair 
trial, does not contain any reference to such an important element of this principle as 
the right to public hearing. Thirdly, the restrictions of the rights of civil servants and 
other classes of public servants are very widely formulated. These restrictions are 
destined for application due to the mere fact of belonging to a particular class of 
profession, what can hardly been deemed as a satisfactory solution. One can mention 
also some other vague provisions of the Hungarian Draft, but I think that I have already 
exhausted the alloted time limit, hence I would like to stop at this point and to thank 
you for your attention. 
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George Law as a Normative Order: 
MOUSOURAKIS a Comparative Study of British and 
Continental Traditions in Legal Theory 
Much of contemporary British legal theory has its roots in the tradition of philosophical 
empiricism, the philosophical position that no theory or opinion can be accepted as valid 
unless verified by the test of experience. In this context normativity, both in law and 
morals, is understood and explained in terms of social practices observable in the world. 
The 19th century British jurist John Austin, for example, defined law in terms of a 
command backed by a sanction and as presupposing the habitual obedience of the bulk 
of a community to the commands of a sovereign himself not habitually obedient to 
anyone else.1 Similarly, Professor Hart's conception of legal obligation, although 
somewhat more complex, came, in the final analysis, from the observation of people's 
actual practices analysed in terms of "the internal point of view" crucial to their 
comprehension of and participation to these practices.2 It is within this framework that 
we must consider the distinction, so essential to positivist jurisprudence, between "is" 
and "ought", as adopted by British positivist theorists. And it is here that a chief 
difference between the British and the Continental traditions in legal theory lies. The 
aim of this paper is to re-examine some of the main themes of positivist jurisprudence 
and explore the extent to which modern theorists, both British and Continental, have 
1 AUSTIN, ].: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, The Noonday Press, New Yoik, 1954 (first 
published in 1832). 
2 HART, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1961 (2nd revised ed. 1994). 
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succeeded in developing a theory of law that would make for a workable marriage 
between the two traditions. 
The continental understanding of the distinction between is and ought is based upon 
the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal world, the province of the is, and the 
world of the right wherein the categorical imperative reigns, the province of the ought. 
According to Hans Kelsen, we can look at the world around us in two distinct ways. We 
can explain it in scientific terms and through scientific laws in which case we are in the 
domain of the is where the mode of explanation is causal. We can also look at the 
world in normative terms and if we do this we are in the domain of the ought wherein 
the mode of explanation is no longer causal but imputational. There is no logical 
connection between these two ways of looking at the world and so we cannot employ 
methods appropriate to one domain to interpret the other. An act in the world is a 
natural event which is the subject of causality. This is properly the subject of the natural 
sciences, in which Kelsen includes sociology, psychology etc. Explanations of the type 
if A happens then В will follow are appropriate here. Normative science, on the other 
hand, seeks to discover the meaning of a natural act. In this respect, explanations are 
organised under the principle of imputation-, i.e. if A is the case then В ought to be (e.g. 
if the traffic light glows red then the cars ought to stop). Kelsen regards legal science 
as a normative science: a science which constitutes knowledge of a normative order. 
Normative science is not concerned with causal messages but rather with representations 
of that which ought to be done, for example, according to positive law. What precludes 
the propositions of normative science from becoming entirely prescriptive judgements 
is their being made from a "hypothetical" viewpoint—Kelsen's basic norm—introduced 
solely for the purposes of normative science.3 From this point of view, the norm—which 
in the law is a direction to officials to apply sanctions if someone does something which 
is forbidden—is a scheme of interpretation in that it enables us to give meaning to a 
natural causal act. So, Kelsen recognises that law is something that sets a standard of 
conduct (i.e. its nature is normative or prescriptive), but he denies that law owes its 
normative quality to social practice. Kelsen denies, in other words, that the standard of 
behaviour rests in some way on the regularity of behaviour (as Austin and Hart argue). 
For him, the sociology of law is a possible mode of explanation but it cannot be seen 
as normative science for "cognition in legal sociology is not concerned with the legal 
norm qua specific meaning; rather, it is directed to certain events quite apart from their 
connection to norms that are recognised or presupposed as valid. Legal sociology does 
not relate the material facts in question to valid norms; rather, it relates these material 
facts to still other material facts as causes and effects."4 
3 See on this RAZ, J.: The Authority of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, ch. 7. For a critical discussion 
of Raz's views see: A. WILSON: 'Joseph Raz on Kelsen's Basic Noim', American Journal of Jurisprudence 
27. 1982,46. 
4 KELSEN, H.: Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (transi, by Paulson, B. L.—Paulson, S. L.), 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992 (first published in 1934). 13. 
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According to Kelsen, a particular legal provision has an objective character because 
it is placed in the context of a legal system. We can trace the legal provision up the 
chain of validity until we can get no further. In Kelsen's terms, we arrive at the 
historically first constitution. But how do we know if that is valid? Kelsen answers this 
question by considering whether the behaviour of the first Parliament can be interpreted 
as having the objective meaning of law-making behaviour. Here we have to presuppose 
that what the members of that Parliament meant by their activity was some form of law-
making behaviour. It is only if we assume this basic norm that we can say that norms 
created in the system have an objective validity. In other words, we can interpret a 
social order legally only if we presuppose a basic norm—or grundnorm-^which says that 
the meaning of the historically first constitution is to be understood as implying that all 
acts made under it should be treated as valid. 
In the British tradition the distinction between is and ought is associated with the 
famous passage of the 18th century philosopher David Hume in which he denies the 
possibility of deriving moral premises from statements of fact.5 In the context of this 
tradition the is/ought distinction adverts to the possibility of critical and censorial 
comment on the law but appears to lack any deep epistemological qualities. In this 
respect the critical evaluation of the law comes, in the final analysis, from one's moral 
premises, whatever these may be based on, but does not affect what the law actually is. 
According to Jeremy Bentham one could divide jurisprudence into two distinct areas, 
an area where one stated the law as it is and an area where one looked at the law as it 
ought to be. Indeed, for Bentham the distinction between law as it is and law as it ought 
to be is a necessary condition for the sound appraisal and intelligent reform of positive 
law.6 This way of looking at the matter boils down to an assertion of the difference 
between law and morality and that while morality can provide the basis for the critical 
evaluation of the law there is no necessary connection between the two. The Continental 
approach, by contrast, does not rule out the necessary connection of law and morality 
for it views both as normative systems inhabiting the world of the ought. Moreover, 
according to Kelsen and others in the continental tradition, an adherence to legal 
positivism implies a non-cognitivist theory of ethics, one which holds that ethics is not 
a matter of knowledge but of attitude. From this viewpoint it is said that, in moral 
reasoning there can be no rational solutions as we cannot "objectively" know what is 
right or wrong. Some have argued that the British tradition, if it is to be seen as 
positivist, must also imply the same. However, neither Bentham nor Austin seem to 
accept that moral judgements are inherently arbitrary. Although they are both seen as 
committed positivists and upholders of the distinction between positive jurisprudence 
and critical jurisprudence, they both proceed from what may be described as a 
cognitivist theory of ethics, namely utilitarianism. 
5 A Treatise of Human Nature, University Press, Oxford, 1978 (first published in 1740), bk. III, I, 469. 
6 BENTHAM, J.: Of Laws in General (ed. H. L. A. HART), Athlone Press, London, 1970. 
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For Hart and his followers the British empiricist approach rests upon understanding 
what makes practices in the world rules of obligation. This question is answered by first 
of all showing how the idea of habits, relied on by Bentham and Austin, relating as they 
do to observed regularities of external behaviour cannot offer an adequate explanation 
of the notion of rules. To understand the normativity of rules we need to reflect upon 
the human attitude to the things people do as a rule. In Hart 's words: 
[I]f a social rule is to exist some at least must look upon the behaviour in 
question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole. A social 
rule has an "internal" aspect, in addition to the external aspect which it shares 
with a social habit and which consists in the regular uniform behaviour which 
an observer could record.7 
Hart rejects the idea that rules are phenomena that have to do merely with an 
externally observable habit of obedience. Instead, he calls our attention to the social 
dimension of rules, in other words, to the way in which members of society perceive 
the rules and their internal stance or attitude towards the rules. If we want to understand 
the nature of rules we need to look at them from the point of view of those who 
"experience" them. It is this internal aspect that distinguishes a social rule from a mere 
habit. One may go even further and say that accepting a rule involves not only a belief 
that there is a good reason to comply with it but also a commitment to the values which 
the rule reflects.8 From this viewpoint deviation is seen as conduct which is open to 
criticism and that criticism is considered justified or legitimate. 
Hart tells us that in a primitive society there are only obligation-imposing primary 
rules, i.e. rules prohibiting forms of conduct to which human beings are tempted by 
nature (the use of violence, theft, deception) but which they must repress if they are to 
live together in society. In such a society no clear distinction is drawn between morality 
and law. But, as society becomes more complex, there may develop dispute-settling 
procedures . and out of them institutionalised systems for this, with enforcement 
procedures and institutions for authoritatively making decisions. As society progresses, 
certain activities can and do become socially and morally institutionalised; but some of 
them, as in the case of contract, for example, can become yet further institutionalised 
by being brought within the sphere of adjudication-the sphere of judicial institutions. 
We might say, then, that moral rules and legal rules are the same thing but that legal 
rules are to be seen as doubly institutionalised. In the process of the institutionalisation 
of certain rules as legal rules it is of course possible that they will diverge from the 
morality of various groups in society and so it can become a question why or whether 
people should morally obey the rules laid down by the institutions of positive law.9 In 
7 HART: supra note 2, 55. 
8 See DUFF, R. A.: "Legal Obligation and the Moral Nature of Law", Juridical Review. 1980, 61. 
9 HART: supra note 2, ch. 5. 
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other words, law is separated from morality by its special institutionalisation. But the 
way that this institutionalisation takes place rests, according to Hart on a social practice 
which does not need to involve more than a small group of people namely those whom 
Hart calls the "officials of the system". For Hart the validity of the secondary rules, as 
well as that of the rule of recognition, depend on the fact that they are accepted by the 
officials of the system "from the internal point of view".10 Although Hart lays 
emphasis on the fact that the law is to be seen from the internal point of view and not 
as based on naked command, it is the normative practice (with the internal point of 
view) of the officials that constitutes the legal system, nothing more being required as 
to the rest of the community than its members habitually obey. So the practice which 
in Hart's theory accounts for a rule of recognition is only distinguishable from morality 
by its institutionalisation as a rule of law. But what does "institutionalisation" mean here 
and how can the nature of legal rules be explained on this basis? 
To gain some insight into this matter it is necessary to consider, briefly, John 
Searle's theory of "institutional facts". According to Searle there are some entities in 
the world which seem to exist wholly independently of human institutions, and he calls 
these "brute facts". Their existence is, or seems to be, in no way dependent on our will, 
nor do they result from our practices and contrivances. Other entities, by contrast, do 
not seem to exist in this way. Take a goal in a football match for example. If someone 
asks me what that is, I cannot point to anything in the material world that I can specify 
as a goal. I cannot point to a ball crossing the line and say, "that is what I mean by a 
goal". And yet I can intelligibly talk of there being such a thing as a goal. According 
to Searle, these facts may be called institutional facts for, as he explains 
[They] are indeed facts; but their existence, unlike the existence of brute facts, 
presupposes the existence of certain human institutions. It is only given the 
institution of marriage that certain forms of behaviour constitute Mr Smith's 
marrying Miss Jones. Similarly, it is only given the institution of baseball that 
certain movements by certain men constitute the Dodgers beating the Giants 3 
to 2 innings. Even at a simpler level, it is only given the institution of money 
that I now have a 5 dollar bill in my hand. Take away the institution and all I 
have is a piece of paper with various green and gray markings." . 
Legal entities appear to exist and behave in a way not different from oiir goal in a 
football match. For example, every time I board a bus a contract is made between me 
and the bus company but I cannot point to it in the material world. I cannot point to 
myself getting on the bus and buying the ticket and say "that is the contract". And yet 
I can, and legal practitioners do all the time, talk intelligibly of a contract. To say that 
10 Ibid. 109 ff. 
11 SEARLE, J. R.: Speech Acts. University Press. Cambridge, 1969, 51. And see ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.: 
"On Brute Facts", Analysis 18, 1957-58. 
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a contract exists presupposes taking a particular view of a particular relation between 
two people, namely that which is set within the frame of reference of certain organised 
groups of people, the legal profession, judges, enforcement agents etc. From this point 
of view it is possible to say what the "institution" itself is. 
It is on this basis that Professors Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger developed 
the theory of Law as Institutional Fact. According to MacCormick, there are three types 
of rules which shape our use of legal institutions, such as wills, trusts, contracts etc.: 
(a) "institutive rules", i.e. separate rules of law prescribing the conditions which are 
vital to the existence of an instance of any such institution; (b) "consequential rules", 
i.e. the set of rules which specify the consequences, in the form of rights, liabilities, 
powers and duties which arise from the setting up of an instance of any such institution; 
(c) "terminative rules", i.e. rules providing for the termination of instances of 
institutions at a particular point of time. In this respect the term "institution of law" 
denotes those legal concepts which are organised on the basis of institutive, 
consequential and terminative rules, with the effect that instances of them are properly 
said to exist over a period of time, from the occurrence of an institutive act or event 
until the occurrence of a terminative act or event.12 Further, a distinction must be 
drawn between the institution itself and instances of the institution—there is a difference 
between the institution of marriage and a marriage. The existence of an institution as 
such is relative to a given legal system, and depends upon whether or not that system 
contains the appropriate institutive, consequential and terminative rules. If it does, then 
the taking place of given events or the carrying out of given acts has on the basis of the 
rules the effect of giving rise to an instance of the institution. What makes the 
institutional theory of law particularly interesting is that it is the product of a joint effort 
of two theorists, the British Neil MacCormick and the Austrian Ota Weinberger, who 
are seen as representatives of different traditions in legal philosophy. MacCormick 
represents the British school; Weinberger speaks for the Continental one. In what 
follows, we will consider whether the institutional theory of law makes for a workable 
marriage between the British and continental traditions in legal theory. 
As was said before, from a British perspective, the only thing that differentiates 
legal from moral and other rules is their special institutionalisation and this presupposes 
some rules of the appropriate "institutive" type. Although it is generally assumed that 
all valid legal acts necessarily presuppose some rule which is constitutive of the act as 
an act in the law, or which confers the power exercised by doing the act in question, 
not all legal rules can be seen as resulting from acts of this kind, for that would lead 
to an unacceptable regressus ad infinitum. At the highest level there must be some rules 
which are capable of being accounted for independently. But what are these rules and 
what is their ontological status? On this point there appears to be a clear difference 
between the British empiricist tradition and the Continental, Kantian, tradition. From the 
12 MacCORMICK, N—WEINBERGER, O.: An Institutional Theory of Law, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 
Dordrecht, 1986, 66. 
Law as a Normative Order 121 
viewpoint of the latter tradition there is more to normativity than the British empiricist 
approach allows for. Let me explain. Hart, in describing the "rule of recognition", says 
that the practice—with the internal aspect—whereby judges recognise rules as legally 
binding on themselves and others is all you need. He then goes on to criticise Kelsen's 
conception of the hypothetical—"presupposed but not posited"—basic norm in the 
following way. He invites us to consider, as an example, the standard metre bar in Paris. 
The standard metre bar defines the metre. In so far as it constitutes what a metre is, 
what is the point in asking if that is valid? In the same way one may say that the 
historically first constitution. Hart's ultimate rule of recognition, defines what valid law 
is. Since it constitutes law what is the point in asking whether it itself is valid? In 
Hart's words: 
We only need the word "validity", and commonly only use it, to answer 
questions which arise within a system of rules where the status of a rule as a 
member of the system depends on its satisfying certain criteria provided by the 
rule of recognition. No such question can arise as to the validity of the very rule 
of recognition which provides the criteria; it can neither be valid nor invalid but 
is simply accepted as appropriate for use in this way. To express this simple fact 
by saying darkly that its validity is "assumed but cannot be demonstrated", is 
like saying that we assume, but can never demonstrate, that the standard metre 
bar in Paris which is the ultimate test of the correctness of all measurement in 
metres, is itself correct." 
A reply to this argument would be, using Hart's metre bar example, the following. 
Although the metre bar defines and constitutes a metre we can still ask the sensible 
question, ought we or anyone else to use this as a unit of measurement? To put it in 
more general terms, of every practice we can still ask the sensible question, ought it to 
be continued? Kelsen and others following the Continental, Kantian, tradition deny that 
any social practice is itself constitutive of an "ought". From this viewpoint the transition 
to the "ought" is seen as a transition into another sphere of thought. Docs Weinberger 
subscribe to this, too? According to him we can speak of the reality of ideal or thought 
objects, such as the norm, but there is also a connection between it and material 
existence. This connection has two types: (a) observable proceedings which can be 
characterised according to their ideal content; (b) such observable relations as make it 
possible to put temporal coordinates to observable actions. Weinberger then sets down 
the relations which appear to reflect the existence of the norm. Here we find diverse 
institutions, including the state, whose existence is associated with norms; the collective 
consciousness of the citizens; the efficiency of norms as determinative of conduct; the 
consequences of punishment or reward which provide further motivation for acting 
according to the norm; through the way in which our behaviour, even though we are 
13 HART: supra note 2, 105-106. 
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unaware of it, is determined by norms and institutions of a normative nature. In 
Weinberger's words: 
Institutional facts—like, for example, the legal system—are in a peculiar way 
complex facts: they are meaningful normative constructs and at the same time 
they exist as elements of social reality. They can only be recognised when 
understood as normative mental constructs and at the same time conceived of 
as constituent parts of social reality. As a meaningful normative construct, the 
law is the object of hermeneutic analysis. The real existence of the legal system 
is conditioned by a multitude of different circumstances: the law exists in the 
consciousness of people, meshes in with interconnections of behaviour-patterns 
and expectations, has standing relationships towards social institutions and 
observable events.14 
Although this way of looking at the issue introduces a connection between the norm 
and the material world that perhaps Kelsen had not envisaged, it still appears to be quite 
difficult to say that it is compatible with the British tradition that Hart and MacCormick 
are seen as representing. For Weinberger is looking at these facts in the material world 
as evidence of a norm which is still in another mode of reality while for the British 
"rule" tradition many of the empirical signs that were mentioned above would be taken 
as constituting the norm and not as merely evidence for it. The British side of the 
Institutional Theory of Law adopts a much more sociological approach and continues to 
view the is/ought distinction as one concerning the difference between critical and 
positive jurisprudence, as propounded by Bentham, rather than the Kantian difference 
between two modes of existence. What we have here, according to the British view, is 
ultimately a theory of moral rules which depends upon cognition, upon seeing what 
people actually do in the world; from this viewpoint, critical jurisprudence depends upon 
taking one set of practices against another legally institutionalised set. The British, 
Haitian, position is that the concept of validity is applicable only within the context of 
the rule of recognition;15 on the other hand, Kelsen's idea of prescriptive bindingness 
is applicable quite apart from such context for the ontological theory he proposes places 
the norm in a different, logically unconnected world. Weinberger's thesis, though it seems 
to depart from the pure logic of Kelsen's position, still treats norm and practice as being 
located in distinct, though in some vague way connected one to another, domains. On the 
other hand, MacCormick, though he talks of the distinct ontological status of the norm, 
does not appear to depart from the practice approach. According to him 
[The] approach which says that laws are actual existent features of human 
societies, available for hermeneutic understanding and description, is one which 
14 MacCORMICK—WEINBERGER, supra note 12, 113. 
15 HART: supra note 2, 105. 
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preserves for the jurist the position also of moral critic. What laws exist, here 
there or anywhere, is determinable by reference to criteria of validity set within 
this, that or the next system. What laws ought to exist is a question of critical 
morality. ... To be a so-called positivist in this mould is not to assert the 
superiority of law to moral considerations nor to treat it as a morally indifferent 
phenomenon. Rather, it is to present law as a form of social practice or social 
institution which has to be subjected to a permanent moral critique...16 
What is the connection between the two approaches then? It is to that question that 
this discussion must now turn. 
According to the British approach, law and morality are both forms of positive 
morality which, we may add, can be judged from the point of view of an ontologically 
different morality. It is here we can see how the two traditions that I have been talking 
about fit together. There are practices with the internal, critical reflective point of view 
which constitute law and morality. But there is also a moral point of view which can 
be applied critically to these practices. Now this moral point of view might ontologically 
be said to belong to the Kantian world of the "ought" and might also be regarded as a 
pure distillation of the critical reflective attitude. Indeed in his critical morality Hart 
seems to recognise that morality would be inconceivable without taking into account 
certain factors, such as internal coherence, universalibility etc. This argument has some 
of the aspects of the Kantian transcendental argument that these elements are necessary 
because they are presupposed by both our positive morality and our law. One might 
compare this "transcendental presupposition" to Professor Lon Fuller's conception of 
the "inner morality of law".17 Although Hart criticised Fuller 's approach on the 
grounds that the "inner morality of law" represent nothing more than the rules for 
efficiency, his more critical moral thinking seems to imply that there is more to it than 
that and that this presupposition of "legality" is one that the officials ought to have or, 
as a matter of historical fact, do have. 
What has been said suggests that law can only be seen as another practice, a form 
of positive morality, whose moral point of view is what we call legality. It is legality 
that appears to be the most likely meeting ground of the two traditions I have been 
talking about. The concept of legality is best expressed in the form of a series of 
maxims such as: all persons are equal before the law; the courts of justice are open to 
all; criminal laws do not apply to punish acts done before their introduction (the 
principle of non-retroactivity); criminal offences should be clearly defined and labelled 
(the principle of maximum certainty). As we can see, legality sets a great premium on 
legal certainty, the knowledge that there is a fair and just procedure for applying a 
general rule to a particular case. 
16 MacCORMICK—WEINBERGER, supra note 12, 138-139. 
17 FULLER, L.: The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, New Haven. 1969 (first published in 1964). 
Yale University Press, 1969. 
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However, rules cannot, by themselves, determine all possible outcomes since there 
is a limit to the guidance general language can provide. We cannot frame a rule which 
will cover all possible outcomes definitely. If, to counter this, we frame a very vague 
rule then how are we to know that it applies to the particular case? If , in answer, we 
reason purposively and determine the meaning of a rule from its purpose or intention 
and not by what it literally says, then how can we tell, in any rational and objective 
way, what the purpose of any particular rule is and thus recover the intersubjectivity that 
legality tried to bring us? One way is to view the system as a whole and allow 
determinations which have a coherent "fit" with the whole system. This way of 
achieving objectivity places a stress on the role of the judicial personnel, those who 
work in the system continually. The emphasis here is on the professionalism and the 
professional skills of the judiciary. So, in practice, the liberal ideal of "government of 
laws and not men" becomes the government of a small group. Here we can see the 
contradiction in a liberal democracy based on the rule of law. For in order that the main 
moral imperative of that society, "the government of laws and not of men", flourish, 
another important value, that of participation must, in part, be negated. One can see this 
in the tension between efficiency and democracy where efficiency, in the shape of 
speed, reliability and constancy, is seen as continually subverted by the demands of 
democratic, and therefore inefficient participation. 
The problem regarding democracy may be tackled by looking at ways in which we 
can make judicial decisions more rational. According to Ronald Dworkin, the fact that 
judges violate the principle of democracy does not matter if there can be said to be a 
right answer.18 But we do not have to adopt such an extreme solution for rationality 
is not a final end. It is a basis of our practical reasoning but nevertheless what we think 
of as acceptable discourses of practical reasoning depends also upon our views as to 
what is right and practical. We cannot just study rationality in the philosophical abstract 
without considering how discourses fit into society, the relations between different 
discourses and what their effect on the future development of society may be. Only on 
this basis we can look for choices as to what are acceptable forms of life and law and 
that, certainly, is the point of legal science. 
18 DWORKIN, R.: Law's Empire, Fontana Press, London. 1986. 
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Gyula GÁL The ILA Draft Instruments on the 
Protection of the Environment from 
Damage Caused by Space Debris 
At the beginning of our century non-governmental international organizations had a 
great role in laying the foundation and development of air law.1 The same can be stated 
for international space law too. The International Law Association at its Dubrovnik 
Conference in 1956 entrusted its Air Law Commitee to study the nature and contents 
of air sovereignty devoting special attention to the future problems relating to space-
flights and the nature of interplanetary space. The answer to this question was 
formulated in an unanimously adopted resolution on the legal regime of outer space at 
the Hamburg Conference of ILA in 1960: "outer space may not be subject to the 
sovereignty or other exclusive rights of any state"—a principle which today is a generally 
accepted basis of treaty and customary law of space activities? 
International non-govermental organizations together with certain national scientific 
institutions in the following post-sateilite years have been granted a productive backing 
for lawmaking in this new sphere of international law. This may be said on the role of 
experts of space law science representing their countries in preparing treaties and 
conventions at interstate level. 
1 Institut de Droit International "with the aim of furthering international law" Neuchâtel 1900, Paris 1910. 
The International Law Association discussed air law at its Paris Conference 1912. See: MATTE, N. M.: 
Treatise on Air-Aeronautical Law, Montreal-Toronto, 1981, 80-83.; GÁL, Gy.: Space Law, Leyden-Dobbs 
Ferry, 1969, 49-52. 
2 ILA report 1960,267-268. 
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For the time being space activity is no matter of saving face, no fighting for the 
"firsts" among leading space powers anymore. If there is a competition, it is going on 
among highly commercialized national organizations dictated by requirements of market 
economy. It could be supposed that this development woulg grant favourable conditions 
for the progressive widening of the so-called corpus iuris spatialis. Unfortunately at 
least at interstate level it cannot be stated. On the other hand, non-governmental studies 
gave birth to very remarkable drafts such as the Draft Convention on Manned Space 
Flight3 and the ILA Draft Instrument on the Protection of the Environment from 
Damage caused by Space Debris,4 
Foregoing events 
The Space Law Resolution adopted at the 63rd Conference of ILA (Warsaw 1988) 
called upon the International Space Law Committee "to elaborate principles and 
guidelines on debris and pollution arising from activities in outer space".5 The Commit-
tee worked on the subject under the directive of Professor Maureen Williams as 
rapporteur and under chairmanship of Professor Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel.6 
Legal question of environmental risks also were discussed at various international 
colloquia. Among others at an interdisciplinary meeting of scientists and lawyers in May 
1988 organized by Professor Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel at the occasion of the 600th 
anniversary of Cologne University. The material of the discussions was published in the 
Studies in Air and Space Law of the Cologne Institute.7 Specific meetings of experts 
on legal problems of space debris were held in Buenos Aires (1987) and Assuncion del 
Paraguay (1988). The Institute of Space Law repeatedly dealth with problems of space 
environmental protection including legal aspects of debris.8 
ILA itself has been involved in the study of the problem for 8 years through reports 
of the Space Law Committee to the conferences. The Committee finally submitted in 
August 1994 to the Buenos Aires Conference a draft convention which—as the first 
concrete proposal for an instrument on space debris-was adopted unanimously by the 
Conference. The Resolution relating to the subject requested the Secretary General " to 
communicate the International Instrument together with the Report of the Committee to 
CUPOUS and to other appropriate governmental and non-governmental institutions for 
3 Draft for a Convention on Manned space Right (BÖCKSTIEGEL. K.-H.-VERESHCHETIN, 
V.-GOROVE, S.), Zeitschrift für Luft- und Wellraumrecht 40. Jg. 1991, 3-8; See: Commentary by the author 
in: proceedings of the 36. Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Graz, 1993, 272-285. 
4 ZLW 43. Jg. 1994, 395^00. 
5 ILA Report 1990, 154. 
6 The work was supported by scientific consultants: Prof. L. Perek, Prof. D. Rex, Prof. H. A. Ricciardi. 
7 Environmental Aspects of Activities in Outer Space. State of the Law and Measures of Protection. Studies 
in AirSpace law. Vol. 9. Köln-Bonn-Beriin-München, 1990. 
8 See: Proceedings 30. Coll. Brighton 1987, 121-191, Proceedings 32. Coll. Malaga, 1989, 59-203. 
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further consideration and action". The Committee was requested to continue its work 
and to promote "the adoption of rules of international law regarding space debris".9 
Environmental protection and debris 
Following the mandate contained in the Warsaw Resolution the Space Law Committee 
prepared and circulated a questionnaire to members of the Committee. Concerning 
debris the question were: 
What is the meaning of contamination in Article IX of the Space Treaty of 1967. 
Does it include both debris and pollution?—Does the responsibility of states under 
Article VI Space Treaty cower space debris and pollution?—Does damage in Article VII 
of the Space Treaty and in Article I of Liability Convention cover the effects of space 
debris and pollution?—Does the term "space object" in Article I d. of the Liability 
Convention include also space debris?—Are these rules in international law applicable 
to the reduction of already existing space debris and pollution?10 
The answers to above questions were instrumental in clarification. of the present 
state of law and the requirements of new legal measures de lege ferenda. 
What is this present state of law? 
The meagre regulation of space environmental protection in the Space Treaty 
(Article IX) contains two obligations and two postulates." 
— In the exploration and use of outer space states shall be guided by the principle 
of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space 
with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. 
— States Parties to the Treaty pursue studies of outer space and conduct exploration 
so as to avoid the harmful contamination and adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter, and where necessary, 
shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. 
Not more than postulates may be understood two rules of this lex imperfecta of 
environmental protection in outer space: 
— If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment 
planned by it or its nationals in outer space would cause potentially harmful interference 
with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, 
it shall take appropriate consultations before proceeding with any such activity and 
experiment. 
— A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or 
experiment planned by another State Party in outer space would cause potentially 
9 ZLW note 4., 396. 
10 ILA Report 1990, 156-170, 
11 GÁL, Gy.: Treaty Law Problems of Space Environmental Protection: De Lege Ferenda. Tasks for 
International Legislation. Note 7, 288-289. 
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harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space 
may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment. 
Both obligations and postulates can be deducted from general clauses of the Space 
Treaty: 
— The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in 
the interest of all countries and shall be the province of mankind. 
— There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space. 
— Outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all states without dis-
crimination of any kind on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law. 
De lege lata the question emerges: do these obligations and postulates apply eo ipso 
to debris? 
Contamination and debris 
The answer depends on the meaning of this word "debris" which by silent consent 
entered into the space law terminology. 
In the literature we meet often the statement of Professor С. O. Christol: "debris" 
is popular rather than a legal term. He is right, in space law instruments we do not find 
it. For the lexical meaning he would name debris "something that possesses tangible 
physical characteristics of the kind that can be seen touches, weighed and processed in 
factories or analyzed in laboratories. As a physical substance it may consist of a space 
object including its component parts are it may be composed of those fragments that or 
located in space".12 In encyclopedic dictionaries we find definitions accentuating this 
later element: "scattered broken pieces, rubbish, wreckage, junk—anything regarded as 
of little value"13 or "the remnants of something broken to pieces".14 
Etymologically the term goes back to the French "debriser"—break down. Debris is 
therefore a "fragment d'un objet brisé, ou un partie détruit".15 
Question Nr. 1 of the circular letter of the ILA Space Law Committee, referred to 
above, concerned the relation between contamination and debris, asking: the term 
"contamination", does include both debris and pollution? 
The answers—differently motivated—were mostly affirmative: Pollution has a 
broader meaning including both material and immaterial pollution (А/. Bourély). Article 
IX includes both debris and pollution in spite of the 1967 Space Treaty not using the 
12. CHRISTOL, C. Q.: The Modern International Law of Outer Space. New York etc., 1982, 130. 
13 The Oxford Reference Dictionary p. 215. 
14 Webster's Dictionary of English Language, New York 1991, 247 ("...broken pieces of rock transported and 
then deposited by a rush of water..."). 
15 In German literature HOBE, S. therefore is right using the word "Weltraumtrümmer" for debris. In Italian 
GROSSO, G. С.: La responsabilitd degli stati per la attivitd svolte nello spazio extra-atmosferico. Padova, 
1990, 46. "frammenti i resti". Baker, H. A. uses the term "space refuse" instead of debris. [CiL HACKET, G.: 
Space Debris and the Corpus Iuris Spatialis, Forum for Air and Space Law, (ed. BENKÓ, M.)[, 209. The 
Hungarian "űrszemét" means similarly "space garbage", "firtörmelék" "space broken fragments". 
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word "debris" (S. Roy Chowdbury). Contamination—pollution—debris are linked since 
they are all three able to produce environmental harm (C.Q. Christol). The term 
"contamination" includes effects of man-made objects (AA. Cocca). Contamination 
includes debris and pollution as well as man-made objects causing such effects (E. 
Konstantinov). Some members expressed their doubts (S. Gorove, U. Leanza, N.M. 
Matte, LU. Siblesz). Clearly negative point of view was taken by Professor V. Kopal. 
He did not think, that the intentions of the drafters of the 1967 Space Treaty was to 
include the effects of man-made objects and debris. Therefore only by means of an 
extensive interpretation would it be possible to conclude otherwise.16 Not being 
member of the Committee I could not answer the same. The opinion that contamination 
as a legal concept covers debris too, seems to be generally accepted also in the space 
law theory.17 Authors are willing to interpret not only the general clauses but also 
Article IX of the Space Treaty in the sense that through the term "contamination" it 
refers indirectly also to debris. 
The ILA draft, in accordance with its intention, solves this problem in respect of 
the protection of the environment from damage caused by space debris. 
a) "contamination/pollution" means a human modification of the environment by 
the introduction of undesirable elements or the undesirable use of those elements. 
b) "contamination/pollution" will be considered as synonyms and are inclusive of 
all harmful elements other than space debris. 
This wording makes clear that space debris do not belong to the elements causing 
contamination in the sense of Article IX Space Treaty. Through "to contaminate" and 
"to pollute" are philologically no synonyms, legally they can be. On the other hand it 
is not clear, what was the reason to mention in the first part of the definition "un-
desirable" and not "harmful" elements as it appears in the second part. The later is more 
interpretable than the far more subjective attribute "undesirable". 
At any rate the Draft do not confuse contamination/pollution and debris as legally 
relevant phenomena cusing damage. 
16 ILA Report 1990, 156-160. 
17 BAKER, H. A.: Current Space Debris Policy and its Implications. Proceedings 32. Coll. Torremolinos 
1989, 160.; COCCA. A. A.: Environment as a Common heritage of Mankind, Proceedings 32. Coll. 72.; 
CARVER, J. H.: Protecting the Environment of Outer Space, Note 7. 195. FASAN, E.: How to Legally Protect 
Outer Space Environment, Proceedings 32. 87.; HACKET: op. cit. (Note 15.) 119-120.; KOPAL, V.: Some 
Remarks on Ugat Aspects of Space Debris, Note 7. 43.; ZBUKOVA-VASILEVSKAIA, G.: Protection cf Outer 
Space Environment According to the Norms and Principles of International Space Law, Note 7. 102. etc. 
Differentiated treatment would prefer. GOROVE, G.: Space Debris in International Legal Perspective, 
Proceedings 32, 98.; GÁL: Note 11. in Note 17. 295. 
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Conceptual sphere of debris 
The Draft defines debris as follows: 
...man-made objects in outer space, other than active or otherwise useful satellites, 
when no change can resonably be expected in these conditions in the foreseeable 
future (I. c.). 
The definition means that space debris are undoubtedly space objects—with all legal 
consequences of this qualification. On the other hand: debris are not only broken pieces, 
rubbish, wreckage etc. but also inactive or not useful satellites. 
"Man-made objects in outer space" to my mind are objects orbiting round the Earth 
or other celestial bodies or put on the surface of a celestial body other than Earth by 
means of orbital movement.18 Otherwise the definition of the draft do not restrict 
"debris" to a certain area of outer space or to a certain size of the object. 
Concerning inactive satellites the Draft corresponds to the opinion of the majority 
of authors. Professor L. Perek e.g. minds: debris is understood generally to mean parts 
of space objects generated by break-ups of spacecrafts, rockets etc. Its characteristic 
attribute is being inactive and not serving any purpose anymore. In this respect there is 
no sharp limit between debris and non-functional space objects, the later conveying the 
impression of large objects down to a fraction of a millimeter.19 An inactive satellite 
would be qualified as debris when its reactivation cannot be reasonably expected in the 
foreseeable future.20 
This condition laid down in the Draft would easily cause disputes concerning 
applicability of the Convention. How can be stated without expressed declaration given 
by the operator that e. g. a telecommunication satellite will not be ready for service in 
one, two or ten years, since this time depends on the technical possibilities and financial 
capability of the owner respectively operator of the satellite. When is the expectation 
reasonable and what is the foreseeable future! To the definition of debris the Draft 
asserts a list of sources originating space debris. Latter may result, inter alia, from: 
— routine space operations, including spent stages of rockets and space vehicles, and 
hardware released during normal maneuvers, 
— orbital explosions and satellite break-ups whether intentional or accidental, 
18 GÁL, G.: Space Objects "While in Outer Space", Proceedings 37. Coll. Jerusalem, 1994, 84-86. 
19 PEREK, L.: Technical Aspects of the Control of Space Debris, Proceedings 33. Dresden 1990, 400.; 
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, I. H. Ph.: An Introduction to Space Law, Deventer-Boston, 1993, 117.; HE QIZB1: 
On Strengthening International Measures for Protection of Space Environment, Note 7, 248.; HACKET: op. 
cit. (Note 15), 1.; BAKER, H. A.: The ESA and US Reports on Space Debris-Platform from Future Policy 
Initiations, cit. HACKET: op. cit. 209.; SCHWETJE, F. К.: Liability and Space Debris, Note 7. 31.; HOBE, 
S.: op. cit. (Note 15), 40. ("alle künstliche Gebilde im Weltraum, die nicht mehr gebraucht werden, weil sie 
ihre Funktion erfüllthaben.") etc. 
20 In the position paper on orbital debris of IAA Ad Hoc Expert Group at the World Space Congress, 
Washington 1992: "Object which is non-functionaL with no reasonable expectation of assuming or resuming 
its intended function or any for which it is or can be expected to be authorized". 
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— collision-generated debris, 
— particles and other forms of pollution ejected for example, by solid rocket 
exhausts, 
— abandoned satellites.21 
This enumeration is of exemplificative character. It corresponds to statements of 
scientific analysis and reports, serving as a practical explanation to the definition of 
debris. 
Scope of application 
According to the Draft the Convention on debris would be concluded for the purpose 
of "protection of the environment from damage caused by space debris". Article II 
cinfines the scope of application to a narrower category of the debris population in outer 
space: 
The instrument shall be applicable to space debris which causes or is likely to cause 
direct or indirect instant or delayed damage to the environment, or to persons or objects. 
In this context environment includes outer space and Earth environments within or 
beyond national jurisdiction (Article I. d). Damage means loss of life, personal injury 
or other impairment of health, loss of or damage to property, or any adverse 
modification of the environment of areas within or beyond national jurisdiction or 
control (Article I. e). 
At any rate, the scope of application would cover an immense population of 
debris. The Satellite Situation Report of 30 September 1987 based on the tracking by 
NORAD listed 6895 space objects in around the Earth. The report estimated that only 
2 - 5 % of this population was operational, 21% not-operational payloads, 25% mission-
related debris, 49% debris from satellite break-ups. In an other report of the 
Interagency Group in February 1989 the estimated debris population was for pieces 
greater than 10 cm 7000 objects, 1 - 1 0 cm 17500 and smaller than 1 cm 3 500 000 
total weight 3 000 000 kg. According to a "Box Score" of catalogued space objects 
of January 1, 1992 the number of orbiting Earth satellites was 2034, tracked debris 
4987, sum total 7021.22 
Measurements indicate that the accumulation of man-made debris has already 
equaled or exceeded the flux of natural meteoroids in certain orbits. The probability 
of collision with debris has been orders of magnitude greater than for meteor-
oids.23 
21 "Particles and other forms of pollution" seems to be contrary to Article I. par. b). 
22 U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessments, orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem-
Background Paper, 1990., Cit. HACKET: op. cit. 26., WIRIN, W. В.: Space Debris 1989, Proceedings 32. 
Coll. Ton-emolinos 1989, 185. "Boxed Score" of catalogued space objects by January I , 1992, See Annex. 
23 KESSLER, D. J.: Orbital Debris Issues. Advances in Space Research. Cit. REIBEL, D. E.: Prevention of 
orbital Debris, proceedings 30. Coll. Brighton, 1987, 147. 
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Up to now there are very few cases of collisions reported.24 In scientific studies 
we find remarkable estimations of future risks and technical informations on potential 
colli tions. 
Some of them: 
Reports estimate that based on the current and projected growth of debris population 
density there is a greater than 50% probability that one or more catastrophic collisions 
will occur by the year 2000.25 
Effects of collisions are determinated by the size of debris and by the relative 
velocity. 
For spacecrafts debris larger than 1 cm can cause catastrophic damage, while during 
extravehicular activity (EVA) a particle only 0,5 mm could rupture the pressure suit of 
the astronaut. The average collision velocity in low earth orbits (LEO) is about 10 
km/sec. i.e. 28,000 km/h. This high velocity generates enormous kinetic energy. The 
impact of a particle weighing 100 gr. is equal to 1 kg of TNT.26 
In the light of technical realities hundred thousands of debris in LEO are "likely to 
cause damage" to persons and objects involved in space flights. 
The damages caused by debris most probably will be homogeneous. States, persons 
or international organizations which themselves operate spacecraft are threatened by 
space debris.27 
Damages in the air space and on the surface of Earth (heterogeneous damages) in 
second place are to be expected. On the other hand debris—apart from NPS particles-are 
unlikely to cause any adverse modification of environment as defined in Article I. e. of 
the Draft. 
Prevention, reduction and control of risks 
Under the title General Obligation to Cooperate the Draft contains the obligation of 
states parties to the Convention "to cooperate directly and/or through the pertinent 
international organizations to prtotect the environment and implement this instrument 
effectively". (Article III. 1) 
Paragraph 2. of this article is subordinated to the general obligation to cooperate, 
though to my mind this contains the most exact and positive obligation of the parties 
to the Convention: 
24 Well-known case was Shuttle flight STS-7. The crew detected a pit on the window of about 5 mm 
diameter containing titanium with a trace of aluminum. It was flake of paint from an other space object 
25 Report on Orbital Debris by Interagency Group (Space) February 1988., cit. WIRIN: in op. cit. (Note 22), 
186. 
26 HACKET: op. cit. 46-47. He quotes the German author P. Eichler who stated: "Anschaulich ausgedrückt 
befinden sich also praktisch Hunderttausende von hochbrisanten Sprenglagungen mit Aufschlagzündern im 
Erdorbit". (Kollisionsgefahr mit Weltraumschrott, Funkschau July 1989.) 
27 REIFARTH, J.: An Appropriate Legal Format for the Discussion of the problem of Space Debris, Note 
7. 305. 
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States and international organizations Parties to this Instrument shall take all 
propriate measures to prevent, reduce and control any damage or significant risk 
arising from activities under their jurisdiction or control which are likely to produce 
debris. 
For possible measures reffered to in this Article may I rely to Professor L. Perek, 
an outstanding expert of this problem. 
He has been suggested as 
— prevention measurey. minimizing the amount of debris produced in operational 
activities—avoiding unintentional explosions—prohibiting intentional explosions—maintain-
ing an economy of space missions, 
— active measures: removing inactive objects from low, high and intermediate 
altitudes—removing debris from orbit by remote action, 
— passive measures: improving the flow of informations-evasive maneuvers—shield-
ing of spacecraft.28 
Preventive and active measures are directed towards the control, limitation, 
minimization and elimination, while passive measures are dictated by the necessity to 
live with present space debris (VF. В. Wirin 
According to the Draft the Convention would oblige states to take the necessary 
steps in their national legislation and/or administration of space activities in both 
directions. Prevention is the most realistic approach. It covers from specific measures 
in the design stage of spacecrafts to prohibition of putting garbage into orbit by 
astronauts many phases of space activity.30 
From Article III. 2 follows the obligation of states to take measures to avoid 
unintentional and to prohibit intentional explosions of space objects as sources of 
resulting debris. 
As to unintentional explosions: the possibility of accidental explosions or launch 
vehicle breakups due to operation failures cannot be eliminated. 
The first break-up of a satellite occurred in 1961 with 280 trackable debris. 
Explosion of the upper stage in orbit may create hundreds or thousands of fragments. 
Such an explosion happened to seven DELTA launch vehicles between 1973 and 1981, 
to the ARIANE V 16 rockets in 1986. In latter case 495 pieces were tracked, the 
estimated number of smaller pieces down to 1 mm size was 2300 dispersed into vast 
regions.31 
Deliberate breack-ups were mainly connected with mulitary space activities—re-
connaissance satellites deliberately destroyed due to malfunctions in reentry, or 
destruction of orbiting targets in ASAT-tests. 
28 PEREK. L : Suggestions for the Future, Note 7. 211-213., and Technical Aspects of the Control of Space 
Debris. Proceedings 33. Coll. Dresden, 1990, 400. 
29 WIRIN, W. В.: op. cil. (Note 22), 190. 
30 DIEDER1KS-VERCHSOOR: op. cit. (Note 19), 119. 
31 HACKET: op. cit. 22. The ESA Report stated that six severe explosions created about 2000 debris. [Able-
star, Titan (2), Agena (3), Cosmos 1275, Cosmos 844, Cosmos 554). 
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Cold war is now over, it is perhaps to be expected that space powers will be more 
willing to take the measures provided in the Draft not to increase the population of 
debris in outer space. 
Removal of debris 
C. Hall referring to the accumulation in LEO of orbiting man-made debris 30 years 
stated: "Before long it will become mandatory to states to remove from orbit unmanned 
space vehicles and debris that pose a hazard to spacecraft navigation".32 
Prevention and reducing of damage caused by space debris in the sense of the Draft 
Convention would be perfect only by removal of all debris at least in LEO. This is 
presently theoretically possible, practically not. Large objects, spent satellites, however, 
could be removed by utilizing a space vehicle with capability to rendezvous and bring 
back the satellite—being now a debris. 
Other method of removal of satellites is the boosting out of orbit at the end of their 
useful life. After completing thier mission they can be set on a trajectory into the dense 
layer of the atmosphere, aiming their annihilation (accelerating the "self-cleaning") or 
into higher disposal orbit rarely used by satellites or far beyond GSO.33 
The correction of the trajectory, however, necessitate special construction of space 
vehicles. The obligation of taking measures for prevention and reduction of damages as 
contained in the Draft could be interpreted in the way that parties to the Convention 
should do this. 
To the problem of removal the logical question can be raised, whether a state other 
than the state of registry having this capability may remove space debris which are 
"likely to cause direct or indirect damage"? 
The law of maritime nations contains rules for dealing with wreckage constituting 
dangerous obstacle in navigable waters. Except state vessels every wreck may be 
removed if it can cause any damage. G. Hacket puts the question: why in the law of the 
sea an abandoned object may be removed by any state other than the state of registry 
whereas in outer space this is not allowed?34 
To my mind Article VIII of the Space treaty excludes the deorbiting of tracked and 
identified space objects by a state other than the state of registry. The latter retains 
jurisdiction and control over the object. Ownership of the object is not affected by its 
presence in outer space. A spent satellite is not "abandoned" with the legal consequence 
32 HALL, C.: Comments on Traffic Control of Space Vehicles. Journal of Air Law and Commerce 1965., 
329. 
33 PEREK, L.: Technical Aspects of the Control of Space Debris. Note 19. 404.; HACKET: op. cit. 27-28. 
34 Op. cit. 197. Similarly DE SAUSSURE: An International Right to Reorbit Earth Threatening Satellites. 
2 Annals of Air and Sapce Law, 1978, 390.; DIEDERIKS-VERCHSOOR reffering to maritime law: "If the 
owner fails to take the necessary steps it would seem reasonable that the owner of the threatened satellite should 
be authorized to do himself (Remove the wrecked satellite). Harm Producing Events Caused by Fragments of 
Space Objects (Debris), Proceedings 25. Coll. Paris, 1982, 3. 
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that it should be treated as being a "res dereliclaT. The animus derelinquendi cannot be 
taken for granted. Implied authory to remove it do not exist, there is no tacitus 
consensus for such a measure taken by others. I share the opinion of W. B. Wirin who 
in this respect refers to U. S. practice with regard to maritime vessels, that abandonment 
cannot be implied from absence, even more a long period of time.35 Nevertheless, this 
conclusion is not so clear-cut for fragments, space junks, garbage etc. orbiting as "not 
identified flying objects" in near-earth orbits. In this respect I would incline to 
admissibility of removal especially in case of an international undertaking for "cleaning" 
the near-earth space from debris. 
Cooperation in prevention, information, consultation in good faith 
Article IV the Draft referring to the general obligation set forth in Article II, contains 
as additional duties the cooperation in prevention of damage to the environment making 
every effort to avoid situations which may lead to disputes, further more in promoting 
the development and exchange of technology to prevent, reduce and control space 
debris. States parties to the Convention have to encourage and facilitate the flow and 
exchange of informations relevant to the instrument. 
The necessity of international consultations in accordance with Article IX of the 
Space Treaty appears in Article IV. с of the Draft. The parties should hold consultations 
when they have reason to believe that a space activity produces debris that is likely to 
cause damage or significant risk thereto. Such consultation may be requested by any 
party when it has reason to believe that the space activity of another state is likely to 
cause damage. 
The obligation to cunsult and the right to request consultation in the Draft are linked 
with two usual clauses: 
refusal to hold consultations or the breaking up of such without justification shall 
be interpreted as bad faith (Article IV. с par. 3) 
The parties have to negotiate in good faith which means inter alia not only to hold 
consultations or talks but also to pursue them with a view of reaching a solution (Article 
III. d). 
Concerning the good faith: this essentially metalegal concept, otherwise incorporated 
in some civil laws, if accepted, could cause serious difficulties. Refusal to hold 
consultations is a clear behaviour, but justification of breaking up talks as well as the 
"view of reaching a solution", all can be highly questionable in a given case. Moreover, 
what is the legal consequence of "bad faith"? Probably not more than a favourable 
35 Note 25. quoted by WIRIN: op. cil. Note 22. 187. 
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position of the other party when in case of damages caused by the space activity it 
comes to legal proceedings.36 
Responsibility and liability 
The Draft lays down principles of international responsibility and liability in accordance 
with existing rules of space law. 
As a general rule Article VI stipulates that the rules of responsibility and liability 
of the Instrument apply to damage caused by debris in the space and in absence of other 
international agreements on the matter to damages caused to the earth environment. 
The two terms responsibility and liability are often used interchangeably suggesting 
that responsibility is broader, encompassing liability of states.37 In the system of the 
Draft responsibility appears clearly related to general international law obligations of 
states or organizations parties to the Instrument. Namely according to Article VII they 
shall bear international responsibility for assuring that national activities are carried out 
in conformity with the provisions of this Instrument, the 1967 Space Treaty and the 
1977 Liability Convention. 
This stipulation, however, is hardly more than a confirmation of obligations 
undertaken by this Instrument and two other basic space law treaties. In my humble 
opinion the wording of Article VII in this way would be more exact. Space activities 
can be carried out in conformity with the Space Treaty but not with the Convention on 
Liability. 
International liability as set forth in Article VIII of the Draft is a logical 
consequence of the principle that space debris are space objects: 
Each state and international organization party to this Instrument that launches or 
procures the launching of a space object is internationally liable for damage arising 
therefrom to another state persons or objects or international organization party to 
this Instrument as a consequence of space debris produced by any such object. 
This liability according to the general rule of Article VI apply to damages caused 
in the space environment. The Liability Convention accepted the distinction between 
objective (absolute) and fault liability. A launching state shall be absolutely liable to pay 
36 "Good Faith" as a mle in International law is questionable. According to SCHWARZENBERGER, G. e.g. 
"rules such as those underlying the principle of good faith ... it would be possible to argue their existence on 
the level of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations". A Manual of International law. VI. 
Ed. London 1976, 27-28. WILLIAMS, M. stating that the obligation to negotiate "is well-established in 
international law" refers to the advisory opinion of the PCU concerning Railway Traffic between Lithuania and 
Poland of 1931: even sanctions may be applied in the event of an unjustified breaking off of the discussions 
or delays and, in general in the absence of good faith. In: Customary International Law and General Principles 
of Law. Note 7, 154. 
37 HACKET, G.: op. cit. 154-159.; VON DER DUNK, F. G.: Liability versus Responsibility in Space Law: 
Misconception or Misconlruction? From Proceedings 34. Coll. 1991 published in "Space Law Syllabus of the 
Seminar Liability and Responsibility in Air and Space Law", Leiden, 1994, 15-23. 
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compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to 
aircraft in flight (Article II). In the event of damage caused in outer space to a space 
object of one launching state by a space object of another launching state, latter shall 
be liable to pay compensation due to its fault (Article III). 
The Draft do not differentiate in its own rule of liability, however, it refers to the 
Liability Convention. Would this mean that damage caused by space debris to a 
spacecraft would be compensated according to the rules of fault liability? 
We may give two alternative answers to this question: 
In case of collision between a spacecraft and a tracked and identified debris the 
launching state can be held responsible for an omission (fault) not having prevented the 
creation of debris which might infringe the freedom of outer space (S. T. Article I).38 
The Instrument, at least in relation of states parties, would support this interpretation 
since it obliges launching states to take measures to prevent any damage or significant 
risk arising from activities under their jurisdiction. 
On the other hand the Draft do not differentiate between strict and fault liability. 
Article VIII therefore may be interpreted in the way that in case of damage caused by 
a debris the launching state shall be absolutely liable i.e. it will be judged by the result. 
Dispute settlement 
For the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Instrument Article IX primarily provides consultations as means of amicable solution. 
The dispute shall be subject to consultation at the request of any of the parties. 
Failing this, if the parties within twelve months could not agree on a means of peaceful 
settlement, the dispute at request of any party shall be referred to arbitration or 
adjudication. To the procedure the ILA Draft Convention on the settlement of Space 
Law Disputes shall be applicable. This is, appended as an annex, integral part of the 
Instrument. However, each party to the Instrument may exclude in full or in part the 
application of Convention. Consequently for parties to a dispute which made use of thie 
right, rules of the Liability Convention on dispute settlement would be applicable. 
Par. 4 of Article IX invests the court of arbitration with a very important right: 
prescribing interim measures to prevent serious damage to the environment, or persons, 
or objects. This measures taken in emergency cases are binding on the parties. They are 
obliged to implement the prescribed measures without delay.39 
38 HACKET, G. minds that "States are obliged by the Outer Space Treaty to prevent the creation of debris 
which might infringe the freedom of outer space. In case of creation of space debris states will be held respon-
sible for an omission...". Op. cil. 164. 
39 The wording "in these procedures it shall be possible..." raises the question how interim measures would 
be possible in proceedings based on the Liability Convention? 
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Studying the ILA Draft Convention on Space Debris we may rightly conclude that 
this work is a major step to the solution in the law making of an urgent problem 
connected with the intensification of space activities. 
We have every reason to hope that as a useful contribution to the progressive 
development of space law it will be the basis of an international convention on this 
subject. 
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Ágnes DÓSA Legal Aspects of Combating AIDS 
in Hungary* 
1. Introduction 
Hungary's AIDS policy is to a large extent based on widescale mandatory HIV testing. 
This policy does not differ from the general approach taken by public health legislation. 
As with approaches to other infectious diseases, its primary goal is to identify as many 
infected persons as possible and to supervise them in order to prevent the spread of the 
infection. In the second half of the 1980s, when the current AIDS legislation was 
passed, respect for privacy and individual rights of the infected persons did not play a 
major role. At that time, under the authoritarian political system, society's interest—as 
defined and articulated exclusively by the ruling Communist Party elite—dominated the 
decision-making process. 
A fundamental transformation of the political system, accomplished in 1989, made 
reform of the whole legal system necessary. Understandably, the legislature has given 
top priority to issues which have a major influence on the country's economy. Other 
fields, such as health law, have temporarily been neglected, so most aspects of current 
health law still reflect the paternalistic approach under which human rights and 
autonomy of patients are not held in high esteem.' 
* The author is deeply indebted to Professor Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky for her kind assistance on the labour 
law part and to Professor Péter Polt for his comments on the criminal law part of this article. 
1 There are quite a few instances of medical paternalism in Hungary (e.g., legal regulation of informed 
consent or transplantation of human organs). KOVÁCS, J.: Bribery and Medical Ethics in Hungary, Bulletin 
of Medical Ethics, No. 66/1991, at 15-16 (providing more details on the subject). 
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However, there are three major exceptions. The first is the financial aspect of the 
health-care system. Substantial changes have been introduced in this area in order to 
make the economic foundations of health care more transparent and effective. The 
second exception is the regulation of civil commitment, where human rights concerns 
necessitated amendment of the legal framework of this special type of detention.2 Last, 
but not least, the third exception is the Law on Handling and Protection of Health-
Related Data, which became operative on 1 January 1998.3 The Law addresses two 
major issues related to HIV: mandatory reporting and anonymous testing. It would be 
natural to expect that the development of democratic institutions and the formation of 
a more pluralistic society, accomplished in the past several years, would lead to a 
profound réévaluation of the legal responses to the HIV/AIDS problem. Specifically, one 
would expect that a democratically-elected Parliament would adopt more liberal 
legislation. Interestingly enough, this was not the case. The original version of the 
governmental draft submitted to the Parliament contained very liberal solutions, e.g., 
instituting anonymous testing and terminating mandatory reporting of HIV and AIDS. 
These matters sparked heated debate. Ultimately, the Parliament rejected the idea of 
anonymous testing and maintained mandatory reporting of HIV/AIDS. 
In addition to health legislation, the legislature explicitly reacted to the HIV/AIDS 
problem in the context of immigration. Other aspects of the problem (such as criminal 
law or labour law) are not only untouched by the legislature but even court decisions 
are lacking. Consequently, when exploring the possible labour and criminal law 
ramifications of HIV infection, we can only apply certain general principles to this 
special condition. 
2. Demographics4 
In 1985 the first two HIV-positive persons were identified in Hungary; both were men 
who reported sexual contacts with other men. The first AIDS case was reported one 
year later. Since then a total of 520 (plus 104 anonymous) infected persons have been 
reported as of 31 December 1996. 
2 DÓSA, Á .: New Legislation on Civil Commitment in Hungary, 14 Medicine and Law, Nos 7-8/1995, at 
581-587. 
3 Act No. XLVII. of 1997 on the Protection and Handling of Health-Related Data (1997. évi XLVII. tv. az 
egészségügyi és a hozzájuk kapcsolódó személyes adatok kezeléséről és védelméről). 
4 The data in this chapter are mainly based on the unpublished report of the external review of the national 
AIDS program, conducted between in June and July 1995 by the World Health Organization Regional Office 
for Europe in collaboration with Hungarian experts. 
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Table I 
Number of reported HIV-positive cases in Hungary as of 31 December 1996 
Year Male Female Anonymous Total 
1985 14 2 0 16 
1986 65 4 0 69 
1987 50 4 0 54 
1988 24 5 0 29 
1989 30 2 4 36 
1990 39 0 1 40 
1991 43 6 6 55 
1992 43 2 16 61 
1993 34 7 15 56 
1994 37 4 24 65 
1995 52 4 25 81 
1996 38 11 13 62 
TOTAL 469 51 104 624 
Source: National Institute of Hygiene 
The number of AIDS cases in the same period was 245; 157 persons in that group 
have died. 
In comparison with most European countries, Hungary can be characterized as a 
relatively low prevalence country. This is partly due to the fact that, at the beginning 
of the epidemic, when only limited knowledge of the nature of the disease and of the 
ways of prevention was available, Hungarian citizens were unable to travel abroad as 
freely as today. For this reason the number of cases "imported" f rom abroad was 
relatively small. In addition, drug addiction was not a major problem. Despite a marked 
steady increase in drug use in the last few years, intravenous drug use is still not 
widespread.5 Only one Hungarian intravenous drug user was found to be HIV positive 
during the 1986-96 period. The only intravenous drug user who died of AIDS, was a 
foreigner. 
5 In 1996 the total number of registered drug addicts (not only intravenous drug users) was 1,654. 
Népegészségügy, No. 6/1996, at 22. 
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Table 11 
Number of reported AIDS cases as of 31 December 1995 
Year Male Female Total 
1986 1 0 1 
1987 6 1 7 
1988 9 0 9 
1989 15 0 15 
1990 17 2 19 
1991 29 1 30 
1992 31 2 33 
1993 28 4 32 
1994 22 1 23 
1995 28 3 31 
1996 40 5 45 
TOTAL 226 19 245 
Source: National Institute of Hygiene 
The low prevalence of HIV infection among haemophiliacs (4,4%) may, in turn, be 
attributed to the relatively late appearance of the virus in Hungary and to the rigorous 
implementation of strict laboratory screening procedures. In fact, all of the HIV-positive 
haemophiliacs were infected through coagulation factor concentrates imported in the 
early 1980s when there were shortages of locally manufactured coagulate products. 
Between 1985 and 1987, extensive screening of the haemophiliac population was 
conducted; 29 positive persons were found among 625 screened. 
Recent estimates of the National Institute of Hygiene put the total number of HIV-
positive cases at between 2,000 and 4,ООО.6 The most affected regions of the country 
have been the capital city Budapest, and Gyôr-Moson-Sopron county which borders 
Austria. These two regions account for 85,5% of reported HIV infections in the 
country. 
6 Weekly Epidemiological Record (WHO), No. 50/1995, at 357. 
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Table III 
Number of AIDS cases and persons who died of AIDS, 
by transmission category, as of 31 December 1996 
Transmission Group A I D S Cases AIDS-Related D e a t h s 
Homo/Bisexua l Men 179 118 
Haemophi l iacs 18 12 
Transfusion Recipients 12 9 
Heterosexual Contacts 2 2 10 
I Drug Users 1 1 
Mother to Child 1 1 
Nosoc imia l 2 1 
U n k n o w n 10 5 
T O T A L 2 4 5 157 
Source: National Institute of Hygiene 
According to official statistics, homosexuals still remain the most vulnerable 
community.7 However, the increasing number of prostitutes, in particular prostitutes 
relocating to Hungary from other countries, and the greater supply of sexual services 
provided by minorities, have presented special concerns. 
Hungary has a long-standing and impressive record in early diagnosis and treatment 
of the notifiable sexually transmitted diseases (other than AIDS), including contact 
tracing and preventive treatment of sexual partners of infected individuals.8 The 
network of outpatient clinics for venereal diseases with trained staff is very well 
developed throughout the country. Other public health indicators are also impressive. 
For example, the percentage of Hungarian infants immunized against infectious 
diseases is well above the European average. ' 
7 The male to female ratio of seropositives is 11:1 which may be explained either by the predominant role 
of homosexual routes of transmission or by selective screening. 
8 After years of steady decline, recent data indicate rapid resurgence in early symptomatic syphilis cases. 
The number of newly reported syphilis cases was 142 in 1993, 254 in 1994, and 239 in 1995 (data of the 
National Institute for Dermatology and Venereal Diseases). Although the trend can be considered statistically 
insignificant, this increase is nevertheless regarded by epidemiologists as a possible indication of the potential 
silent spread of HIV. 
9 For poliomyelitis the European average in the period 1991-93 was 83% while 100% in Hungary in 1994; 
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3. Public Health Law 
The chief priority of the current public health policy is clearly to protect the interests 
of society, first of all, by creating a legal framework to erect a barrier between the 
contaminated and the uncontaminated, and by devising effective methods of treatment 
and prevention. This policy is illustrated by the regulations governing detection and 
compulsory treatment of traditional venereal diseases.10 In this field, very strict 
coercive legal measures may be applied. In particular, the public health authorities have 
the right to control various aspects of the patient's private life; the legal consequences 
connected to the disease might be very inconvenient for the patient Of course, from the 
point of view of epidemiology, this type of regulation can be effectively employed by 
public health authorities. In fact, it seems that such a strict legal regime has substantially 
contributed to achieving good results in reducing the number of cases of venereal 
disease, and to a generally satisfactory public health situation. Whether such a regime 
is defensible from the civil rights and liberties point of view is another question. 
Under current regulations governing the treatment and prevention of venereal 
diseases, a person who has contracted a venereal disease is obliged to undergo regular 
check-ups and submit to treatment." If the patient does not comply with the treatment 
and—after repeated summons—does not visit the outpatient clinic, the physician may ask 
the police for help to compel the patient to undergo treatment. The prosecutor's 
approval is not needed for the implementation of this measure, which falls within the 
discretion of the outpatient facility physician. Since 1972, however, involuntary 
hospitalization of venereal patients has not taken place because of the lack of secure 
establishments for such purpose. Theoretically, though, involuntary hospitalization of 
such patients is possible. 
The patient is obliged to disclose the identity of persons with whom he had sexual 
contact. These persons must then undergo treatment, and the above-mentioned coercive 
measures may be applied to them as well. Two hundred and fifty contact persons were 
named by syphilis patients in 1995 (compared to the 239 newly registered syphilis 
patients), among whom 81 were found infected; an additional 98 were treated 
preventively. The police were involved in fewer than 2% of cases. 
for diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus the European average was 78%, while in Hungary it was 99.9%; 
as to BCG and morbilli the European average is 82% while 99.9% in Hungary. World Health Statistics 
Quarterly, No. 3-4/1995, at 288; Népegészségügy, No. 12/1995, at 235. 
10 Syphilis, gonorrhoea, ulcus molle, and lymphogranuloma venereum. Although AIDS is not classified as 
a venereal disease, certain elements of AIDS legislation are very similar to that of venereal diseases (contact 
tracing, partner notification, etc.). The outpatient care of HIV/AIDS patients is also assigned mostly to the 
venereal disease clinics. 
11 Act No. II. of 1972 on Health Care (1972. évi П. tv. az egészségügyről) Sec. 32; Ordinance 15/1972 (VIII. 
5.) of the Minister of Health Care on the implementation of provisions of treatment and prevention of Act No. 
II. of 1972 on Health Care (15/1972 (VIII. 5.) EüM. rendelet az egészségügyről szóló 1972. évi törvénynek a 
gyógyító megelőző ellátásra vonatkozó rendelkezéseinek végrehajtásáról! Sec. 35-40. 
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As to AIDS policy, emphasis is placed on testing procedures. In deciding which 
group has to undergo testing, individual privacy interests are balanced against the 
public's "need to know." Hungary's current legislation places the public interest 
first—the regulations impose compulsory testing on a very wide range of people.12 The 
consequences of positive test results are rather serious for the infected person and are 
very similar to those of venereal disease patients. It is important to note that the current 
testing policy is clearly not in compliance with the recommendations and guidelines of 
international organizations active in the field of public health.13 Hungary has so far 
resisted any pressure from these organizations to change its testing policy. 
The following groups are subject to mandatory or compulsory testing:14 
a) Patients suffering from venereal diseases or those with clinical indications of 
venereal disease.15 Patients attending the outpatient venereal disease clinics are tested 
routinely for HIV without their express consent when they exhibit early symptoms of 
any kind of venereal disease. In the 1993-94 period, a total of 28,157 patients were 
tested for HIV; 14 tested positive. From the public health point of view this is the most 
effective way of testing for HIV, as venereal disease patients are more likely to have 
contracted HIV than other population groups. Most Hungarian clinics treating sexually 
transmitted diseases are still state-run, but the few private clinics are also obliged to 
report identified HIV/AIDS cases. 
b) Sexual partners of HIV-positive persons and other persons the HIV-positive 
person had contact with, and who might have transmitted the disease.16 This provision 
allows extensive contact tracing. It imposes the duty of submitting to HIV testing not 
only on the sexual partners of the HIV-infected person but also on anyone in the HIV-
positive person's surroundings who is at risk of infection (e.g., the medical staff treating 
the patient). However, in the absence of effective treatment of AIDS, the infection chain 
cannot be broken. Therefore, the only aim of the testing may be the notification of the 
12 Ordinance No. 5/1988 (V. 31.) of the Minister of Social and Health Care Affairs on the measures taken 
in order to prevent the spread of AIDS. [5/1988. (V. 31.) SZEM rendelet a szerzett immunhányos tünetcsoport 
terjedésének meggátlása érdekében szükséges intézkedésekről és a szűrővizsgálat elrendeléséről.] 
13 See, e.g.. Council of Europe: Recommendation No. R. (89) 14 on the ethical issues of HIV infection in 
the health care and social settings; The World Health Organization: Statements from the Consultation on 
Testing and Counselling for HIV infection (Geneva 16-18 November, 1992); The European Union: Resolution 
of the Council of and the Ministers for Health of the Member Slates, meeting within the Council of 22 
December 1989 on the fight against AIDS; Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the 
Governments of the member States, meeting within the Council of 31 May 1988 concerning AIDS. These 
international instruments consider compulsory testing unethical and counterproductive. The emphasis is laid 
on voluntary testing. More on this topic in Danzinger, D.: Compulsory Testing for HIV in Hungary, Soc. Sei. 
Med. No. 8/1996, at 1199-1204. 
14 According to the terminology adopted in Recommendation R. (89) 14 of the Council of Europe, testing 
is considered mandatory if it is mandated by law in order to permit participation in an activity which in itself 
constitutes a voluntary act. A testing procedure can be considered compulsory if the test is required by law, 
if informed consent is not sought, and if refusal may result in sanctions. 
15 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 1/a. 
16 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 1/b. 
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infected person about seropositivity and calling this person's attention to those rules 
which are designed to prevent the further spread of infection. 
c) Intravenous drug users.17 In practice, this method of detecting HIV-positive 
patients is ineffective because most clinics do not comply with this legal obligation. The 
Decree does not specify when the test should be carried out or whether it should be 
periodically repeated. 
d) Prisoners.18 Persons sentenced to imprisonment, but not pretrial detainees, also 
have to undergo testing. Those who test positive are to be placed in the medical care 
facility of the correctional institution. They should be treated once they start to exhibit 
clinical indications of the disease. 
e) Inmates of juvenile correctional facilities.19 A person who commits a crime 
between the ages of 14 and 18 may be sentenced to detention in a juvenile facility, 
which is a milder measure than regular prison. Juveniles detained in this type of 
correctional facility also have to undergo testing. 
0 Prostitutes.20 Prostitution was a crime until 1993, when it was removed from the 
Criminal Code and became an administrative offense, carrying minor penalties. Some 
forms of activities associated with prostitution, like soliciting prostitution, are still 
criminal. Every person charged with a prostitution-related activity has to undergo HIV 
testing during criminal proceedings. The Decree does not specify at which stage of the 
proceedings the test should be conducted and whether it should be repeated. 
In addition, mandatory testing takes place in situations related to tissue and organ 
transplantation. In cases where organs or tissue are removed from deceased persons, a 
transplant may proceed only if an HIV test is conducted and proves negative.21 In 
cases of organ and tissue donation among living persons, a donor must be tested for 
HIV before the transplant may take place. Sperm samples used for the purposes of 
artificial insemination may be utilized only after a certain time period has elapsed. 
Sperm donors have to undergo HIV testing twice: first, at the time of donation, and then 
six months later. The sperm may be utilized only if both samples test negative.22 
Testing of blood samples was gradually introduced in Hungary at a relatively early 
stage of the epidemic (between March and July of 1986). During the first three years, 
10 samples tested positive. All were attributable to first time blood donors belonging 
to homo- or bisexual risk groups, who donated blood primarily to leam about their HIV 
status. Each prospective blood donor has to be informed that the blood will be screened 
for the presence of HIV antibodies.23 The prospective donor is further informed that. 
17 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 1 If. 
18 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 1/d. 
19 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 1/e. 
20 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 1/c. 
21 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 7. subsec. 1. 
22 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 7. subsec. 2. 
23 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 7. subsec. 3. 
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should the test results be positive, the donor will be notified and registered, and that he 
is to bear the consequences of the positive test result. 
Finally, the problem of mandatory testing can arise in a clinical setting. If a 
physician examining a patient concludes that the patient's symptoms might be related 
to HIV infection, he must order an HIV test.24 Whether the physician has the legal 
obligation to obtain the patient's consent is unclear. However, suing the hospital for lack 
of informed consent in that case would not seem promising. As previously mentioned, 
Hungarian health law has retained a paternalistic approach to the doctor-patient 
relationship under which the physician plays the dominant role. In fact, the doctrine of 
informed consent did not develop until quite recently.25 The issue is still inadequately 
regulated by the health legislation. There is now an increasing support among physicians 
and patients for a legal solution that would meet the needs of a democratic society. 
Despite the lack of clear legal guidelines, the ethical obligation of informing the patient 
and asking for his consent has taken root in the medical community. One may note here 
that general principles of contract law require detailed information for consent to be 
legally valid. 
Unfortunately, Law No. II on Health Care does not impose a general obligation of 
informed consent. Instead, it requires the patient's consent only in some cases (e.g., 
hospitalization, surgical procedures and organ transplants).26 The Law is still based on 
the premise that if a patient decides to be seen by a physician, then the patient impliedly 
consents to all the tests and treatments ordered by the physician. 
For a short period, HIV screening of all pregnant women was mandatory under a 
1992 Ordinance of the Minister of Welfare, but due to high costs and minimal benefits 
the provision on mandatory screening was repealed.27 
Citizens entitled to public health-care services, who want to know their HIV status, 
may undergo testing on a voluntary basis free of charge. If they test positive, however, 
they have to bear the consequences connected with a positive test result described 
above: registration, mandatory regular check-ups, contact tracing, etc. 
There are only two anonymous test centers in the country. Since their introduction 
in Budapest in 1988, almost 10,000 samples have been tested; of these some 90 tested 
positive. Of course, it may safely be assumed that some of these HIV-positive persons 
were previously examined elsewhere and only came to the anonymous test site for 
verification. For this reason, these test results are registered separately in the official 
statistics. 
Prior to 1992 the Budapest test centre operated without substantial financial support; 
the physicians, assistants, and the operators of the AIDS hotline were all volunteers. 
24 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 6. 
25 KOVÁCS, J.: Medical Ethics Activities in Hungary, Bulletin of the European Philosophy of Medicine and 
Health Care, No. 1/1994, at 13. 
26 Act No. II. Sec. 47. subsec. 3. 
27 Ordinance No. 33/1992 (XII. 23.) of the Minister of Welfare on Prenatal Care (33/1992. (XII. 23.) NM 
rendelet a terhesgondozásról). 
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Unfortunately, the personnel faced substantial opposition from the public. At the very 
beginning it was difficult to find an appropriate place for the centre as the people living 
in the neighbourhood tried to impede the centre's establishment. The second anonymous 
test centre was opened in 1994 in Pécs, in the southern part of Hungary. 
Until 1997 there were no specific provisions allowing or prohibiting anonymous 
testing, so the two test sites operated for years without express legal authorization. With 
the preparation of the bill on the Protection and Handling of Health-Related Data in 
1997, the question could not be avoided any longer; the legislature had to make a 
definitive decision.28 During the heated public debate, various arguments were raised 
for and against anonymous testing. Public health policymakers found it unacceptable 
that while mandatory testing imposed a substantial burden on a wide range of people 
(including all the consequences following the test), many others could avoid the harsh 
public health measures simply by choosing anonymous testing. In their opinion, the 
primary aim of HIV testing was to break the chain of transmission by all possible 
means. As anonymous testing does not allow for proper follow up, it does not serve the 
needs of the public. In response, proponents of anonymous testing warned that the lack 
of respect for privacy, and the resulting lack of control over those to whom the results 
are communicated, might discourage many from voluntary testing unless it was offered 
on an anonymous basis. 
Ultimately, after a long and heated debate the Parliament adopted a rather 
controversial model. Under the 1997 Law, a person wishing to undergo HIV testing is 
not obliged to disclose his personal data to health-care personnel before the test. 
However, should the test be positive, then the testee is required to reveal his identity 
and bear the consequences related to the positive result. Those wishing to undergo 
testing have to be told in advance that anonymity is guaranteed only as long as the test 
is negative. It is unclear how this regulation may be enforced (e.g., how to compel 
someone to give personal data if he is not willing to). In fact, anonymity becomes 
relevant for the individual only if the sample tests positive; if the test result is negative, 
it is of no importance at all. Some predict that the solution accepted by the Parliament 
will radically decrease the number of persons visiting the "anonymous" (if they still 
merit the name) test centres. 
The consequences resulting from positive test results are very similar to those 
following the application of traditional public health measures which proved highly 
successful in the treatment of venereal disease patients. The first step is verification of 
the diagnosis. If it is confirmed, then the laboratory notifies the outpatient clinic in 
charge of the treatment of HIV-positive patients.29 If the seroconversion occurred as 
a consequence of blood transfusion, then the lab has to contact the National Institute for 
Haematology and Blood Transfusion. If the patient contracted the disease through sexual 
contact, then the lab notifies an outpatient clinic treating venereal diseases which must 
28 Act No. XLVII, of 1997. 
29 Decree No. 5/1988. Section 3. jubsec. 1. 
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register the patient. From then on, the patient must visit the clinic for regular check-ups. 
During the first visit the physician informs the patient of his seropositivity and provides 
detailed information on the disease, the possible modes of transmission, and the 
behavioral rules with which he must comply.30 The assistance of the police may not 
be used to compel the patient to come to the clinic, although involuntary hospitalization 
may be ordered.31 
From the very beginning of the epidemic, reporting of both HTV infection and AIDS 
at any stage of the disease has been mandatory. The person's full name and address was 
to be provided to the local public health service and to the National Institute of 
Hygiene—just as with any other infectious disease. The National Institute was required 
to send a copy of the report to the Institute of Haematology and Blood Transfusion, and 
to the National Institute of Venerology. The only requirement intended to protect 
privacy was that the report had to be mailed in a sealed envelope. 
The new 1997 Law on the Protection and Handling of Health-Related Da ta 
developed a new scheme for reporting infectious diseases.32 Two different categories 
of cases have been distinguished. If a case falls under the first category, then the 
physician reports the disease with the patient's full name and address to the local public 
health authority (the vast majority of the infectious diseases belong here). In turn, if a 
case falls under the second category, then only the diagnosis is to be reported, without 
any personal data. The second category includes cases of sexually transmitted diseases, 
tuberculosis, nosocomial infections, and HIV/AIDS. Under the original governmental 
draft, AIDS and HIV were exempted from mandatory reporting as they were not listed 
in any of the two groups. The Parliament, however, decided to include HIV/AIDS in the 
second category. Although these infectious diseases are reported without personal data, 
the public health authorities may require these data "if it is justified by public health 
reasons."33 
As to communication of test results, the physician at the outpatient clinic has to 
inform all the physicians having contact with the patient of the individual's sero-
positivity, including the patient's general practitioner.34 This procedure has been 
slightly modified by the Law on the Protection and Handling of Health-Related Data . 
In a case of infectious diseases, data may be (but do not have to be) forwarded to other 
physicians taking part in the treatment of the patient, even in spite of the patient 's 
objections.35 Although all the physicians are obliged to observe the rules of 
professional confidentiality, the more people who know about a person's HIV status, 
the less likely it is to remain secret. 
30 Decree No. 5/1988 Sedion 3. subsec. 4. 
31 Act No. II. on Health Care. Section 16. subsec. 2. 
32 Act No. XLVII of 1997. 
33 Act No. XLVII of 1997. Sec. 15. subsec. 2. 
34 Decree No. 5/1988. Sec. 9. subsec. 3. 
35 Act No. XLVII. of 1997 Sec. 10. subsec. 2. 
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4. Immigration Law 
The number of immigrants entering Hungary is quite substantial. The majority come 
from the former Hungarian territories (mainly from Romania). In addition, a great 
number of people seek refugee status as a result of the protracted war in former 
Yugoslavia.36 If we consider the number of refugees per 10,000 inhabitants, Hungary 
is fifth in Europe (with a total of 18,000 refugees). Relative to its gross national 
product, Hungary accommodated the most refugees, even more than Germany.37 
The explicit public health objective of the current immigration policy is that 
migration from abroad should not increase the number of AIDS cases in the country. 
For this reason immigration restrictions do not refer to those belonging to high-risk 
groups but try to ban generally the admittance of those who exhibit symptoms of the 
disease. There are, however, no measures introduced against Hungarian citizens 
travelling abroad; in particular, Hungarian nationals returning from foreign countries 
with high incidence of AIDS do not have to undergo HIV testing. As to foreigners 
who wish to enter the country, there are no systematic health checks at the border. 
Short-term visitors are not required to certify their HIV status. Public health measures 
apply exclusively to those who wish to stay in the country for a longer period of 
time. 
Under current legislation, the issuance or extension of visas or residency permits, 
and the issuance of immigration permits may be denied in the interest of public 
health.38 This is especially true if the petitioner suffers from AIDS, tuberculosis, 
leprosy as well as if he is in a state of virulent syphilis and/or a carrier of pathogens, 
or is a bacterium carrier of typhoid and paratyphoid.39 Curiously enough, syphilis is 
treated more harshly than AIDS: in syphilis cases, even the carrier of pathogens can be 
rejected, while the HIV infected may not be rejected exclusively on the ground of 
seropositivity. 
Those applying for visas or the extension of their visas, and for residency up to one 
year, do not have to undergo HIV testing; they only have to give a statement as to 
whether they suffer from AIDS.40 Making a false statement, however, or admitting 
36 As reported by the National Office of Immigration and Refugees, the total number of refugees arriving 
from the territory of former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 was 75.531. 
37 TÓTH, J .: Towards a Refugee Law in Hungary, in Genesis of a Refugee Regime, the Case of Hungary 
(H. ADELMAN. E. SÍK and Gy. TESSÉNYI eds.), 1994. 87-91. 
38 Act No. LXXXVI of 1993 on the Entry, Stay in Hungary and Immigration of Foreigners (1993. évi 
LXXXVI. tv. a külföldiek beutazásáról, magyarországi tartózkodásáról és bevándorlásáról); Government 
Decree No. 64/1994 (IV. 30.) on the Execution of Act LXXXVI of 1993 on the Entry, Stay in Hungary and 
Immigration of Foreigners [64/1994 (VI. 30.) Korm. rendelet a külföldiek beutazásáról, magyarországi 
tartózkodásáról szóló 1993. évi LXXXVI. törvény végrehajtásáról.] 
39 Act No. LXXXVI. Sec. 23. subsection l/e.; Decree Sec. 32. 
40 Decree 64/1994. Sec. 33, subsec. 1. 
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AIDS infection, may lead to prohibition of entry or stay in the country, or even to 
expulsion. The decision falls within the discretion of the immigration officer. 
In cases concerning applications for long-term residency permits (over one year) or 
for immigration, proof that the applicant is not suffering from AIDS is a precondition 
for obtaining an approval.41 Seropositivity alone, without evident symptoms of the 
disease, is not a ground for denying permission. A statement by the applicant is not 
sufficient in such cases; an official medical certificate is required. The certificate may 
be obtained in Hungary or in the petitioner's home country. In the latter case, the 
National Public Health Service makes the decision as to its recognition. 
Each person intending to take up long-term residence in Hungary has to undergo 
HIV testing. If the test is positive, the applicant has to undergo a medical examination 
in the designated hospital. If there are no evident symptoms of the disease, permission 
may not be denied for public health reasons. However, the applicant is required to sign 
a written statement that, during his stay in the country, he will voluntarily undergo 
regular check-ups, and will comply with all those behavioral rules communicated by the 
public health authority to the patient, which are designed to reduce the risk of 
transmitting the disease. In contrast, if there are evident symptoms of the disease, then 
permission may be denied for public health reasons. This decision falls within the 
discretion of the immigration officer. 
As to the regulation of employing foreigners, there is no general requirement of 
certification regarding HIV-antibody status. However, as the working permit may not 
be granted unless the foreigner has a valid visa or residency permit, the above-
described procedures determine the preconditions of conducting any legal activity for 
profit. 
When it comes to refugees and asylum seekers, the United Nations R e f u g e e 
Convention (1951) and the 1989 Government Decree do not explicitly require the 
certification regarding an HIV status.42 However, in such cases the application may 
be refused on the ground of public health concerns. The Decree does not specify in 
detail what amounts to a danger to public health which permits such a refusal. Even 
after refugee status has been granted, public health concerns might still result in the 
revocation of permission. However, if the refugee is able to prove that he became 
seropositive after the permission had been granted, the permission may not be 
revoked. 
41 Decree 64/1994. Sec. 33, subsec. 4. 
42 Government Decree No. 101/1989 (IX. 28.) on granting the refugee status [101/1989 (DC. 28.) MT rendelet 
a menekültként elismerésről]. 
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5. Labor Law4 3 
Employers have a strong interest in learning as much as possible about prospective 
employees to assess their capacity to perform thejob. In particular, the employee's 
health condition might be of importance. 
An HIV seropositivity might be of importance to the employer for two separate 
reasons. First, the HIV-infected person might become sick and thus unable to perform 
the job. The employer would then have to face the costs and inconveniences associated 
with an ill employee. Second, the employer would have to prevent the possible infection 
of other workers, especially if the job is of such a nature that substantial risk of 
transmission is real. 
The issues to be discussed in this context arise at the very beginning and the very 
end of a labour contract. First, does the employer have a right to inquire about the 
health status of the prospective employee and/or to demand an HIV test? Second, may 
an employee be dismissed on the ground of seropositivity or on the ground that HIV 
status was not disclosed during the hiring process? 
According to the Hungarian regulations on pre-employment medical examinations, 
the vast majority of prospective employees must undergo a medical examination before 
being hired.44 The aim of this examination is defined broadly—it is meant to assess the 
applicant's suitability for the job. Specific tests are required for various jobs, but none 
of them include HIV testing. Even in the health-care setting, where the existence of 
numerous infectious diseases has to be ruled out in order to be hired, there is no legal 
obligation to produce an HIV test result. 
The regulations do not restrict the employer's right to require the applicant to 
undergo other examinations. However, the employer's right to ask for a certificate of 
the applicant's HIV status, or to have him/her make a declaration on this matter, is 
restricted by the Labor Code's general provision. This provision states that, during the 
hiring process, only data which do not violate the applicant's privacy rights or dignity 
and which entail essential information related to the employment contract may be 
requested.45 It is obvious that health-related data may determine not only the 
applicant's chances to get or keep a job. In some instances the applicant's privacy rights 
might be violated if the employer learns confidential data about him. 
The basic question to be decided at this point is whether a possible HIV infection 
is the kind of information which is acceptable in view of the Labor Code's provision. 
43 Generally on Hungarian labor law: KOLLONAY LEHOCZKY, Ca.: labor Law in Hungary, in: Legal 
Reform in Past-Communist Europe (FRANKOWSKI, S. and STEPHAN, P. B. eds.), 1995, 409-431. 
44 Ordinance No. 4/1981. (III. 31.) of the Minister of Health Care on the medical examinations carried out 
to assess the ability to work [4/1981. (III. 31.) EiiM rendelet a munkaköri alkalmasság orvosi vizsgálatáról és 
véleményezéséről]. These regulations still reflect the conditions when most people were employed by state 
enterprises. Nowadays with the emergence of private businesses it is becoming more and more difficult to 
enforce these provisions. 
45 Act No. XXII of 1992 on labor [1992. évi XXII. tv. a Munka Törvénykönyvéről]. Sec. 76. 
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Generally, the HIV test in itself does not say much about the employee's further ability 
to work due to the substantial uncertainty as to the timing of developing AIDS. But an 
HIV test could be considered essential information in this context if the employee might 
pose significant risk of infection to others. Although HIV infection is not transmissible 
by casual contact, health-care personnel involved in invasive medical procedures might 
get infected even if utmost care has been taken. Although the risk is very low, it can 
still be considered a significant factor given the severe consequences of infection. Under 
this approach, an HIV infection might be considered essential job-related information 
especially in the case of health-care workers involved directly or indirectly in invasive 
procedures. 
There are few legal sanctions for an unlawful rejection of one ' s job application. 
As the employer has no obligation to reveal the reasons for rejection, such cases 
could hardly be brought to court. Grounds for judicial review exist only where the 
applicant has reason to believe a dismissal was discriminatory. The Labor Code 
prohibits discrimination on the traditional grounds of race, sex, age, and national o r 
ethnic origin and also because of religion, social origin, political views, membership 
in any organization, and on any ground not related to the labor contract.46 Therefore, 
in those cases where HIV infection is unrelated to the nature of employment, refusal 
to hire on the ground of HIV infection could be considered as amounting to 
discrimination. 
Termination of labor contracts on grounds of HIV seropositivity is a more 
complex matter. In this context Hungary's labor law system has different sets of rules 
depending on the type of employment. In particular, separate statutes regulate 
employment in the public sector (health, education, and cultural agencies financed 
from the state budget)47 and the employment of public servants.48 There are con-
siderable differences among the respective statutory rules. These differences are most 
striking regarding the grounds for terminating labour contracts. In the private sector, 
termination of a labour contract is possible if the employer has just cause. The cause 
may be related to the employer's business. It may also derive from the employee's 
conduct or ability to perform the job to the employer's satisfaction. In the latter cases , 
dismissal must be preceded by notice of 30 days to six months. In addition, the 
employee is entitled to a severance payment, depending on the length of service. 
However, if the employee breaches an important duty by intentional or grossly 
negligent conduct, or if the employee's conduct makes continuation of the employment 
impossible, immediate dismissal is possible. 
However, in cases involving public servants or those employed in the public sector, 
the employer's ability to terminate the contract unilaterally is much more restricted. 
46 Labor Code, Sec. 5. 
47 Act No. XXXIII of 1992 on Public Employment (1992. évi XXXIII. tv. a közalkalmazottak jogál lá-
sáról). 
48 Act No. XXIII of 1992 on Public Servants (1992. évi XXIII. tv. a köztisztviselők jogállásáról). 
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Even ordinary dismissal may only take place in cases specified by law. The employer 
may terminate the contract for two reasons: the employee's inability to perform the job, 
or his eligibility for retirement. If the inability is due to health reasons, then the 
employer is obliged to offer another suitable job. Finally, the severance payment is 
substantially higher than in the private sector. 
In most cases, an HIV infection by itself should not be deemed a cause for 
termination of employment as HIV cannot be transmitted by casual contact, and is 
usually irrelevant to the employee's ability to work. Therefore, HIV infection may be 
considered neither material from the point of view of the job performed nor as disabling 
the employee to perform the job. The only case where it could possibly lead to 
termination of the labour contract is where real danger of infection exists. In cases 
involving private sector employees (e.g. private dentists), the risk of infection would 
probably be high enough to terminate the contract. In cases involving employment in 
the public sector (the vast majority of health-care workers are employed here), it would 
have to be shown that, due to the infection, the employee is unable to perform the job. 
There are quite a few situations in which carriers of infectious diseases are considered 
unable to perform certain jobs (e.g., persons suffering from tuberculosis or syphilis who 
work in neonatal units), so it is likely that the court would approve terminating a 
contract in quite a few instances. 
The employer has the right to demand that his employee undergo a medical 
examination at any time in order to assess his ability to work. If the employee does not 
comply, then the employer has the right to prohibit him temporarily from working. 
It seems that termination of a labour contract on the ground of HIV has never taken 
place. In the very few cases of HIV-positive surgeons and dentists, it was enough to 
persuade them to refrain from carrying out invasive procedures4' (similar to the cases 
involving health-care workers carrying hepatitis virus; hepatitis due to its high frequency 
is in practice a much more critical problem than HIV). 
If the applicant during the hiring process intentionally misleads the employer 
concerning a material fact or condition, the contract will be declared void. In the AIDS 
context it can be hardly applicable, however, as the proceedings have to be initiated 
within six months after the contract has become binding. 
6. Criminal Law Aspects of HIV/AIDS 
Because Hungary has had few HIV cases, it is no wonder the country has no specific 
criminal provisions regarding HIV. The question then arises whether traditional 
criminal offenses would be applicable in situations of HIV infection. No cases 
criminalizing the transmission of HIV have arisen; consequently, no court decisions are 
yet available. 
49 Personal communication of Professor István Dömök, former Deputy Director of the National Institute of 
Hygiene, Budapest. 
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As to transmission of venereal diseases other than HIV, the judiciary found that the 
transmission of syphilis could be characterized as "causing serious bodily injury."50 
This means that if the infected person, being aware of infection, engages in activity 
likely to transmit the disease, then this person may be convicted of causing bodily 
injury. Therefore, if an HIV-positive person practices unprotected sex without 
informing the other about his seropositivity, then the charge of causing bodily injury 
(if the sexual partner becomes HIV positive or develops AIDS) or even homicide (if 
the partner dies) could be brought. 
In cases of transmission of HIV, however, several difficulties might arise with the 
application of bodily injury charges even if one is ready to accept that HIV infection 
itself (even without any symptoms) amounts to bodily injury. First, it would have to 
be proven that the victim was not HIV positive prior to the sexual act, and that he did 
not acquire the infection in some other way. If both the defendant and the victim 
belong to a high-risk group, then proving the causality seems almost impossible. 
Second, it also would have to be proven that the alleged offender was aware of his 
seropositivity. If the offender is not a registered HIV patient but tested at an alternative 
test site, serious problems of proof would obviously arise. 
If someone knowingly engages in activity likely to result in HIV infection but 
causality between the act and the infection cannot be proven, then attempted bodily 
injury or attempted murder charges may be considered. Problems of proof, however, 
might also present difficulties here. As the state of mind of the alleged offender is at 
issue here, it has to be proven that the defendant, being aware of his HIV status, 
intended to cause a bodily injury to, or the death of, the victim. It would be enough 
to prove in this context that the defendant either intended the harm (dolus directus) or 
accepted it as a possible consequence of his conduct (dolus eventualis). If one of these 
two states of mind could not be proven, then the attempt charge would fail. Obviously, 
actual transmission of HIV need not be proven in such cases. 
The issue of the vict im's consent requires separate treatment. Although consent 
as a defense is not mentioned in the Criminal Code, both legal theorists and judges 
agree that in some instances the victim's consent may exclude criminal liability. 
However, there are obviously limits to the degree of physical harm to which a person 
may effectively consent. Unfortunately, it is by no means clear where the line is to 
be drawn. The seriousness of the bodily harm is an important factor but not the only 
one. In cases of assault (where the injury heals or recovery occurs within eight days) 
the informed consent of the victim is considered effective. In contrast, in cases of 
serious bodily injury or homicide the answer hinges upon finding whether the act 
SO ANGYAL, P.: A magyar büntetőjog kézikönyve. A testi sértés és a közegészség elleni büntettek és 
vétségek (Manual of Hungarian Criminal Law. Assault, battery and crimes against public health), 1928, 
21-22. 
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itself was injurious to the public interest." The fact that unprotected sexual contact 
with an HIV-positive partner endangers life does not alone exclude consent as a 
defense. A case may arise where a defendant discloses his seropositivity to his/her 
partner, and the partner voluntarily engages in sexual activity being aware of the 
danger of HIV transmission. If the partner then becomes HIV positive or develops 
AIDS, a court would have to decide whether such a situation should be evaluated 
differently from one where, e.g., a victim voluntarily engages in an extremely 
dangerous sporting activity. 
Another possible criminal charge might be that of reckless endangerment. This 
charge may be filed if someone—in violation of professional rules-recklessly engages 
in conduct that places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily 
injury.52 For example, it seems that a health-care worker who improperly uses 
infected needles could be convicted of reckless endangerment. Obviously, it would be 
unnecessary to prove that the defendant's conduct actually harmed the other person. 
Let us stress that this charge may be brought only in those cases where the 
endangerment involves the violation of professional rules. 
There are specific criminal provisions directed at the transmission of infectious 
diseases. The Criminal Code contains one crime specifically related to the infringement 
of the rules concerning the control of infectious diseases.53 There is also one semi-
administrative offense related to the same matter.54 The latter might be applicable in 
the AIDS context because any infringement of public health rules is punishable (the 
applicable penalty in this instance is a small fine). In practice, this provision has been 
applied extremely rarely.55 
Finally, one criminal procedure issue should be briefly mentioned. In criminal 
proceedings, a defendant must undergo necessary medical examinations as determined 
by the court. A defendant only has the right to object to a surgery or similar procedure. 
The HIV status of the alleged rapist may thus be established in criminal proceedings 
even if he objects to testing. 
7. Conclusion 
Although the level of HIV infection has been relatively low, the epidemic has 
challenged the Hungarian legal system in many ways. The country's HIV/AIDS policy, 
however, has remained basically the same. This is puzzling in view of the radical 
51 HORVÁTH, T.: Az élet, egészség, testi épség bünetőjogi védelme. (The protection of life and bodily 
integrity in criminal law.) 1965, 407-412. 
52 Criminal Code Sec. 171. 
53 Criminal Code Sec. 284. 
54 Decree 17/1968. (IV. 14.) on certain administrative infractions. [17/1968. (IV. 14.) Korm. rendelet egyes 
szabálysértésekről] Sec. 67-68. 
55 The maximal amount is approximately 170 $. In 1995 the penalty was imposed only in 6 cases in the 
whole country. The average amount of the fine was S85. Source: National Institute of Hygiene. 
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socio-political systemic transformations after 1989. Most experts predicted that the 
legislative reforms in the HIV/AIDS field would be based on the acceptance of 
democratic values such as individual freedom and personal autonomy, especially when 
it comes to the most intimate aspects of life. Consequently, to give just one example, 
many experts expected that voluntary HIV testing would become the norm. However, 
the Law on the Protection of Health-Related Data did not enhance the protection of 
confidentiality of medical data in the HIV context. Although the government proposed 
fairly liberal solutions, the Parliament opted for a more rigid option in view of the fact 
that the paternalistic attitude towards patients, including HIV patients, is widely 
accepted in the society. All in all, Hungary still remains at a crossroads. The liberal 
model adopted in Western Europe is an ideal favoured by many, especially those who 
support rapid and full integration of the country into the Western community of 
nations. At the same time, however, the fairly rigid approach developed in the 
communist era has retained its attractiveness due to its proven efficiency. 
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KALEIDOSCOPE 
New Nuclear Legislation in Hungary 
The need for a revision of nuclear law of the former socialist States had been clearly 
seen prior to the political transformations of 1990. Still, the terrible tragedy of the 
Chernobyl accident mus t have occurred for public opinion to finally arrive at a conclusion 
that the national nuclear law in the former socialist state on the one hand, and the existing 
world wide international liability regime for nuclear damages, established by the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, on the other, cannot solve 
satisfactory the problem of adequate compensation of the victims of a potential nuclear 
accident.1 Shocked by the Chernobyl accident the Board of Governors of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency put on the agenda of the revision of the 1963 Vienna Convention 
and the negotiations on the amendment of the Convention started in 1989. After more 
than eight years a Diplomatic Conference were held in Vienna which adopted not only 
a Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention but also an other treaty, the Convention 
on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.2 
In parallel with the negotiations in Vienna most Eastern and Central European States 
started to elaborate modern national nuclear legislation. It should be mentioned that in 
those countries nuclear law was not at the same level, some States had a rather developed 
and detailed legislation on the matter, in others very few norms were in force concerning 
different legal questions connected with the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy. Even 
1 PELZER, N.: Current problems of nuclear liability law in the post-Chernobyl-period. A German standpoint. 
Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 39. and GONZALES, A.: The radiological health consequences of Chernobyl: the 
dilemma of causation, in: Nuclear Accidents Liabilities and Guarantees. OECD Paris, 1993. 25-55. 
2 The Diplomatic Conference held between the 8 and 12 September 1997. The two Conventions were adopted 
by a two-third majority of those States present and voting. 
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in those States which had relatively developed nuclear law some fields were not regulated, 
or the existing legal norms were not in harmony with major international documents.3 
The elaboration of a domestic nuclear law fully in line with modem European laws has 
constituted a no small problem even in a country like Hungary, which enacted a 
comparatively developed nuclear law as far back as the early 1980s4 and has tried to 
keep abreast with modem trends of legal development over the past 10 to 15 years.5 
The Fast Hungarian Atomic Energy Act was adopted in 1980. That Act was a relatively 
modem legislation, it introduced the special third party liability regime for nuclear 
damages, before the enactment of that Act the damages caused to third parties by the 
use, production, transport, etc. of radioactive substances and preparations were to be 
compensated according to the rules of strict liability for hazardous activities contained 
in the Civil Code of 1959. The Act provided on the channelling of liability on the 
operator, on the absolute liability of the operator, on the prohibition of the exclusion 
or restriction of the operator's liability, etc.6 At the same time, however, it failed to 
cover a number of questions on which the 1963 Vienna Convention contains express 
provisions. Thus, for instance, it was silent on liability for lost or stolen nuclear materials 
(Art. VI. para. 2. of the Vienna Convention), on the non-discrimination between victims 
3 Cf. Third Party Liability, OECD NEA, 1990. 51-53., 69-75., 119-121., 179-188., 247-252. 
4 The first step of nuclear legislation in Hungary goes back to the 1960s when the Government adopted the 
Decree No. 10 of 1964 relating radioactive substances and preparations. Provisions for the implementation and 
enforcement of the Decree were made by different ministerial orders enacted in agreement with the Hungarian 
Atomic Energy Commission. The 1964 Decree was in force until an act on atomic energy was adopted in 1980 
(Act I. of 1980). 
The preparations for an act on atomic energy was started practically in the same time when Hungary started 
to execute its nuclear program at the beginning of the 1970s. The agreement with the former USSR concerning 
the erection of a nuclear power plant in Hungary was concluded on the 28 December, 1966 and the construction 
work at Paks started in 1974. (Paks is a small town situated in the heart of Hungary 115 km south of Budapest 
on the right bank of the Danube river.) The four units of Paks Nuclear Power Plant are WWER-440\213 belonging 
to the second generation of Soviet-designed power stations; they were put into commercial operation between 
1983 and 1987. (Paks-1 in August 1983, Paks-2 in November 1984, Paks-3 December 1986, Paks-4 November 
1987.) The total installed capacity of Paks Nuclear Power Plant is 1760 MWe. In Hungary the nuclear power's 
share of electricity production is about 43%. 
5 In 1989 Hungary acceded to the 1963 Vienna Convention Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
and to the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, 
which established a bridge between the 1963 Vienna Convention and the Convention on Third Party Liability 
in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 (known as the Paris Convention), soon after its accession Hungary 
launched initiatives for framing a domestic law that would be in line with the Vienna Convention in every respect 
See VON BUSEKIST, O.: A bridge between two Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear damage: the Joint 
Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. Nuclear Law Bulletin, 
No. 43. 
6 Cf. EÖRSI, Gy.: A polgári jogi kártérítési felelősség kézikönyve. (Manual on the compensation for civil 
liability), Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1966. 280. 
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(Art. XIII. of the Vienna Convention),7 on the upper limit of the operator's liability, 
or the non-inclusion in it of any interest or costs (Art-V. para 2. of the Vienna Convention) 
and so on. The above-mentioned shortcomings of Hungarian nuclear law became more 
evident after Hungary's accession to the Vienna Convention and to the Joint Protocol. 
As is know, in the domestic law of the majority of nuclear States the operator's liability 
is a specified amount, which, under the 1963 Vienna Convention, may not be less than 
5 million US $ for any one nuclear incident. The Hungarian nuclear law contained no 
provision on such limit, which is to say the operator's liability was unlimited. The 1980 
Atomic Energy Act did not mention any ceiling of the operator's financial liability, the 
general rules on compensation of the Civil Code had to apply which do not contain any 
limit of compensation for damages. At the time the 1980 Atomic Energy Act was adopted 
such unlimited nuclear liability was acceptable since, under the Act, the State had exclusive 
ownership of nuclear installations. It was not merely by legislation that, with its material 
resources, the State guaranteed payment of compensation for nuclear damage, but it referred 
claims of victims to the State Insurance Company, that time the only nation-wide state-
owned insurance firm. The Act provided that claims of compensation for nuclear damage 
may be enforced against the organ designated by the Council of Ministers. Under the 
ordinance enforcing the Act,8 compensation as stated above may be deemed exclusively 
from the State Insurance Company. However, this provision, which was in force until 
the 1 June 1997, had in fact been inapplicable for years, because the State Insurance 
Company was privatized years ago, with new insurance companies emerging in its place. 
As a matter of fact, the 1980 Act originally imposed an obligation on the State Insurance 
Company, but the latter never really had the necessary finance, for in case of a major 
nuclear incident the amount of compensation would certainly have been beyond its 
economic strength. So the money could only have been provided by reinsurance, which, 
however, the State Insurance Company had failed to maintain. Consequently the relevant 
provisions of the old Act did not in reality established any actual insurance relationship 
between the operator and the State Insurance Company, which in this respect was 
essentially a state firm destined to register eventual claims for compensation and to forward 
them to the Treasury. 
The political change in Eastern Europe and the resultant more open political atmosphere 
have also entailed the impossibility for the governments of the States there to continue 
refusing to face and address problems arising from eventual accidents at nuclear 
installations. One can state that the political changes accelerated that process in the sense 
that no single responsible political force questioned the importance of modifying the 
legislation on the uses of nuclear energy and of approximating it to the nuclear laws of 
7 The Act does not apply to all foreign victims even if the damage was entirely suffered in Hungary, since 
under the Act the compensation of foreigners depends on the existence either of an international agreement to 
which both Hungary and the home country of the victim are parties or the existence of reciprocity between the 
two States. All other foreign victims have the right for compensation only under the relevant provisions of the 
Civil Code. 
8 Ordinance No. 12. of 1980 of the Council of Ministers. 
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the highly industrialized countries, but, on tbe other, it made it necessary to revise the 
whole fabric of domestic law of those countries, while the urgency of adopting certain 
laws that were more important from the point of view of daily politics delayed the 
elaboration of a new atomic energy act.9 
It should be noted, however, that the elaboration of a new atomic energy act was 
also delayed in no small measure by the negotiations on the revision of the Vienna 
Convention.10 In point of fact, the slow progress of the negotiations in Vienna for years, 
appeared to be a good pretext for some political personalities for postponing the decision 
concerning the revision of the Hungarian domestic law, suggesting that one should first 
wait till the Vienna Convention was amended and that the new domestic law of Hungary 
should be drafted in the light of the provisions of the "new" Vienna Convention. This 
was particularly true of questions like the concept of nuclear damage, the problem of 
environmental damage or the upper limit of liability for nuclear damage, which had given 
rise to a great deal of debate during the revision of the Vienna Convention as well. 
After many years of elaboration it was only in 1996 that a comprehensive draft law 
on nuclear energy was finalized and was submitted by the Government to the Hungarian 
Parliament, which on 10 December 1996, adopted the new Atomic Energy Act (Act No. 
CXVI. of 1996). The Act entered into force on 1 June 1997, with the exception of the 
provisions on the Central Nuclear Financial Fund (Art. 62-62) which will enter into force 
half a year later, on 1 January 1998. The Act aims to regulate all activities connected 
with the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy, with the exemption of some activities 
which due to the small extent of the risk involved do not create hazards to human life 
and health. Since the new Act in some respect is a legislative framework which sets forth 
the basic principles governing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, its enactment made 
necessary to adopt a series of new legislative provisions and to amend certain laws and 
regulations. 
One of the foremost aims of the new Act is to create harmony between international 
treaties binding on Hungary and the domestic law and to formulate fundamental nuclear-law 
norms of a modern industrial State. In preparing the new regulation attention has also 
been paid to the fact that Hungary became a member of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development and its Nuclear Energy Agency in the summer of 1996. 
It should be added that already at the elaboration of the Act tbe Hungarian legislator 
followed with attention the ongoing negotiations in Vienna on the revision of the 1963 
9 For that matter, e.g. in Hungary between 1990 and 1996 several ministerial regulations were adopted on 
questions relating to the uses of nuclear energy, but those rules do not cover but partial areas. By these regulations 
the legislator amended some decrees and filled the gaps in Hungarian nuclear law. 
10 The negotiations on the revision of the Vienna Convention were started in 1989. Since that time till the 
Diplomatic Conference the Standing Committe on Nuclear Liability, set up by the Board of Governors of the 
IAEA to study the revision of the Vienna Convention, had 17 sessions, several intcrsessional working group 
meetings, and informal consultation meetings. On the revision of the Convention see WARREN, G. C.: Vienna 
Convention Revision: A Review of the exercise and the insurance implication in the provisions under discussion. 
Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 55. 1995. 9-17. 
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Vienna Convention. As it was already mentioned after some months of the adoption of 
the new Atomic Energy Act a Diplomatic Conference was convened in Vienna to adopt 
a Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention and to adopt a new Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.11 
The basic principles of the new Act are to protect the population against the hazards 
generated by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to improve the safety of all nuclear 
activities. 
The Act consists of six chapters and 68 articles. 
The first chapter contains definitions, such as nuclear material, nuclear installation, 
nuclear wastes, etc. From legal point of view it is interesting to mention that the Act 
instead of the operator of nuclear installations uses the term of "licensee" who is the 
legal person possessing the licenses of competent authorities as required for nuclear 
activities. The definition of nuclear damage includes not only loss of life, health 
impairment, and damage to property, but also the costs of measures of reinstatement of 
the impaired environment arising concurrently with loss of life, health impairment or 
damage to property, it comprises also the costs connected with mitigation of damages 
and preventive measures, in both cases only the costs of reasonable and necessary actions 
are covered. 
The second chapter is devoted to questions connected with regulation and control 
of nuclear activities. A great asset of the Act lies in the endeavour to make a clean sweep 
in the different spheres of competence and in the field of the licensing procedure. 
According to the Act the Government is primary responsible for the control and 
supervision of the safe utilization of nuclear energy, by Art 6. para. 1. that governmental 
function is vested on to the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission and to the Hungarian 
Atomic Energy Authority, as well as different ministries concerned. The Act envisages 
a preliminary consent of the Parliament for the construction of a new nuclear installation, 
including for the establishment of radioactive waste disposal facilities, and for the 
enlargement of an existing nuclear installation. 
The Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission, headed by its President appointed by 
the Prime Minister, addresses the development of policy as well as overall co-ordination 
and monitoring of activities in the nuclear field. Other members of the Commission are 
designated by different Ministers, one can state that practically all Ministries are 
represented in the Commission. 
The Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority is the central governmental organ dealing 
with the use of nuclear energy. With the exception of the questions connected with 
radiation safety, which is under the responsibility of the Minister of Public Welfare. The 
11 Both instruments were opened for signature at IAEA headquarelers from 29 September 1997. The Protocol 
shall enter into force three months after the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance 
or approuvai. As regards the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage the situation is more complex since, according to Article XX of that Convention, there are two 
requirements: on the one hand at lest 5 States should deposit its instrument of ratification, and those States 
should have a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity, on the other. 
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principal responsibility of the Authority is to fulfil regulatory duties in connection with 
peaceful uses of atomic energy, with special emphasis on the safety of nuclear materials 
and facilities.12 
The Nuclear Safety Directorate of the Authority is the nuclear safety regulatory body. 
The licensing procedure for nuclear activities is under the supervision of that Directorate 
which decides in the fust instance, on licensing, inspection and enforcement matters. The 
appeals against the decisions of the Directorate should be submitted to the Director General 
of the Authority, whose decision is final and without appeal.13 The Directorate has a 
wide competence it issues licences for nuclear activities, e.g. for construction, enlargement, 
decommissioning, shutdown, etc. of nuclear facilities; it is also responsible for technical 
radiation protection of nuclear equipment and is entitled to conduct quality inspections 
at licensees and suppliers' premises. In addition to defining the functions of different 
authorities the Act makes it clear, and confirms the stand, that the Nuclear Safety 
Directorate should be completely independent of the interests of producers, owners, 
suppliers of services, etc. 
The substance of the system of administrative fora is that the licensing procedure 
and supervision connected with nuclear installations and equipment, registration of nuclear 
and radioactive materials, and the export and import of nuclear materials are within the 
competence of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, whereas licensing and supervision 
connected with other facilities and installations relating to the uses of nuclear energy as 
well as with radiation safety and radioactive waste are within the competence of the 
Ministry of Public Welfare. Regulations concerning nuclear safety and radiation safety 
are within the purview of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority or the supervising 
minister and the Minister of Public Welfare, respectively. The conceptual basis of the 
licensing procedure is that in any procedure in which the Hungarian Atomic Energy 
Authority or the Minister of Public Welfare acts as the licensing authority the other organs 
of public administration cooperate as line authorities. Any substantive measure in respect 
to establishment of a new nuclear installation, acquisition of the right of ownership in 
an existing nuclear installation and transfer of use on any ground as well as to choice 
of site for storing radioactive waste is subject to the Government's prior consent. Of course, 
such consent does not replace the licenses to be subsequently obtained from different 
authorities. 
Chapter V of the Act concentrates on liability issues. According to the Act the liability 
for nuclear damage is channelled to the licensee (operator) of the nuclear facility; in other 
words, liability for nuclear damage is borne by the legal person possessing the license 
of the competent authorities as required for the operation of a nuclear installation. The 
licensee's liability is strict and absolute, although the Act docs not use the term of absolute 
12 Ordinance No. 87. of 1997 of the Government made under the Act specifies the responsibilities and 
competences of both the Commission and the Authority. Official Journal, No. 46. of 1997. 
13 See Ordinance No. 108. of 1997. on the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority. Officiai Journal, No. 54. 
of 1997. 
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liability. The reason behind that solution is very simple, the Hungarian Civil Code does 
not use the term of "absolute liability" and instead of absolute liability it speaks about 
special strict liability for hazardous activities, and the new Act tries to be in line with 
that provisions of the Civil Code. The principle of absolute liability is reflected also in 
the provisions on exonerations. According to the Act the licensee is exempted from liability 
if the nuclear damage is the consequence of a nuclear incident directly triggered by an 
unavoidable external cause outside the scope of activity in the facility, armed conflict, 
war, civil war, armed uprising or a grave natural disaster of an extraordinary character 
(Art. 49.). 
The ceiling of the licensee's liability is 100 million SDRs, in case of an incident in 
a nuclear power plant, but it will be much lower for incidents occurring during 
transportation of nuclear materials. If the amount of 100 million SDRs proves insufficient 
for compensation of all victims, an additional amount of 200 million SDRs will be paid 
by the State from public funds. These figures corresponds to some respect to the Protocol 
amending the Vienna Convention,14 since according to the 1997 Protocol, the liability 
of the operator may be limited by the Installation State for any one nuclear incident either 
a) to not less than 300 million SDRs; or b) to not less than 150 million SDRs provided 
that in excess of that amount and up to at least 300 million SDRs public funds shall be 
made available by the Installation State. The Protocol provides a fazing in mechanism 
for a maximum of 15 years from the date of entry into force of the Protocol amending 
the Vienna Convention, to a transitional amount of not less than 100 million SDRs in 
respect of a nuclear incident occurring, provided that public funds shall be made available 
by that the Installation State to compensate nuclear damage between that lesser amount 
and 100 million SDRs. The amount of 300 million SDRs, inclusive the supplementary 
contribution of the State, provided in the new Hungarian Atomic Energy Act, corresponds 
to the above-mentioned provisions of the Protocol and as a consequence Hungary will 
ratify the Protocol without using the fazing in mechanism. 
Following the world trends to increased emphasis on human environment, the Act 
regulates the question of environmental damage, some types of which it deems to be 
nuclear damage. Nevertheless, it does not ensure compensation for all environmental 
damage except in cases of damages to the environment arising concurrently, with loss 
of life, damage to the physical integrity and the health of persons and damage to property. 
These environmental damages and costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the 
environment (the costs related to all reasonable and required actions carried out for the 
mitigation or restoration of damages) are principles embodied in recent conventions 
connected with the protection of the environment, including the approach that the extent 
of compensation for environmental damage is essentially equal to the costs of reasonable 
restoration of the environment, are regarded by the Act as a yardstick for the compensation 
for environmental damages. 
14 See Consolidated Text of the Vienna Convention on Civil laibility for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 
as Amended by the Protocol of 12 September 1997. GOV/INF/822/Add. 1. Article V. para. 1. (a) and (b). 
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It is also in view of the rules of international law that the Act has incorporated the 
provision that the amounts of liability for nuclear damage do not include any interest 
and other costs likely to be incurred in connection with compensation. This provision 
is primarily intended to protect the interests of the victims, for the amount of compensation 
as defined by the Act, i.e. 300 million SDRs, is exclusively available for compensation 
of the victims and the costs connected with assessment of damage, registration of victims, 
judicial proceedings, etc. may not be paid from that amount 
The licensee is liable for nuclear damage involving lost, stolen, jettisoned or abandoned 
nuclear materials for a rather long period, one of 20 years to be counted from the date 
of the nuclear incident. The extinction period of liability for other nuclear damage is to 
be 10 years, double the period of prescription under tort law and much longer than that 
established for damages resulting from ultra hazardous activities. The victims may claim 
compensation within a 3 years limitation period, which starts on the date when the person 
suffering damage had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of the damage 
and of the licensee liable for the damage. The licensee shall be exempt partly or wholly 
to pay compensation in respect of nuclear damage if it can prove that the damage suffered 
by the injured party resulted wholly or partly either from the gross negligence of the person 
suffering the damage or from an act or omission of such person done with intent to cause 
damage. 
Some groups of damage are excluded from the special liability regime established 
by the Act and the licensee shall be liable for it in accordance with the Civil Code; such 
is the case, if the damage was caused to the nuclear facility itself or to any property on 
the site of that facility, which is used or intended to be used in connection with that 
facility, or to the means of transport upon which the given nuclear material was placed 
at the time of the nuclear incident. 
The licensee is obliged to provide for insurance and other financial security up to 
the amount of 100 million SDRs for nuclear power plant. The insurer or financial guarantor 
may not suspend or cancel the insurance or financial security without giving notice in 
writing, at least two months in advance, of the suspension or cancellation to the Hungarian 
Atomic Energy Authority. In case of carriage of nuclear materials, the insurance or 
financial security may not be cancelled or suspended during the carriage of nuclear 
materials. Ordinance No. 227 of 1997" of the Government determines in detail the 
insurance of nuclear installations and the amount of financial security. As a consequence 
of these provisions on the insurance of nuclear third party liability, 11 Hungarian insurers 
representing the vast majority of Hungarian insurance market's non-life capacity established 
at the end of 1996 the Hungarian Nuclear Insurance Pool. The Pool is based on the 
fundamental principles common to all nuclear pools and organized and managed by the 
Hungaria Insurance Co. the largest in its field. The Hungarian Pool provides third party 
liability cover for the Paks Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with the new Atomic Energy 
Act. 
15 Official Journal, No. 110. of 1997. 
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A separate chapter of the Act contains the rules on nuclear waste and spent fuel. In 
formulating them due account was taken of the safety standards elaborated within the 
frameworks of the IAEA.16 The Act expressly states that the costs of the temporary 
and final disposal of nuclear wastes should be covered by the licensee. The Act regulates 
the shutdown of nuclear installations as well, it says that the licensee has to cover the 
cost of the commissioning of its nuclear installation. 
The Act envisages establishing a Central Nuclear Financial Fund as a separate public 
fund. That Fund exclusively destined to finance the construction and operation of facilities 
for the final disposal of radioactive waste, the interim storage and final disposal of spent 
fuel, and the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The financing of the Fund is intended 
to be secured from regular contributions by the licensees and from other appropriate 
sources. The Fund is managed by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority as a separate 
State fund (pursuant to Act No. XXXVIII. of 1992 on Public Finance). 
As a conclusion it should be mention that Hungary was among the first States which 
signed the Protocol amending the Vienna Convention and its ratification is also envisaged. 
Although the new Atomic Energy Act took into consideration the on-going negotiations 
in Vienna, after the entry into force of the Protocol, with all probability the Act should 
be revised in order to make it in harmony with the new Vienna Convention. 
Vanda Lamm 
16 See; Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management, International Legal Materials, 1997. No. 6. 
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Draft Constitution 
of the Republic of Hungary 
Prepared by the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Committee for Drafting 
the Constitution 
P R E F A C E 
IN SUMMER 1994, after the second general elections in Hungary following the beginning 
of the transition to pluralist democracy and market economy, the newly formed socialist-
liberal coalition government adopted in its programme the elaboration of a new Constitution 
which would replace the Constitution in force, which, albeit substantially new, still bears 
the unpleasant name Act No. XX. from the the more irritating year 1949. 
The constitution-making process started first under the supervision of the Minister 
of Justice, and later in June 1995 by its resolution No. 63 1995, Parliament established 
an ad hoc Parliamentary Committee with the task to produce a draft of the new 
Constitution, under the chairmanship of the Speaker of Parliament That Committee which 
included four deputies from each parliamentary party, and has been assisted by many 
experts after long debates adopted a document called the 'Concepcion of the new 
Hungarian Constitution' containing the principal contents of the new Constitution; this 
document was approved by Parliament in its resolution No. 119/1996 on December 21, 
1996. Already from the beginning of this process, foreign scholars and experts have 
displayed a good deal of interest in the constitution-making process and this is the reason 
why the Institute for Legal and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences took the initiative to publish this booklet. 
The present publication encompasses the edited and revised version of the draft 
elaborated by the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Committee lead by Dr István 
Somogyvári. Although it is based on the conception adopted by Parliament, it should 
not be regarded as an official document of Parliament nor as necessarily reflecting the 
views of the Parliamentary Drafting Committee. It is noteworthy that the Parliamentary 
Committee agreed at the outset of its work that the text of the Constitution in force should 
be retained if there is no overwhelming majority in the committee to change it. For this 
reason, the draft has retained the text and formulations of the present Constitution in 
I 
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many cases. The texts set in italics were added by the drafters as a suggestion based 
on expert opinion as emerged during the discussions of the earlier versions of the draft 
without being based on the conception adopted by the resolution of Parliament of 
December 1996. 
Critical comments and suggestions for improvement of the text will certainly be useful 
for the constitution-making process in Hungary. 
Budapest, May 16 1997 
Notes of the translator: The parts of the text marked by square brackets ([...]) are added 
in the translation to make the reading of the text more legible and understandable to the 
reader; thus they do not form paît of the Dra f t Since Hungarian language does not express 
gender differences, the personal pronouns 'he or she' were used randomly throughout 
the translation. In order to avoid possible confusion, the word 'state' used in the sense 
of 'political unit' was capitalised, while other uses of it were not. 
[PREAMBLE] 
THE PEOPLE OF HUNGARY, inspired by the constitutional traditions of Hungary, symbolised 
also by the Holy Crown [of St. Stephen] and 
by the universal values of constitutionalism, 
reaffirming the thousand years continuity of the State of Hungary, 
SOLEMNLY DECLARE their will to establish a democratic State based on the rule of law, 
to guarantee and protect human and civil rights in the spirit of liberty, equality and 
fraternity, 
to reassert national sovereignty in harmony with the principle of the equality and peaceful 
co-operation among nations. 
W I T H THESE IN MIND, r e s p e c t i n g t he w i l l o f H u n g a r i a n c i t i z e n s , 
Parliament [hereby] adopts the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Chapter I 
FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS 
Form of government and official name of the State 
Article 1 
1. The official name of the Hungarian State is 'Republic of Hungary'. 
2. The Republic of Hungary shall be an independent, democratic State based on the 
rule of law. 
3. The Republic of Hungary shall be a social State, committed to social values; its 
primary concern is to promote the economic and cultural welfare of citizens. 
Sovereignty 
Article 2 
Variant A 
All power of the State emanates from and belongs to the people; the people shall 
exercise its power on the basis of the Constitution through elected representatives and 
in cases determined by statute through referendum. 
Variant В 
1. AU power shall emanate from and belong to the people, which shall exercise 
its power through organs and institutions established in accordance with the Consti-
tution. 
2. Elections to Parliament and the référendums shall be held on the basis of universal, 
equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. 
Article 3 
Variant A 
1. Parliament may in an international treaty transfer legislative, executive or judicial 
powers defined by the Constitution—except the power to modify the Constitution—to 
international organisations or institutions of which the Republic of Hungary is a 
member. 
2. Delegation of powers referred to in para. 1 shall be made by the two-thirds of the 
votes cast of the deputies; it shall be submitted to referendum. 
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Var iant В 
If the Republic of Hungary becomes member of an international organisation or 
institution entailing the transfer of legislative, executive or judicial powers as defined 
by the Constitution, the conclusion of the instrument of accession shall be proposed by 
the two-thirds majority of the votes cast in favour by all the deputies; it shall be confirmed 
by referendum. 
Constitutional principles and objectives 
Article 4 
1. The State shall recognise and protect the inalienable, and inviolable fundamental 
human rights. 
2. The State shall respect and promote fundamental rights. 
Article 5 
1. The powers of the State shall be divided between its organs. 
2. Organs of the State shall exercise their powers in accordance with the Constitution 
and the statutes adopted under it, respecting legal security. 
3. No State organ shall interfere with the powers of other organs. 
Article 6 
Nobody, including social organisations, State organs or individuals shall engage in 
any activity directed towards seizure or exercise of power by force or its exclusive 
possession. Everyone has the right and the duty to resist such aspirations in accordance 
with the law. 
Article 7 
1. Political democracy is based on pluralism and popular elections regularly held. 
2. Political parties shall function freely subject to the respect of the Constitution and 
the statutes; they shall respect the principles of democracy. 
3. Political parties participate in the formation and expression of the will of the people. 
4. Political parties shall in no way exercise the authority of the State. 
5. Political parties are obliged to publish a statement of their financial resources 
and their spending. 
Article 8 
1. The State shall promote co-operation between the Government, and the business 
and economic organisations and trade unions; it shall promote the organisational framework 
of that co-operation. 
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2. A separate statute settles the framework and procedure of the co-operation between 
social partners. 
Article 9 
1. The Republic of Hungary renounces war as a means of settling disputes between 
nations and shall refrain from the use or threat of force against the independence or 
territorial integrity of other States. 
2. The Republic of Hungary seeks co-operation with all peoples of the world as well 
as with all democratic countries and international organisations. 
3. The Republic of Hungary participates in the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 
Article 10 
The Republic of Hungary feels itself responsible for the Hungarians living beyond 
its borders. It shall promote the protection of their rights and interests as well as the 
cultivation of their mother tongue, national culture, and ties with Hungary, as a matter 
of an important duty of the [Hungarian] State in both bilateral and multilateral international 
relations. 
Article 11 
1. National and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary are constitutive 
members of the State; they are participating in the power of the people. 
2. The State shall protect the rights of the national and ethnic minorities living in 
its territory. 
Article 12 
The Republic of Hungary shall protect marriage and family and shah devote a particular 
measure of care to children's security of existence, education and training. 
The territory of the State 
Article 13 
1. The territory of the Republic of Hungary shall form a unity; it shall be indivisible 
and inviolable. The State shall defend the territorial integrity of the country. 
2. The national territory shall be divided into the capital city, counties, towns and 
villages. The capital city shall be divided into districts. A different territorial division 
may also be established by statute. 
3. The capital of Hungary shall be Budapest. 
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4. The conditions for obtaining town and village status, the designation and seat of 
the counties, as well as of the towns and villages belonging to them, shall be determined 
by statute. 
Citizenship 
Article 14 
1. Hungarian citizenship may be acquired by birth, change in the family status, 
naturalisation and renaturalisation. 
2. A person confessing herself to be of Hungarian nationality and having [at least 
one] ascendant of Hungarian citizenship [at any time], shall enjoy more favourable 
conditions for naturalisation [than persons not being ethnic Hungarians]. 
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of Hungarian citizenship and of the right to 
change citizenship. 
4. Citizenship, its acquisition and termination shall be regulated by statute. 
Article 15 
1. The Republic of Hungary shall protect the rights and legitimate interests of 
Hungarian citizens abroad. 
2. No Hungarian citizen shall be extradited to another State or an international authority 
except in the cases and the manner specified by statute or international treaty. 
Article 16 
1. Political and social rights of Hungarian citizens domiciled outside the territory of 
the State as well as their military duties may be regulated by statute differently from those 
of citizens domiciled within the territory of the country. 
2. No discrimination among Hungarian citizens shall be made on the ground of the 
mode of acquisition of the citizenship and, unless otherwise provided by statute, of being 
citizens of a foreign State [dual citizenship]. 
3. Election or appointment of persons having [together with the Hungarian] dual or 
multiple citizenship to specific public positions may be restricted or prohibited by statute. 
State symbols and holidays 
Article 17 
1. The national anthem of the Republic of Hungary shall be Ferenc Kölcsey's poem 
entitled 'Himnusz' with the music composed by Ferenc Erkel. 
2. The flag of the Republic of Hungary shall consist of three horizontal stripes of 
equal width, the upper stripe to be red, the middle one to be white and the lower one 
to be green. 
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3. The coat of arms of the Republic of Hungary shall be a shield, divided into two 
parts, with a pointed base, four horizontal red stripes alternating with four silver ones 
in the left section, a silver double cross standing in the rising middle part, with a golden 
crown, of a green triple mount in the red section on the right, with the Holy Crown of 
Hungary resting on the shield. 
4. The protection and use of the State symbols of the Republic of Hungary shall be 
regulated by statute. 
Article 18 
1. The national holidays of the Republic of Hungary shall be 
(a) March 15, in commemoration of the revolution and war of independence of 
1848-49; 
(b) August 20, in commemoration of the foundation of the State, the day of King 
SL Stephen, the founder of the State; 
(c) October 23, in commemoration of the revolution and fight for freedom of 1956. 
2. The official State Day shall be determined by statute. 
PART П 
HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
Chapter II 
GENERAL RULES ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Regulation of fundamental rights 
Article 19 
The human and civil rights (henceforth fundamental rights) laid down in the 
Constitution shall be regulated by statute. 
Exercise of fundamental rights 
Article 20 
1. The fundamental rights shall be exercised on the basis of respect for the fundamental 
rights of others, in good faith and in accordance with their purpose. 
2. Fundamental rights, in accordance with their nature, and legal protection against 
their violation shall also be enjoyed, in the manner defined by statute, by legal persons 
and organisations not possessing legal personality (henceforth referred to jointly as legal 
persons). 
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3. Everyone may lawfully protect her fundamental rights and, in case of their violation, 
may seek legal remedy before the court or other law enforcement organ. 
Equality of rights and equality before the law 
Article 21 
1. All persons shall have legal capacity and shall be equal before the law. 
2. No one shall be subject to discrimination of any kind, such as on the ground of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
3. The rights of aliens may be regulated differently from those of Hungarian 
citizens. 
Chapter III 
THE [FUNDAMENTAL] RIGHTS AND THEIR GUARANTEES 
Right to life and human dignity 
Article 22 
1. Every human being shall have the inherent right to life and human dignity. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of her life. The right to life may be interfered 
with on the basis of a statute. 
3. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment violating human dignity. 
4. No one shall be subjected to medical or scientific experiment without her 
consent. 
Personal freedom 
Article 23 
1. No one shall be arrested or detained or otherwise deprived of his liberty except 
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as established by statute. 
2. Anyone arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of his liberty shall be brought 
promptly, but not later than seventy-two hours, before a court of law, or shall be released. 
The court shall hear the person brought before it and shall decide in written reasoned 
decision without delay on his release or to uphold the deprivation of liberty. 
3. Unlawfully arrested or detained persons shall have a right to ful l compensation. 
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Article 24 
1. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
2. The duty of persons convicted for criminal offence to perform work, or the 
obligation to work in case of emergency for the purposes and in the manner determined 
by statute shall not be deemed to violate the prohibition stated in para. 1. 
Freedom of movement 
Article 25 
1. Every Hungarian citizen and everyone staying lawfully within the territory of 
Hungary shall have liberty of movement and freedom to choose his place of residence 
and to leave the country. This right may be restricted by statute. 
2. A Hungarian citizen may return from abroad to Hungary at any time. 
3. No Hungarian citizen shall be expelled from the territory of the Republic of 
Hungary. 
4. An alien staying lawfully in the territory of Hungary may be expelled from 
the country only in pursuance of a decision rendered in accordance with a statute. 
Personality rights and protection of personal data 
Article 26 
1. Everyone shall have personality rights, in particular the right to good reputation, 
the right to privacy, the inviolability of his home and correspondence. 
2. Everyone shall be free to dispose of her personal data and of any information 
received. 
3. The rights set forth in this Article may be restricted by statute. Persons 
performing public functions may be subject to more severe restrictions in the interest 
of public morality. 
Right of access to data of public interest 
Article 27 
1. Everyone shall have access to data of public interest. 
2. Access to data of public interest may be restricted by statute in the case of 
classified information, provided that the possession of them strongly prejudices or 
imperils the interests of the Republic of Hungary in national defence, crime control 
and crime prevention, maintenance of public order, national security, central 
[government's] financial or foreign policy, foreign affairs or international relations, 
and propriety of administration of justice. 
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Freedom of conscience and religion 
Article 28 
1. The State shall recognise and protect the freedom of conscience and religion. 
This freedom includes the right to have or adopt a religion or belief of one ' s own 
choice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others, to manifest , 
or not to manifest, one 's religion in belief on worship, observance, practice or 
teaching. 
2. Churches shall be separated from the State; the State shall be neutral in religious 
and philosophical matters. 
3. The State shall recognise and guarantee the independence and autonomy of the 
churches. 
Freedom of expression and freedom of the press 
Article 29 
1. Everyone shall have the right of express her opinion in speech, in press or in any 
other way of communication. Censorship is forbidden. 
2. Propaganda for war and incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, and 
discrimination, hostility or violence is forbidden. 
3. The freedom of expression may be restricted by statute in view of the protection 
of minors (henceforth children). 
4. The court may prohibit the publication of any expression ifit violates the consti-
tutional order, the personal rights of others or their right to personal data, the restrictive 
rules adopted for the protection of children, and the prohibition stated in para. 2. 
5. The press, the radio, the television and the news agencies shall provide balanced, 
accurate and objective information. 
Freedom of assembly 
Article 30 
1. Everyone shall have the right to peaceful assembly. 
2. The statute [regulating the exercise of the fredom of assembly] may 
(a) make assembly on a public place subject to prior notification; 
(b) prohibit assembly in certain places; 
(c) make the holding of the assembly conditional upon compliance with requirements 
relating to public order, national security, public health or environmental 
protection. 
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Freedom of association 
Article 31 
1. Everyone shall have the right to associate with others, including the right to form 
or join associations or other voluntary organisations. 
2. Establishment of an armed organisation or an organisation the activity of which 
offends against the constitutional order shall be prohibited. 
3. The freedom of association of aliens may be restricted or made subject to conditions 
by statute. 
Right to participate in public affairs 
Article 32 
Every Hungarian citizen shall have the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs 
and to access to public service on the basis of his skill, qualification and professional 
knowledge in conformity with the conditions set forth in statute. 
Right to petition and complaint 
Article 33 
1. Everyone shall have the right to submit, individually or in community with others, 
written petitions or complaints to State organs. 
2. They shall, within the time limit set by statute, respond to the petition or complaint 
on its merits. 
Rights relating to judicial, administrative 
and other procedures 
Article 34 
1. Everyone shall have the right to access to court in order to protect her rights or 
lawful interests. 
2. The State shall, in the manner defined by statute, bear the costs, wholly or in part, 
of legal procedures, including lawyers fees, of persons without sufficient means. 
Article 35 
1. Everyone shall have the right to a fair hearing in a lawsuit by an independent 
and impartial court of law established by statute which shall decide, within a 
reasonable time, on her rights and obligations, as well as on any criminal charges 
against him. 
2. No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of her lawful judge. 
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Article 36 
1. No one shall be held guilty of, and be punished for, any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time when it 
was committed. 
2. The criminal punishment applied shall be determined exclusively by statute. In 
no case shall be more severe penalty imposed than that applicable at the moment of the 
commission of the criminal offence. 
3. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence until his criminal responsibility 
has been established in a final judgement of a court of law. 
4. No one shall be prosecuted or punished for an offence for which he has already 
been finally convicted or acquitted in Hungary. 
Article 37 
1. Everyone accused with a criminal offence shall have the right to defence in each 
stage of the procedure. 
2. The accused and counsel shall have the right to be informed of the charge and 
of the evidence upon which it is based. 
3. Counsel shall not be held responsible for any opinion expressed in defence of the 
accused. 
Article 38 
1. Any party to a court procedure shall have the right to be heard in person by the 
court. An exception to this rule may be established by statute. 
2. If the party renounces of the right or fails to exercise it in reasonable time, the 
court may decide without hearing the party. 
Article 39 
1. Everyone shall be entitled to seek legal remedy, as defined by statute, against a 
judgement of a court or decisions of administrative or other authorities (henceforth referred 
to jointly as authorities) violating or allegedly violating the law. 
2. Everyone shall be entitled to legal representation in procedures before the 
authorities. 
3. Any party to a procedure before the authorities shall have the right to use a language 
which she understands. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the costs of interpretation 
and translation shall be borne by the authority. 
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Minority rights 
Article 40 
1. The State shall guarantee the right of citizens belonging to national and ethnic 
minorities living in the territory of the country to participate in public life individually 
and collectively, the right to protect and promote their culture, maintain their institutions, 
use their mother tongue in public life and administration, be educated in their mother 
tongue, and use their names in their own language. 
2. A separate statute shall guarantee the right to representation for citizens belonging 
to national and ethnic minorities. 
Right of asylum 
Article 41 
1. The Republic of Hungary shall grant asylum to aliens or stateless persons who, 
in accordance with international treaties or by virtue of a statute are refugees, as well 
as to other persons recognised as refugees [on other grounds], 
2. No person enjoying asylum shall be returned or expelled from the territory of 
Hungary or be extradited to any State save in exceptional cases specified by international 
treaty and with lawful procedure. 
Right to property and the right to inherit 
Article 42 
1. Everyone shall have the right to property and to inherit. 
2. Everyone shall be free to dispose of her property. 
3. The scope of the Stale's exclusive and permanent ownership shall be determined 
by statute. 
4. No limitation on the right to property and no restriction on its exercise shall be 
imposed except in the public interest and in the cases and the manner specified by statute. 
5. Property shall not be expropriated save exceptionally and exclusively in public 
interest and in the cases and the manner specified by statute; expropriation is allowed 
only with full, unconditional and prompt compensation. 
6. The property and use of agricultural land may be subject to specific regulation 
by statute. 
Freedom of enterprise and freedom of economic competition 
Article 43 
1. The Republic of Hungary shall recognise and protect the freedom of enterprise 
and the freedom of economic competition. 
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2. The scope of activity reserved to the State shall be determined in statute. 
3. A statute may restrict the freedom of enterprise and freedom of economic 
competition in order to protect consumers, to control unfair competition, and to prevent 
of monopolies. 
Right to work and to holiday 
Article 44 
1. Everyone shall have the right to the free choice of employment and occupation 
as well as to healthy, safe and reasonable conditions of work. 
2. With a view to implementation of the rights contained in para. 1 the State shall 
promote the highest possible rate of employment and, in the interest of employees shall 
(a) regulate the rights of employees; 
(b) determine the health and safety requirements at workplace; 
(c) establish minimum wages; 
(d) operate job placement and retraining systems. 
3. Employees shall have the right to rest and leisure; to this end, the State shall regulate 
the working time, periodic paid holidays, and remuneration for official holidays. 
Right to form trade unions and other professional associations 
and right to strike 
Article 45 
1. Everyone shall have the right to form or to join associations or trade unions to 
defend his economic interests. 
2. The State shall guarantee the right to establish employee organisations and trade 
unions and accordingly recognise the right of everyone to exercise the right to strike under 
the conditions specified by statute. 
Right to living conditions appropriate to human beings, 
to health and to social security 
Article 46 
1. It shall be a duty of the State to ensure living conditions appropriate to human 
beings. 
2. Citizens shall be entitled to health care. Its scope and manner of provision shall 
be determined by statute. 
3. Citizens shall have the right to social security, to support for a livelihood in the 
event of old age, sickness, disability, widowhood and orphanhood. 
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Article 47 
1. The principal source of primary health care and social benefits shall be constituted 
by citizens' compulsory contribution to the social security scheme, with the assessable 
income for and the extent of, as well as exemptions from, such contribution to be 
determined by statute. 
2. The State shall maintain or support health care and social welfare institutions and 
shall contribute to the provision of social insurance benefits due to citizens under statute. 
3. There may be operated private insurance schemes. 
4. The State shall support healthy way of life and physical training. 
Article 48 
Persons of impaired and physically or mentally handicapped condition shall be entitled 
to special protection. With a view to implementation of this right, the State shall provide 
for them material support and increased protection under labour law, and shall maintain 
and support institutions of rehabilitation and education. 
Article 49 
1. Everyone shall have the right to a healthy environment. 
2. The State shall take measures to preserve the natural and man-made environment 
as well as to prevent and reduce environmental damage. 
3. It shall be a duty of everyone to preserve the environment 
Article 50 
The State shall not reduce the legally guaranteed level of health protection, social 
security and environmental protection except when such measure is inevitable in the 
interest of implementing other fundamental rights or in the public interest, the reduction 
in the level of protection to be proportional, even in such cases, to the objective pursued. 
Rights relating to education, scientific research, 
culture and cultural activities 
Article 51 
1. The State shall recognise and support the freedom of education and instruction. 
2. Primary education shall be compulsory. The age limit for children's compulsory 
school attendance shall be prescribed by statute. 
3. During the period of compulsory schooling, education in the State owned educational 
institutions shall be free. 
4. Everyone shall have access to secondary and higher education on the basis of 
capacity. Everyone shall be entitled to obtain professional qualification. 
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5. Everyone shall be free to attend an educational institution of her own choice. 
6. Teachers shall be free to express their convictions in accordance with the rules 
governing the freedom of expression. 
Article 52 
1. Institutions of primary and secondary education may be founded by anyone, while 
institutions of higher education may be established by such organisations as are determined 
by statute. 
2. Tbe State shall maintain institutions of primary education within easy reach of 
children. 
3. The State shall maintain institutions of secondary and higher education, and it shall 
provide support, as determined by statute for educational institutions maintained by others. 
4. The State shall exercise professional and financial control over the educational 
institutions. 
Article 53 
1. The State shall recognise the freedom of scientific research, art and culture. 
2. Intellectual property shall be protected by the law. 
« 
3. The protection and support of the national and universal values of science, art, 
culture and sports (including those of the national and ethnic minorities), and the protection 
of the Hungarian language shall be a responsibility of the State; which shall perform it 
primarily by legal regulation, by support for the preservation and enrichment of those 
values, and by operating of appropriate institutions. 
Right to found a family 
Article 54 
1. Any man and any woman who have reached the age limit determined by statute 
may contract a marriage and found a family. 
2. The spouses shall have equal rights both during marriage and in case of its 
dissolution. 
Rights of the child 
Article 55 
1. Children shall be entitled to increased protection and care by the family, society 
and the State. 
2. The State shall guarantee the child 's right to have a citizenship, be registered, 
bear a name, be brought up in a family, and express her wish, in a manner appropriate 
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to her age, in respect to matters affecting her fate, and shall take care for children without 
a family. 
3. The parents shall be free to choose the education and training appropriate to the 
child. 
Chapter IV 
RESTRICTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
General principles governing the restriction 
of fundamental rights 
Article 56 
1. The rules restricting fundamental rights shall be laid down by the Constitution or, 
if authorised by the Constitution, in statute. 
2. Fundamental rights may be restricted by statutory regulations only exceptionally, 
to the extent absolutely necessary in proportion to the goal pursued and without prejudice 
to their essential content, in particular if restriction is necessary for the protection of 
the fundamental rights of others, in the interests of crime prevention and control, public 
order, national security and public health, for the protection of the environment or in the 
interest of proportionate bearing of public charges. 
Derogation from fundamental rights 
in emergency situations 
Article 57 
1. In a state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution, the exercise 
of fundamental rights may be suspended or regulated in a manner different from the general 
rules, to the absolutely necessary extent and in close connection with the exigencies of 
the situation. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply in any case to the prohibition of deprivation of 
citizenship, to equal rights and equality before the law, and to the rights stated in Articles 
22, 23 (3), 28, 37 and 39 (2). 
Restrictions by reason of profession 
Article 58 
Variant A 
1. Members of the Constitutional Court (henceforth constitutional judges), judges, 
public prosecutors, the President and the Vice-President of the State Audit Office, and 
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the professional members of the Hungarian Armed Forces, Frontier Guards, the police 
and the national security services 
(a) shall not be member of a political party; 
(b) shall not engage in public activities in or on behalf of a political party; and 
(c) may exercise the rights of assembly and association subject to conditions specified 
in statute. 
2. The parliamentary commissioners and public servants shall not engage in public 
activities in or on behalf of a political party. 
3. A statute may make the exercise by public servants and public employees as well 
as by the professional members of the military and police organs of their right to form 
trade unions and to strike subject to specified conditions. 
Variant В 
Membership in a political party of, political activity by, and the exercise of rights of 
association, assembly and strike of the members of the Constitutional Court (henceforth 
constitutional judges), judges, public prosecutors, parliamentary commissioners, the 
President and the Vice-President of the State Audit Office, and the professional members 
of the Hungarian Armed Forces, the Frontier Guards, the police and the national security 
services may be prohibited by statute. 
PART III 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
Chapter V 
LEGAL NORMS 
Fundamental rules 
Article 59 
1. The legal system of the Republic of Hungary is based upon the Constitution. 
2. Legal norms may be made by the organs vested with law-making powers by the 
Constitution with the designation and the content defined by the Constitution. 
3. Norms issued by international organisations or institutions if they are obligatory 
for Hungary and directly applicable, are to be regarded as norms of Hungarian law. 
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Article 60 
1. The following [kinds of] legal norms shall be adopted by the [following] law-making 
organs: 
(a) statute by Parliament; 
(b) ordinance by the Government; 
(c) ordinance by the ministers and other members of the Government (henceforth 
referred to jointly in this part as ministers); 
(d) regulation by the President of the Hungarian National Bank; 
(e) by-law by the local self-government (henceforth referred to in this Part as self-
governments). 
Article 61 
Variant A 
No legal norm may be contrary to the Constitution, ordinances to statutes, and 
ministerial ordinances to government ordinances. 
Variant В 
No legal norm shall be contrary to the Constitution, ordinances to statutes, and 
ordinances of ministers, ordinances of the President of the Hungarian National Bank, 
and by-laws of self-governments to government ordinances. 
Statutes 
Article 62 
1. If a fundamental social relationships or legal institution is to be regulated by statute 
under the Constitution, its content, safeguards and limitations shall be [exclusively] 
regulated by statute (henceforth exclusive subject-matter of legislation). 
2. In matters falling within the exclusive subject-matters of legislation, ordinances 
may contain rules for the execution of the statute within the limits of the authorisation 
given in the statute [itself]. 
3. Parliament may adopt statutes on any subject-matter not falling within the exclusive 
subject-matters of legislation. 
Government ordinances 
Article 63 
Government may issue ordinances 
(a) without special authorisation in subject matters not regulated by statutes, within 
the limits of its competence; 
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(b) upon authorisation given in a statute and within the limits contained therein to 
establish detailed rules for the execution of the statute. 
[Central] Bank regulations 
Article 64 
The President of the Hungarian National Bank may, within his competence defined 
by Article 145 para. 3, issue regulations 
(a) without special authorisation in subject-matters not regulated in a statute; 
(b) upon special authorisation given in statute to lay down detailed rules for the 
execution of the statute. 
Ministerial ordinances 
Article 65 
Ministers may, within the limits of their competence, issue ordinances if authorised 
to do so by a statute or by an ordinance of the government. 
By-laws of self-governments 
Article 66 
The self-governments may issue by-laws, 
(a) within their competence without special authorisation, in matters not regulated 
by statute or government ordinance; 
(b) within the limits of the authorisation given in a statute in order to lay 
down detailed rules for the execution of the statute appropriate to local 
conditions. 
Force of legal norms 
Article 67 
1. Legal norms shall be binding to 
(a) natural and legal persons in the territory of the Hungarian State; 
(b) all Hungarian citizens domiciled or staying abroad. 
2. Legal norms shall be binding upon the territory of the Hungarian State; by-laws 
of self-governments shall be binding within the confines of their [territorial] juris-
diction. 
3. N o legal norm may create obligations nor declare any conduct to be unlawful for 
a time preceding its entry into force. 
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Publication of legal norms 
Article 68 
1. With the exception of the by-laws of self-governments, all legal norms shall be 
promulgated in Magyar Közlöny, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Hungary. 
2. The by-laws of self-governments shall be promulgated in their own official journals 
or made public in any other way locally customary. 
Regulation of law-making 
Article 69 
The detailed rules relative to general legal instruments other then legal norms, official 
journals, and official collections of the legal norms shall be laid down in statute. 
Chapter VI 
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 
Bills 
Article 70 
1. A statute may be proposed by the Government or by any deputy. 
2. Fifty thousand citizens may propose the adoption of a statute in the form of a 
bill in any subject-matter, except those excluded from referendum. 
3. The details of the popular initiative shall be laid down in statute. 
Legislative drafting by committees 
Article 71 
Variant A 
1. The standing committees of Parliament shall take part in the drafting of bills 
by 
(a) discussing bills; 
(b) submitting motions for amendments to bills; 
(c) making recommendations for Parliament concerning its decision on the adoption 
of statute. 
2. The Parliamentary drafting of bills may be assisted by ad hoc committees and sub-
committees of standing committees. 
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Variant В 
Article 71 to be omitted. 
Adoption of statutes 
Article 72 
Parliament shall adopt statutes by simple majority (para. 2 of Article 89); in cases 
defined by the Constitution the adoption of a statute requires at least two-thirds of the 
votes cast by the deputies present and voting (henceforth qualified majority). 
Promulgation of statutes 
Article 73 
1. Bills voted by Parliament shall be signed by the Speaker, who shall transmit them 
to the President of the Republic. 
2. The President of the Republic shall sign the statute within fifteen days of receipt 
or, upon the request of urgency by the Speaker, within five days, and shall proceed to 
promulgate it immediately. 
Article 74 
1. In cases where the President of the Republic disagrees with a statute or any provision 
thereof, he shall, within the time limit set in Article 73 return it with a statement of reasons 
to Parliament for consideration. 
2. Parliament shall debate [de novo] the bill and vote again on its adoption. [If the 
vote is again in favour of the statute] the President of the Republic shall sign the statute, 
transmitted to him by the Speaker, within five days and shall proceed to promulgate it 
immediately. 
Article 75 
1. If the President of the Republic is of the opinion that a statute or a provision 
thereof is contrary to the Constitution, he shall, within the time limit set in Article 
73 submit with a statement of the reasons the statute to the Constitutional Court for 
decision. 
2. The Constitutional Court shall decide in priority. 
3. If the Constitutional Court declared the statute [bill] unconstitutional, the President 
of the Republic shall return it to Parliament which shall proceed in accordance with Article 
7 (2). 
4. If the Constitutional Court declares the statute or its provision concerned conform 
to the Constitution, the President of the Republic shall, within five days of receipt thereof, 
sign the statute and shall proceed to promulgate it immediately. 
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Chapter VII 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND HUNGARIAN LAW 
Harmonisation of international law and Hungarian law 
Article 76 
The Republic of Hungary shall accept the generally recognised rules of international 
law and shall ensure the conformity of Hungarian law with its obligations assumed under 
international law. 
Conclusion of international treaties 
Article 77 
1. International treaties shall be prepared by the Government. 
2. An international treaty becomes binding on the Republic of Hungary upon its 
confirmation by Parliament or the President of the Republic, or upon its approval by the 
Government. 
3. International treaties confirmed by Parliament shall be promulgated by a statute; 
other international treaties shall be promulgated by government ordinance. 
1 
Article 78 
Parliament shall confirm the conclusion of international treaties governing subject-
matters regulated by statute or those of paramount importance to the foreign relations 
and the constitutional order of the Republic of Hungary, in particular if their content 
(a) affects questions concerning a state of war or conclusion of a pcace treaty, 
employment of the Hungarian Armed Forces and Frontier Guards for acts of 
war, the borders or the territory of the State; 
(b) concerns accession to a military or political organisation; 
(c) entails a considerable unplanned financial obligation for the budget. 
Article 79 
1. The President of the Republic shall have the power to ratify international treaties 
which require ratification by virtue of their content or by the will of the contracting parties, 
but are not within the competence of Parliament. 
2. If the President of the Republic disagrees with an international treaty submitted 
to him to ratification, he shall return it with a statement of reasons to the Government 
within fifteen days for reconsideration. The President of the Republic shall proceed to 
ratify the treaty transmitted to him again by the Government. 
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Article 80 
1. International treaties not subject to ratification shall be approved by the Government 
2. The rules of procedure for the conclusion of international treaties shall be laid down 
by statute. 
Control of the constitutionality of international treaties 
Article 81 
1. Examination by the Constitutional Court of the constitutionality of an international 
treaty to be concluded may be proposed by Parliament, its standing committee, the 
President of the Republic—within fifteen days of its transmission to him for 
ratification—and the Government. 
2. If the Constitutional Court has declared the international treaty unconstitutional 
the treaty shall not be concluded until the organ responsible for its conclusion has 
eliminated unconstitutionality. 
PART IV 
THE STATE 
Chapter VIII 
ELECTIONS 
Suffrage 
Article 82 
1. Every adult Hungarian national shall have the right to vote. 
2. Any person who 
(a) is under guardianship restricting or excluding his capacity for action; 
(b) has been barred by a final judicial decision from participating in public 
affairs; 
(c) is serving a prison sentence; 
(d) has been committed in criminal procedure to compulsory medical treatment shall 
be disqualified from the franchise. 
3. Every Hungarian national having the right to vote (henceforth elector) shall, but 
for para. 4, have the right to be elected. 
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4. Electors living abroad and not domiciled in Hungary shall not have the right to 
be elected. 
Article 83 
1. The right to vote shall be exercised in person. 
2. Exercise of the right to vote shall be free. 
3. Electors shall have equal rights and shall be subject to no distinction on the grounds 
stated in Article 21 (2) or on any other ground. 
4. The participation in elections of any elector living abroad not domiciled in Hungary 
or temporarily staying abroad on the day of election may be regulated differently [from 
the general rules] by statute. 
Election of deputies 
Article 84 
1. Candidates for deputies shall obtain mandates on the basis of the majority principle 
in individual constituencies and on the basis of the principle of proportionality on party 
lists. At least one half of the mandates shall be obtained on party lists. 
2. The boundaries of constituencies and the number of obtainable mandates shall 
be determined in a statute. 
3. Individual constituencies shall be established by taking into account the equality 
of suffrage, the administrative boundaries, and the national, religious and historical 
peculiarities. 
4. Lists may be drawn up by political parties under the conditions specified by 
statute. 
5. Mandates on a party list may be obtained by the political party having obtained 
the legally established threshold which shall not exceed five percent of the votes 
cast. 
Regulation of elections 
Article 85 
1. The election of deputies, self-government representatives, burgomasters and the 
Chief Burgomaster of the capital city, self-government representatives of national and 
ethnic minorities as well as the electoral procedure shall be governed by separate statute. 
2. No statute concerning elections shall enter into force before the first day of the 
seventh month following the day of its promulgation. 
3. The statute on the election of deputies shall be adopted by Parliament by a qualified 
majority of votes. 
Draft Constitution of (lie Republic of Hungary 193 
Chapter IX 
PARLIAMENT 
Article 86 
1. Parliament shall represent the people of Hungary, exercise the legislative power 
on the basis of the Constitution and the statutes as well as in representation of the 
electorate, control the executive power and make use of the sovereign rights of the people 
transferred to it. 
2. Within its functions defined in para. 1, Parliament 
(a) adopts the Constitution; 
(b) makes statutes; 
(c) decrees national referendum; 
(d) ratifies international treaties; 
(e) decides on the employment of the Hungarian Armed Forces and Frontier Guards 
outside or inside the country; 
(f) decides on the entry of foreign military forces into the territory of Hungary; 
(g) decides on the declaration of a state of war and the conclusion of peace; 
(h) declares state of emergency and state of necessity; 
(i) approves the central budget and the appropriation accounts; 
(j) dissolves the representative organ of local self-governments functioning contrary 
to the Constitution (in case of Variant A, Article 160[4])\ 
(k) elects the officers as determined by the Constitution and by the statutes, and 
decides on the termination of their mandates; 
(1) accords amnesty. 
Constitution and functioning of Parliament 
Article 87 
1. The first meeting of Parliament shall be convened by the President of the Republic 
within one month to election day [at latest]. Parliament shall be deemed to be constituted 
upon the verification of the mandates of deputies. 
2. Parliament shall meet in regular sessions twice a year from February 1 to June 
15 and from September 1 to December 15. 
3. At the written demand of the President of the Republic, the Government or one-
fifth of the deputies, Parliament shall meet in extraordinary session or meeting; the 
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demand shall indicate the reasons for convocation together with the proposed date and 
agenda. 
4. The Speaker shall convoke the sessions and meetings of Parliament. 
5. The President of the Republic may adjourn Parliament's session not more than 
once for thirty days during a session. In the course of the period of adjournment, the 
Speaker shall convene Parliament at the written request of one-fifth of the deputies within 
eight days of receipt thereof. 
Article 88 
1. Parliament's standing orders and conduct of business shall be established by 
the Statute on the Rules of Procedure, which shall be adopted by a qualified majority 
of votes. The President of the Republic shall not exercise his prerogatives stated in 
Articles 74 and 75 in respect to the Rules of Procedure. 
2. The meetings of Parliament shall be public. The rules on admission to the House 
of Parliament and its session room as well those on the stay there shall be laid down 
by the Rules of Procedure. 
3. At the request of the President of the Republic, the Government or any deputy, 
Parliament may decide, by a qualified majority of votes, to hold a meeting in camera 
for the protection of State secrets or of personal data not to be made public. 
Article 89 
1. The presence of more than one half of the deputies shall constitute the quorum. 
2. Parliament shall adopt its decisions by the votes cast in favour by more than one 
half of the deputies present and voting. The Constitution and the Rules of Procedure may 
make the adoption of certain decisions subject to a greater number of votes in favour. 
3. At the proposal of the Government or at least one-fifth of the deputies, Parliament 
shall bold a political debate. 
Organisation of Parliament 
Article 90 
1. Parliament shall elect a Speaker, Deputy Speakers and Recording Officers from 
among the deputies. 
2. Deputies belonging to the same political party may set up a parliamentary group 
to co-ordinate their parliamentary activity. 
Article 91 
1. After it has been constituted, Parliament shall establish standing committees and 
may set up ad hoc committees and commissions of inquiry functioning as temporary 
committees. 
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Variant A 
2. At least one member of each parliamentary group shall sit on the standing 
committees. The number of deputies from each group participating in the work of a 
standing committee as its member shall be proportional to the number of deputies in the 
different groups, but Parliament may depart from this rule in favour of the parliamentary 
groups of the opposition. 
Variant В 
Para. 2 to be omitted. 
3. A commission of inquiry shall be set up on the proposal of at least one-fifth of 
the deputies. 
4. Authorities, institutions and citizens shall supply data as required by par-
liamentary committees or, upon request, shall appear and give testimony before those 
committees. 
Termination of Parliament's term 
Article 92 
1. Parliament's term shall be four years from its election. 
2. Parliament may dissolve itself before the expiry of its mandate. 
3. The President of the Republic may dissolve Parliament if 
(a) Parliament on at least four occasions within twelve months withdrew confidence 
from the Government; or 
(b) in case of termination of the Government's mandate, it failed to elect a new 
Prime Minister within forty days. 
4. Before dissolving Parliament, the President of the Republic shall consult the Prime 
Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, and the leaders of the parliamentary groups. 
5. The President of the Republic shall call parliamentary elections simultaneously 
with dissolving Parliament. 
6. Dissolution of Parliament shall be of immediate effect. 
Article 93 
1. A new Parliament shall be elected in the same month in which the mandate of 
the former Parliament expires. 
2. If Parliament's term is terminated before its expiry, the new Parliament shall 
be elected within three months of the date of the decision on the former's dissolution. 
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Legal position of deputies 
Article 94 
1. Deputies shall not be instructed in their quality of deputy; they shall exercise their 
mandate in the public interest. 
2. A deputy may not be 
(a) President of the Republic; 
(b) constitutional judge; 
(c) parliamentary commissioner; 
(d) President or Vice-President of the State Audit Office, or an auditor thereof; 
(e) judge, public prosecutor; 
( 0 public servant, except a member of the Government and a Parliamentary 
Secretary of State; 
(g) professional member of the armed forces, the police and other similar 
organisations. 
3. Cases of incompatibility of deputies other than those enumerated in para. 2 may 
also be defined by statute. 
4. Deputies shall be entitled to remuneration guaranteeing their independence as well 
as to reimbursement of expenses and to specified benefits; the detailed rules to be laid 
down in a statute. 
Article 95 
1. Deputies shall enjoy immunity from the day of their election. 
2. Deputies and former deputies shall not be held responsible for their vote cast, 
facts alleged or opinions expressed in exercise of their mandate. This immunity shall 
not apply to violation of State secrets, defamation or libel, and responsibility in civil 
law. 
3. No deputy shall be detained or prosecuted, nor shall any contravention procedure 
be instituted or any coercive police measure be taken against them without the consent 
of Parliament, unless apprehended during the commission of the criminal act. 
4. Further details of the immunities of the deputies shall be regulated by statute. 
Article 96 
1. The mandate of a deputy shall terminate upon 
(a) termination of the Parliament's term of office; 
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(b) termination of the right to vote of the deputy; 
(c) resignation; 
(d) establishment of incompatibility of the deputy. 
2. A deputy may by a declaration addressed to Parliament resign her mandate. 
3. On the incompatibility of deputies Parliament decides. 
Article 97 
1. Each deputy may interpellate and address question to members of Government 
and the Chief Public Prosecutor, and may address question to the parliamentary 
commissioners, the President of the State Audit Office and the President of the Hungarian 
National Bank, in any matter within their competence. 
2. Each interpellation or question shall be answered—in writing, if so requested 
by the interpellator—at the meeting of Parliament. 
National referendum 
Article 98 
1. National referendum (henceforth referred to in this Chapter as referendum) may 
be held in matters within the competence of Parliament either as mandatory referendum 
or as consultative referendum. 
2. The result of a mandatory referendum shall bind Parliament; the conditions for 
the validity of voting and result of référendums shall be determined by statute. 
3. The consultative referendum serves to know the opinion of citizens before a 
decision is made by Parliament. 
4. There shall be no referendum on 
(a) the State budget and its implementation, taxes and duties, customs duties, and 
statutes establishing conditions for local taxation; 
(b) elections of officials within the competence of Parliament; 
(c) obligations based on international law; 
(d) the dissolution of Parliament; 
(e) declaration of the state of war, a state of emergency and a state of necessity; 
(f) employment of the Hungarian Armed Forces and Frontier Guards outside or 
inside the country. 
5. The prohibition under para. 4 (c) shall not apply to approval or rejection by 
referendum of acceptance pro futuro of obligations under international treaties affecting 
State sovereignty, or to prolongation of expired international treaties. 
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Article 99 
1. Organisation of a referendum may be proposed by 
(a) the President of the Republic, 
(b) the Government, 
(c) at least fifty deputies, 
(d) at least 300,000 citizens having the right to vote. 
2. Electors may propose [only] a referendum to repeal a statute, except the 
Constitution, or the statutes directly executing the provisions of the Constitution. The 
statute on référendums may set a time limit for the collection of signatures required for 
submission of a proposal to hold a referendum. 
3. It shall be obligatory to organise the referendum 
(a) if it is proposed against a statute to modify the Constitution not yet in force 
(in case of Variant A in Article 193); 
(b) on any international treaty under which the Republic of Hungary transfers a 
part of its legislative, executive or judicial powers to an international 
organisation; 
(c) if it is proposed by 300,000 citizens having the right to vote. 
4. In cases set out in para. 3 the referendum shall be ordered by the President of 
the Republic and it shall be mandatory. In any other case the referendum shall be 
consultative and it shall be ordered by Parliament. 
Chapter X 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
Legal position of the President of the Republic 
Article 100 
1. The head of State of the Republic of Hungary shall be the President of the Republic 
who expresses national unity and shall be the custodian of the democratic functioning 
of the State. 
2. The President of the Republic shall be the supreme commander of the Hungarian 
Armed Forces. 
3. The person of the President of the Republic shall be inviolable; his protection 
in criminal law shall be guaranteed by statute. 
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Article 101 
1. The office of the President of the Republic shall be incompatible with any other 
state, political and economic occupation or office. The President of the Republic shall 
not engage in any other lucrative occupation and shall not accept fee or remuneration 
for any other activity except those under copyright protection. 
2. Before taking office the President of the Republic shall eliminate incompatibilities. 
Article 102 
1. In accordance with a statute the President of the Republic shall be entitled to 
personal protection, remuneration, reimbursement of expenses, and benefits. All these 
remunerations, benefits shall be due to him even after the termination of his office except 
when his mandate is terminated by removal from office or upon establishment of 
incompatibility. 
2. The President of the Republic shall be assisted in his work by an office. 
Functions of the President of the Republic 
Article 103 
1. The President of the Republic 
(a) represents the Republic of Hungary; 
(b) may address message to Parliament; 
(c) may participate and at the meetings of Parliament; 
(d) calls parliamentary and general local self-government elections; 
(e) appoints on the proposal of the Prime Minister the members of the Government 
and the Secretaries of State; 
(f) ratifies on the Government's proposal international treaties within his 
competence; 
(g) appoints, accredits and receives ambassadors, envoys, and consuls-general; 
(h) appoints on the proposal of the minister the professors of State owned 
universities and confirms in their posts the rectors of State owned universities, 
the directors-general of State owned colleges, and the President of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences; appoints and promotes the generals; 
(i) decides on the proposal of the minister on conferring town rank, and under 
separate statute on other matters concerning administrative division of the 
national territory; 
(j) exercises individual pardon on the minister's proposal; 
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(к) on the proposal of the minister, decides on the acquisition and termination of 
Hungarian citizenship; 
(1) confers awards, prizes, titles, orders and distinctions established by statute, and 
authorises the wearing of foreign State distinctions; 
(m) decides in matters referred to his competence by statute. 
2. The powers of the President of the Republic to appoint and to accreditations 
includes the power to release from office and removal from duty; those to confer 
distinctions and to authorise wearing them shall include revocation in accordance with 
conditions laid down in by statute. 
Article 104 
1. All decisions of the President of the Republic set out in para. 1 of Article 103 
shall, except for subparagraphs (a) to (d), require for their validity the countersignature 
of the Prime Minister or a member of the Government. 
2. The President of the Republic shall decide within thirty days on the proposals 
submitted to him unless another time limit is set by statute. 
3. The President of the Republic shall reject a proposal submitted to him if 
(a) it fails to meet the statutory requirements of submission; or 
(b) he has reasonable ground to believe that the acceptance of it is likely to disturb 
gravely the democratic functioning of the State organisation. 
Election of the President of the Republic 
Article 105 
1. The President of the Republic shall be elected by Parliament for a term of four 
years. 
2. Any elector who has completed thirty-five years of age before the election day 
shall be eligible to be elected President of the Republic. 
3. The President of the Republic shall be eligible for reelection to this office for 
one more term only. 
4. The President of the Republic shall be elected at least thirty days before the expiry 
of the term of the President in office or, if the latter's term terminated before its expiry, 
within thirty days of its termination. 
5. The date of presidential election shall be fixed by the Speaker of Parliament. 
Article 106 
1. The election of the President of the Republic shall be preceded by nomination. 
Draft Constitution of (lie Republic of Hungary 201 
2. The written recommendation of at least fifty deputies shall be required for a valid 
nomination. 
3. Nominations shall be submitted to the Speaker of Parliament before the election 
is ordered. 
4. Each deputy may recommend one candidate only; if a deputy recommended more 
than one candidate, each of his recommendations shall be invalid. 
Article 107 
1. Parliament shall elect the President of the Republic by secret ballot. In the first 
ballot the candidate who received two-thirds of the votes cast by all the deputies in his 
favour shall be elected President of the Republic. 
2. If no candidate obtains the majority of votes as defined in para. 1 in the first ballot, 
another ballot shall be ordered. Votes may only be cast for the two candidates who 
obtained the highest number of votes in the first ballot. The person who has obtained 
the two-thirds of the votes of all the deputies shall be elected President of the Republic. 
3. If the second ballot was unsuccessful, the President of the Republic shall be elected 
in a third ballot by the votes in favour of more than one-half of all the deputies. 
4. The voting shall take place in no more than three consecutive days. 
Article 108 
1. If the ballot under para. 3 of Article 107 was unsuccessful, a new election shall 
be held on the basis of repeated nomination. 
2. The new election may take place on the eighth day following the day of the last 
unsuccessful ballot. 
Article 109 
The person elected President the Republic shall take office on the expiry of the former 
President's term or, if the latter's term terminated before its expiry, on the eighth day 
following the publication of the results of election; in assuming office he shall take an 
oath before Parliament. 
Substitution of the President of the Republic 
Article 110 
1. In cases where the President of the Republic is temporarily hindered in performing 
bis office or his term has terminated, his powers shall, until the new President takes 
up his duties, be exercised by the Speaker of Parliament subject to the folloving restric-
tions: the Speaker 
(a) shall not return any statute to Parliament for consideration or to submit to the 
Constitutional Court for review; 
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(b) shall not dissolve Parliament; 
(c) shall not exercise the power of pardon, except in the case of persons sentenced 
by a final judgement of a court. 
2. While acting as a substitute for the President of the Republic, the Speaker of 
Parliament shall not exercise his rights as deputy and his functions shall be performed 
by a Deputy Speaker designated by Parliament for that purpose. 
Termination of the President's t e rm 
Article 111 
1. The President's term shall terminate upon 
(a) the expiry of its term of office; 
(b) the occurrence of a condition rendering [the President] incapable to perform 
his functions for more than ninety days; 
(c) the establishment of incompatibility; 
(d) resignation; 
(e) removal from office. 
2. The existence of the condition stated in para. 1 shall be established by Parliament 
at the motion of one-fifth of the deputies. 
3. If the question of incompatibility of the President of the Republic during his term, 
Parliament on the motion of one-fifth of deputies shall decide. 
4. In the cases referred to in paras. 2 and 3, the resolution shall require the votes 
in favour cast by two-thirds of all the deputies. The vote shall be by secret ballot. 
5. The President of the Republic may, by a declaration addressed to Parliament, resign 
from his office. The resignation shall be valid upon its acceptance by Parliament. Within 
fifteen days Parliament may invite the President of the Republic to reconsider his decision. 
If the President of the Republic upholds his resignation, Parliament shall not refuse to 
accept it. 
6. The President of the Republic may be removed of his office, if during its 
performance he has intentionally violated the Constitution or the statutes. 
Responsibility of the President of the Republic 
Article 112 
1. One-fifth of the deputies may initiate the calling to responsibility of the President 
of the Republic pursuant to para. 6 of Article 111. 
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2. The institution of procedure shall require the votes in favour of two-thirds of votes 
in favour by all the deputies. It shall be decided by secret ballot. 
3. The President of the Republic shall not exercise his functions from the adoption 
of Parliament's decision until the termination of the procedure. 
4. The President's acts violating the Constitution or other statute shall be judged 
by the Constitutional Court. 
5. If, as a result of the procedure, the Constitutional Court establishes the fact 
of violation of the Constitution or other statute, it may remove the President of his 
office. 
Article 113 
1. If, pursuant to Article 112, procedure against the President of the Republic have 
been instituted for a criminal act committed during his term of off ice in connection with 
his official duties, the procedure before the Constitutional Court shall also be governed 
by the rules of criminal procedure. The case shall be pleaded by a commissioner for 
impeachment elected from among the deputies. 
2. Until after his mandate has terminated, criminal procedure against the President 
of the Republic shall not be instituted for acts other than those mentioned in para. 1. 
3. If the Constitutional Court establishes the President's culpability in the commission 
of an intentional criminal offence, it shall remove him of his off ice and may impose 
any punishment and [punitive] measure determined by the Penal Code for the act in 
question. 
Chapter XI 
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Members of the Government 
Article 114 
1. The Government shall consist of the Prime Minister and the ministers. 
2. The Prime Minister shall direct the work of the Government and shall be responsible 
for iL 
3. The Prime Minister may propose the appointment of one or more Deputy Prime 
Minister(s) and ministers without portfolio, whose appointment to the Government shall 
not derogate from the Prime Minister's responsibility and powers. 
4. The Prime Minister shall be substituted by a member of the Government designated 
by him. 
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Article 115 
1. The Deputy Prime Minister(s) and the ministers (henceforth referred to jointly as 
ministers) shall, under the guidance of the Prime Minister and in accordance with the 
legal norms, conduct independently the branch of public administration within their 
competence, direct the administration organs subordinated to them and discharge tasks 
determined by the Government or assigned to them by the Prime Minister. 
2. Attached to the ministers there shall be Secretaries of State. 
3. The ministries shall be enumerated in a statute. 
Formation of the Government 
Article 116 
1. The Prime Minister shall be elected by the votes of more than the half of the 
deputies. 
2. The Prime Minister shall be proposed by the President of the Republic. 
3. In case of an unsuccessful vote, another person shall be proposed by the President 
of the Republic. 
Article 117 
1. Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic upon 
the proposal of the Prime Minister. 
2. The Government shall be formed upon appointment of the ministers. As the 
Government has been formed, its members shall take an oath before Parliament. 
3. The Prime Minister shall present the program of the Government to Parliament 
within thirty days of the Government's formation. 
Functions of the Government 
Article 118 
1. The Government shall be the head of the executive power. 
2. In accordance with the Constitution and the statutes the Government shall determine 
the general policy of the state, execute the Constitution and the statutes and, with the 
exceptions defined by statutes, direct the public administration. 
Article 119 
In the exercise of its functions, the Government 
(a) may set up organs of public administration; 
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(b) shall determine the functions of the ministers and the administrative organs under 
its direction; 
(c) may appoint government commissioners for the discharge of specific functions 
and set up decision-making, preparatory, advisory and control committees or 
other bodies; 
(d) may examine the activity of any organ of public and self-government admi-
nistration (henceforth referred to jointly as organs of public administration) 
and request data on, account of or explanation about it; 
(e) may, where appropriate, draw to its own competence any case from any admi-
nistrative organ under its direction in any matter and may annul any decision 
of any such organ. 
Relationship between the Government and Parliament 
Article 120 
1. The Government shall be responsible to Parliament and shall have its 
confidence. 
2. The ministers [members of the Government] may attend and have the right to 
be heard at the meetings of Parliament and its committees. 
3. Parliament and any of its committees may require any member of the Government 
to attend their meeting. 
4. The legal status and remuneration of the members of the Government as well 
as reimbursement of their expenses and the benefits due to them shall be regulated by 
statute. 
Termination of the Government' tenure of office 
Article 121 
1. The Government 's tenure of office shall terminate upon the termination of the 
Prime Minister 's tenure of office. 
2. The Prime Minister 's terms of office shall terminate upon 
(a) the assembly of a newly elected Parliament; 
(b) his resignation; 
(c) expression of the lack of confidence towards him. 
3. Upon termination of its mandate the Government shall remain in office until the 
formation of a new Government, but it shall not possess the power to approve 
international treaties, and may issue ordinances only in cases of urgency pursuant to 
an explicit enabling provision given by a statute. 
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Vote of confidence 
Article 122 
1. One-fifth of the deputies may submit to Parliament a written motion of non-
confidence in the Prime Minister. The motion shall designate the person proposed for 
the office of Prime Minister. 
2. Once Parliament has expressed lack of confidence in the Prime Minister [in office], 
the person proposed in the motion as new Prime Minister shall be deemed to have been 
elected. If the vote of confidence was unsuccessful, a new motion of non-confidence may 
not be submitted only after three months lapsed. 
3. The Prime Minister may request a vote of confidence or may request that the vote 
over a bill be at the same time a vote of confidence. 
4. Parliament shall decide on a motion of non-confidence or that of confidence by 
the votes in favour of more than the half of all the deputies. 
5. A debate and a vote over the motion shall not be held sooner than three days from 
and not later than eight days after its submission. 
Public administration 
Article 123 
1. Rights and duties concerning matters of public administration shall not be established 
except by virtue of and under a procedure determined by a statute or other legal norm. 
The rules of administrative procedure shall be laid down in a statute. 
2. Organs of public administration are obliged to act in any matter within their 
competence and [territorial] jurisdiction. 
3. No case within its competence shall be withdrawn from any organ of public 
administration except pursuant to Article 119 (e). 
4. Organs of public administration may be controlled by citizens in observance of 
the rules relative to the protection of official secrets and personal data. 
Public servants 
Article 124 
1. Every public servant shall have individual tasks and responsibilities in public 
administration. 
2. Public servants shall act impartially in accordance with the law. 
3. Unless otherwise provided in statute, civil servants shall be appointed and employed 
on the basis of open competition for an unspecified term. 
Draft Constitution of (lie Republic of Hungary 207 
4. Public servants may be dismissed on grounds and in a procedure determined by 
statute. 
5. The legal status and the remuneration of civil servants shall be regulated by 
statute. 
Chapter XII 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIC 
Principles governing the administration of justice 
Article 125 
1. Justice in the Republic of Hungary shall be administered solely and exclusively 
by courts of law. 
2. Courts shall decide in criminal cases, civil disputes and other matters referred in 
a statute to their competence; unless otherwise provided in a statute, courts of law shall 
have the power to review administrative decisions. 
Article 126 
1. Judicial power shall be independent of other powers. 
2. Judges shall decide solely on the basis of the legal norms and in accordance with 
their conscience and conviction. They shall not be instructed and may not accept 
instructions. 
3. The costs of the judicial organisation shall be supplied by the central budget in 
a separate item. 
Article 127 
1. Courts of law shall deliver their judgements in the name of the Republic of Hungary. 
Judicial decisions shall be binding on everybody. 
2. Court hearings shall be public unless otherwise provided in a statute. 
3. Any means of proof likely to lead to the establishment of the facts of the case may 
be used freely as evidence in judicial procedure; the courts shall be free to take notice 
of any evidence separately as well as taken together, appraising them in accordance with 
their inner conviction. 
Article 128 
1. Courts of law shall administer justice in trial courts consisting of at least three 
judges, unless otherwise provided by statute. 
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2. Non-professional [lay] judges may also participate in the administration of justice 
in the matters and in the manner specified by statute. 
3. Only a professional judge may act as single judge or presiding judge of a trial court 
Judicial organisation 
Article 129 
1. The judicial organisation shall be determined by statute. A statute m a y establish 
special courts to hear specific group of cases. No extraordinary court shall be set up. 
2. Establishment merger and abolition of courts shall be within the competence of 
Parliament. 
Supreme Court 
Article 130 
1. The Supreme Court shall be the highest judicial organ of the Republic of Hungary. 
2. The Supreme Court shall guarantee unity in the application of law by the courts; 
its directives to ensure unity of the case law shall be obligatory to all courts of law. 
3. The President of the Supreme Court shall be elected for a term of six years from 
among the judges by Parliament on the proposal of the President of the Republic, by 
a two-thirds majority of votes of all the deputies in favour. 
4. The cases of the termination of the office of the President of the Supreme Court 
shall be defined in statute. 
Variant A 
5. The Vice-President of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from among the judges 
by the President of the Republic for a term of six years, in accordance with the conditions 
set out by a separate statute. 
Variant В 
Para. 5 to be omitted. 
J u d g e s 
Article 131 
1. Judges shall be appointed for an unlimited period, and be relieved from office, 
by the President of the Republic. 
2. The office of a judge shall be incompatible with any other State, political and 
economic office or occupation. 
3. Judges shall not engage in any professional activity except for scholarly, literary 
or other artistic, educational activities and creation of works protected by copyright law. 
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4. Except in flagrante delicto, detention of a judge, institution of criminal or 
administrative procedure and taking of coercive police measures against her shall be subject 
to the prior consent of the organ entitled to appoint or elect her. 
5. Judges shall be entitled to a remuneration ensuring their independence; its amount 
shall be determined by statute. 
Article 132 
1. A j udge shall not, apart from dismissal on disciplinary grounds, without her consent 
be relieved or suspended from her office or set in retirement except upon proposal of 
the competent body of judges and upon grounds specified in statute. 
2. No judge shall be transferred to another court except with her consent, save if 
otherwise provided by statute. 
3. The [compulsory] retirement age of judges shall be determined in statute. 
Article 133 
1. Judges may form organs of self-government which shall have the power to give 
opinion and consent in cases specified in statute. 
2. The statute on the organisation and administration of courts as well as organs of 
self-government and the status of judges shall be adopted by a qualified majority; rules 
of judicial procedure shall be defined by statute. 
Functions of the public prosecutor 
Article 134 
1. The public prosecutor shall prosecute in criminal affairs, take action in the cases 
and manner specified by statute against other unlawful acts and omissions, and promote 
the prevention of violations of law. 
2. In performing his functions, the public prosecutor 
(a) exercises the powers defined by statute in criminal investigations; 
(b) represents the prosecution in judicial procedure; 
(c) supervises the legality of the execution of criminal punishments; 
(d) initiates, if authorised in a statute in cases of violation of law, judicial procedure 
in civil and administrative cases or takes part in procedures and makes use of 
legal remedies if the person concerned is unable to defend his rights, or if such 
remedy is required in the public interest; 
(e) takes action in matters within his competence to prevent or terminate violations 
of law. 
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T h e Chief Public Prosecutor 
Article 135 
1. The Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Hungary shall be elected on the 
proposal of the President of the Republic by Parliament with a two-thirds majori ty of 
votes cast in favour of all the deputies for a term of six years. 
2. The Chief Public Prosecutor shall be responsible to Parliament and shall render 
account to it of his activity at periods specified in a statute. 
3. The Chief Public Prosecutor shall not be instructed by Parliament and shall not 
be interpellated on pending cases. 
4. The cases in which the Chief Public Prosecutor's term of office shall be terminated 
shall be determined in statute. 
Var ian t A 
5. The deputies of the Chief Public Prosecutor shall be appointed on the latter 's 
proposal, in accordance with a statute by the President of the Republic for a period of 
six years. 
Variant В 
Para. 5 to be omitted. 
Organs of the public prosecution 
Article 136 
1. Public prosecution shall be an autonomous organ of the State subject but to the 
legal norms. 
2. The organs of the public prosecution shall be directed and controlled by the Chief 
Public Prosecutor. 
3. Public prosecutors shall be subordinated to the Chief Public Prosecutor and shall 
not be instructed except by the Chief Public Prosecutor and by the superior public 
prosecutors. Instructions may be given to prosecute in court and on the of exercise the 
public prosecutor 's powers; the public prosecutor may not be instructed, however, to 
drop or set off prosecution. 
4. Public prosecutors shall be appointed and dismissed, and their service terminated 
by the Chief Public Prosecutor in accordance with a statute. 
5. Detailed rules on public prosecutors, the organisation of the prosecution, the status 
and remuneration of public prosecutors shall be laid down by statute. 
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Chapter XIII 
PUBLIC FINANCE 
Currency system 
Article 137 
The currency system of the State shall be established by Parliament in a statute 
ensuring the security of money owners and that of the circulation of money. 
Public revenues and expenditures 
Article 138 
1. The central State organs, the local self-governments, the separate public funds and 
the social security funds shall administer the assets entrusted to them in a responsible 
manner and on the basis of budgets for calendar years. 
2. Budgets shall comprise all revenues and expenditures in itemised breakdowns and 
in aggregates in a uniform accounting system. 
3. Data concerning implementation of budgets, draft budgetary plans and appropriation 
accounts, budgetary balances, and information upon which they are based shall be published 
upon their submission to Parliament and the representative organs of local self-
governments. 
4. The administration and use of public revenues and expenditure shall be regulated 
by statute. 
Article 139 
1. Parliament shall determine in statute the budgets of the central State organs 
(henceforth the central budget), the budgets of social security funds and adopt the reports 
on the implementation of the budgets. The respective bills as well as the proposed amounts 
and uses of the revenues and expenditures of separate State funds shall be submitted to 
Parliament by the Government within the time limits established by the Constitution or 
by statute. 
2. Local self-governments shall in a by-law adopt their budgets upon the adoption 
of the central budget in accordance with its requirements, taking into account the central 
financial assistance and the grants they receive from the central budge t 
Equality in bearing public charges 
Article 140 
1. Persons and organisations shall contribute to meeting public needs by paying taxes, 
charges, customs duties and other dues on the ground of their participation in economic 
transactions and in accordance with their income, financial situation and capacity to bear 
212 Kaleidoscope 
burdens, as well as by paying fees charged for certain public services (henceforth referred 
to jointly as rates and taxes), the extent of such contribution to be established in such 
a way as not to imperil the subsistence of individuals and the operational capacity of 
organisations. 
2. The forms of paying rates and taxes, the scope of persons obligated for such 
payment, the basis of assessment for and the scale of payments, exemptions and allowances 
shall be determined by statute and, within the limits set by statute, in by-laws of self-
government; their entry into force shall be set in such a way as to leave appropriate time 
for individuals and organisations for preparation. 
Central budget 
Article 141 
1. By distribution of revenues from rates and taxes, the central budget shall provide 
for the financial conditions for the implementation of fundamental rights and for the 
functioning of the State's organisational system and institutions, while securing, in 
the cases specified in statute, the material resources for the discharge by self-governments 
of their mandatory functions, and shall promote the development of the national 
economy. 
2. The bill containing the central budget for the following year shall be submitted 
to Parliament by the Government at least ninety days before the expiry of the budget 
for the current year. 
3. In adopting the central budget, Parliament shall, in case of a budgetary deficit, 
determine which part of the deficit can be financed from internal or external borrowing. 
In addition to the items approved in the central budget, adoption of any measure to 
increase the public debt or assumption of commitments leading to the increase of public 
debt shall be subject to authorisation of Parliament passed by a qualified majority of 
votes. 
Article 142 
1. If Parliament had not adopted the central budget before January 1 of the fiscal 
year, the Government shall, within thirty days, submit to Parliament a bill on the interim 
administration of finances. 
2. In the statute on interim finances Parliament shall authorise the Government to 
collect the revenues and incur the expenditures determined therein. 
3. The statute on interim finances shall cease to be in force on the day of the entry 
into force of the new budget but in any case not later than the last day of the sixth month 
following its adoption. 
4. Before the adoption of the statute on interim finances, or if it lost effect before 
the entry into force of the statute on the new budget, the Government shall be entitled 
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to collect the revenues determined by legal norms [in force] and, within the limits of 
the credits accorded the budget for the preceding year, to incur the expenditures 
proportionate to the time lapsed. 
Article 143 
1. Government shall, within eight months following the end of the fiscal year, 
submit to Parliament a report on the implementation of the budget in the same structure 
and comparable with that of the budget, together with the statement the State Audit 
Office. 
2. Parliament shall adopt the implementation report in the form of a statute before 
the end of the tenth month following the end of the fiscal year. 
3. The Government shall propose to Parliament a vote of confidence if Parliament 
has refused to adopt the statute on interim finances or the implementation report. 
4. The rules governing the elaboration and implementation of the central budget shall 
be laid down in statute. 
State Audit Office 
Article 144 
1. The State Audit Office shall be the control organ of Parliament; it shall be the 
supreme organ of financial and economic control vested with general powers; it shall 
perform its functions in subordination but to the statutes. 
2. The State Audit Office shall control the legality and efficiency of 
(a) the administration of public revenues, the State budget and the implementation 
accounts; 
(b) the utilisation budgetary resources outside public finances; 
(c) the management of State property. 
3. Functions may be assigned to and competences vested in the State Audit Off ice 
only by the statute governing its [organisation and competence]. 
4. The State Audit Office shall report to Parliament on its control activities; the reports 
shall be published taking into account the rules on the protection of official secrets and 
personal data. 
5. The President and Vice-President of the State Audit Office shall be elected by 
Parliament by a two-thirds majority of votes in favour of all the deputies for a term of 
twelve years. 
6. The organisation and functioning of the State Audit Office as well as the status 
and remuneration of auditors shall be governed by separate statute. 
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Hungarian National Bank 
Article 145 
1. The Hungarian National Bank shall be the bank authorised to issue banknotes and 
to coin money of the Republic of Hungary, the central bank of the national economy; 
it shall be owned by the State. 
2. Within the framework of the statute governing it and in accordance with the 
Government's economic policy, the Hungarian National Bank as central bank shall act 
in independence to adopt its money supply policy and to devise the instruments thereof 
in order to contribute to maintaining the equilibrium of the economy. 
3. In the manner defined in statute, the Hungarian National Bank shall 
(a) have the exclusive right to issue the national currency; 
(b) protect the internal and external purchasing power of the national currency; 
(c) regulate money circulation; 
(d) devise the national accounting and payments system. 
4. President of the Hungarian National Bank shall, on the proposal of the Prime 
Minister, be appointed by the President of the Republic for a term of six years. 
5. The President of the Hungarian National Bank shall render annual account to 
Parliament on the Bank's activity. 
6. The organisation and functioning of the Hungarian National Bank shall be governed 
by statute. 
State property 
Article 146 
1. State shall own and administer the property necessary for the performance of its functions. 
2. The State shall be the owner of the property requiring increased protection and care 
of salient importance. 
3. The exercise of the rights relating to State property shall be regulated in statute. 
Chapter XIV 
ARMED FORCES AND ORGANS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
General rules 
Article 147 
1. The functions relating to national defence, defence of public order and national 
security, and defence against catastrophes (henceforth referred to jointly as military and 
policing functions) shall be performed by the following organs: 
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(a) the Hungarian Armed Forces (henceforth the Armed Forces); 
(b) the Frontier Guards; 
(c) the Police; 
(d) the national security services. 
2. Policing and other organs not mentioned in para. 1 may also collaborate in the 
performance of military and policing functions. 
3. The military and policing organs shall be directed by the Government in the manner 
defined in statute. The statute may confer the right of direction on a member of the 
Government designated for that purpose. 
4. The President of the Republic shall participate in the direction of the Armed Forces. 
5. Parliament shall exercise continuous control over the activities of the military and 
policing organs. 
6. Separate statutes shall regulate 
(a) the national defence and the Armed Forces; 
(b) the Frontier Guards, the Police and the national security services; 
(c) policing organs other than those enumerated in para. (b). 
A r m e d Forces 
Article 148 
1. The military defence of the country shall be the duty of the Armed Forces. 
2. In accordance with the rules relating to emergency situations, the Armed Forces 
shall collaborate in 
(a) putting an end to armed actions aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order 
or seizure of exclusive power and imperilling personal safety and material security 
on a large scale, so that police action proves insufficient to cope with it; 
(b) averting and removing the consequences of catastrophes. 
F ron t i e r Guards 
Article 149 
1. The function of the Frontier Guards shall be to maintain order at the State frontiers. 
2. The Frontier Guards shall collaborate in the military defence of the country. 
Police 
Article 150 
The Police shall prevent, detect and hinder crime and defend public order. 
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National security services 
Article 151 
The national security services shall have the following functions: 
(a) to disclose and avert disguised efforts prejudicing or endangering national 
sovereignty and the country's political, economic and military interests; 
(b) to obtain data and information, of foreign origin or destined for use abroad, 
fostering the country's interests and necessary for government decisions; 
(c) to disclose and avert disguised efforts at changing or disturbing by unlawful 
means the constitutional order and the functioning of constitutional institutions. 
Consent to the crossing of the State frontiers 
Article 152 
1. Units of the Armed Forces or the Frontier Guards shall not cross the frontiers of 
the Hungarian State without the prior consent of Parliament. 
2. The prohibition stated in para. 1 shall not apply to 
(a) military manoeuvres conducted under international treaties; 
(b) peace-keeping operations at the request of the United Nations. 
3. Unless otherwise provided by international treaty, the armed forces of foreign States 
shall not move through, and shall not be employed or stationed in the territory of the 
Hungarian State without the prior consent of Parliament. 
Article 153 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 152, the Government may, in the cases 
defined by statute authorise, for purposes of manoeuvres or exercising or for other purposes 
of co-operation between military organs, 
(a) a unit of the Armed Forces or the Frontier Guards, of a strength and with 
equipment as defined in statute to cross the Hungarian State frontiers; or 
(b) a unit of the armed forces of a foreign country, of a similar strength and with 
similar equipment, to enter the territory of the Hungarian State. 
2. The Government shall immediately inform Parliament of such authorisation. 
Obligation to personal military service 
Article 154 
1. The Defence of Hungary shall be the duty of every Hungarian citizen. 
2. Citizens' obligation to personal military service and the procedure for exemption 
from military service on grounds of conscience or for other reasons shall be regulated 
in statute. 
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3. The duties to be performed by citizens in emergency situations shall be regulated 
in statute. 
Obligation to provide economic and other services 
Article 155 
1. Every individual living or residing in the territory of the Hungarian State and 
every legal person operating in that territory may be required to carry out an economic 
activity or to provide material service, as determined in statute in the interest of national 
defence. 
2. In establishing and discharging the duty to provide economic and other services, 
regard shall be paid for proportionate sharing in public burdens, protection of property, 
and the possibility of recourse to compensation. 
Professional corps 
Article 156 
1. Any Hungarian citizen may voluntarily join the professional corps of a military 
or a police organ, upon conditions determined by statute. 
2. The status and remuneration of the professional corps of the military and policing 
organs shall be regulated by statute. 
Chapter XV 
SELF-GOVERNMENTS 
Local self-governments 
Article 157 
1. The community of electors of villages, towns, the capital city and its districts, and 
the counties shall have the right to self-government. The local communities shall exercise 
this right through representative organs elected by them as well as directly through 
referendum. 
2. Aliens domiciled in Hungary who are of full age under Hungarian law, shall 
have the right to vote on the election of local self-government representatives and 
in local référendums on their place of residence, but they shall not have the right to 
be elected. 
Fundamental rights and functions of local self-governments 
Article 158 
1. Local self-governments shall have equal fundamental rights, but their duties may 
differ. 
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2. Within the framework set by the statutes, local self-governments to manage local 
public affairs, and to perform communal local public services 
(a) shall issue by-laws; 
(b) shall adopt their organisational and operational statutes; 
(c) shall be free to form associations with other self-governments, establish 
associations representing their interests, co-operate with local authorities of other 
countries, and join international organisations of self-governments; 
(d) shall exercise owner's rights in respect of self-government property; 
(e) may found undertakings using their property and revenues available for that 
purpose, without prejudice to the performance of their mandatory tasks; 
(0 shall determine the types and rates of local taxes; 
(g) shall adopt annual budgets and utilise them independently; 
(h) may request information from, initiate decision by, and express opinion to 
competent organs; 
(i) may establish self-government symbols and may award local distinctions and 
honorary titles. 
3. The fundamental rights of local-governments shall enjoy judicial protection. 
Article 159 
1. The mandatory functions of local self-governments shall be defined [only] by statute. 
2. The central budget shall provide the funds necessary for the fulfilment of local 
responsibilities. 
3. A statute may make it obligatory to local self-governments to discharge mandatory 
functions in association with others. 
Organisation and functioning of local self-governments 
Article 160 
1. The representative bodies of villages, towns and metropolitan districts shall be 
headed by a burgomaster, the metropolitan [Budapest] self-government assembly by the 
Chief Burgomaster, and the county assemblies by their presidents (henceforth referred 
to jointly as burgomasters). 
2. The term of office of representative organs and burgomasters shall be four years 
from their election. Elections of representative organs and burgomasters shall be held 
every four years in the same month. 
3. Before the expiry of its term of office a representative organ may declare its 
dissolution under the conditions determined by the Statute on Local Self-Governmcnts. 
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Variant A 
4. On the proposal of the Government, Parliament may dissolve a representative organ 
functioning contrary to the Constitution. 
Variant В 
4 . Upon the request of the organ exercising legality control, the court shall dissolve 
a representative body functioning contrary to the Constitution. 
5. If the term of office of a representative body, its members or a burgomaster 
terminates before its expiry, the new mandate shall last until the expiry of the original 
term. 
Article 161 
1. The representative organ [of local self-governments] shall be independent and shall 
have general competence in the conduct of local public affairs. 
2. A local public matter may exceptionally be referred in a statute to the competence 
of another State organ only in cases where so required by the nature of the matter involved 
or by criteria of efficiency or economic expediency. 
Article 162 
1. The decisions and functioning of the representative organs shall not be reviewed 
except their conformity with law. 
2. Legality control over local self-governments shall be the responsibility of the 
Government, while financial and economic control shall be exercised by the State Audit 
Office. 
3. Decisions of local self-governments violating the law shall be subject to court review 
upon request of the control organ. 
Article 163 
1. Local self-government, local referendum and people's initiative shall be regulated 
in statute. 
2. The Statute on Local Self-Government shall be adopted by Parliament by a qualified 
majority of votes. 
Self-governments of national and ethnic minorities 
Article 164 
1. The national and ethnic minorities living in the territory of the Republic of Hungary 
may form local and central self-governments. 
2. The self-government of national and ethnic minorities shall be regulated by statute. 
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Public corporate bodies 
Article 165 
1. Public corporate bodies shall be self-governing organisations with registered 
membership established by statute. 
2. Public corporate bodies shall carry out public functions in relation to their members 
and with regard to their professional activities. 
3. Public corporate bodies shall be legal persons. 
PART V 
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
Chapter XVI 
SPECIAL RULES ON EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
State of preventive defence 
Article 166 
1. A state of preventive defence shall exist when 
(a) the Republic of Hungary is threatened by an attack of a foreign power; or 
(b) the territory of the Hungarian State is unexpectedly invaded by a foreign armed 
group. 
2. The existence of a state of preventive defence shall be established by the 
Government, which shall declare a state of preventive defence in ordinance. 
3. Parliament shall decide on the approval of the Government's ordinance within 
fifteen days of its promulgation. 
4. In accordance with the plan of national defence approved by the President of the 
Republic, the Government shall immediately take 
(a) preparatory measures proportionate to the threatening attack; or 
(b) the measures necessary for repelling the armed group which has unexpectedly 
invaded the country. 
5. The Government shall immediately inform Parliament and the President of the 
Republic of the measures taken in accordance with para. 4. 
6. The Government shall end the state of preventive defence upon discontinuance 
of the conditions for its declaration. 
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State of armed defence 
Article 167 
1. A state of armed defence shall exist when 
(a) the Republic of Hungary is directly threatened by an attack of a foreign power, 
(b) the attack of a foreign power has actually taken place; or 
(c) a state of war has been declared. 
2. Parliament shall decide on the declaration of a state of war and on the conclusion 
of peace by a qualified majority. 
3. Parliament shall establish the existence of a state of armed defence by a qualified 
majority and shall declare the state of emergency. 
4. The state of emergency shall be terminated upon cessation of the acts of war by 
Parliament. 
Article 168 
1. During a state of emergency Parliament may not decide its own dissolution and 
may not be dissolved. 
2. If Parliament was previously dissolved, in case of a state of emergency the President 
of the Republic shall convene a session of the previously dissolved Parliament and 
Parliament shall decide on the prolongation of its mandate. 
3. If Parliament's term of office expires during the state of emergency, its mandate 
shall be prolonged until the termination of the state of emergency. 
Article 169 
1. If the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister and the President of the 
Constitutional Court have jointly established that Parliament is prevented from declaring 
a state of emergency, the existence of the state of emergency shall be established and 
declared by the President of the Republic on their proposal. 
2. At its first session after the termination of its inability to perform its functions, 
Parliament shall examine the justifiability of the existence of the state of armed defence 
and of the declaration of the state of emergency and shall decide by a qualified majority 
on the approval of the decision of the President of the Republic. 
Article 170 
1. During a state of emergency the emergency measures determined by separate statute 
shall be introduced by government ordinance. 
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2. In case authorised by the statute containing the roles applicable in states of 
emergency, the government ordinance may depart from provisions of statutes or suspend 
their application and adopt other specific measures [required], 
3. The Government's responsibilities connected with the state of emergency may 
be assigned to a smaller body [Cabinet] consisting of the Prime Minister and ministers 
designated by the Government. 
National Defence Council 
Article 171 
1. The National Defence Council shall consist of members of all parliamentary groups 
of deputies, deciding on the ground of proportionality of the number of the deputies 
belonging to the parliamentary groups; it will be established by Parliament for its term 
of office. 
2. In order to prepare for the discharge of its functions during a state of emergency, 
the National Defence Council may at any time request information from the Government 
on matters of national defence. 
3. During a state of emergency the National Defence Council 
(a) shall be in continuous session and control the Government's actions in the state 
of emergency, and may annul the Government's ordinances and measures; 
(b) shall decide on the employment of the Armed Forces and the Frontier Guards 
inside or outside the country as well as on authorising the entry of foreign military 
forces into the territory of the Hungarian State. 
4. The President of the Republic and the members of the Government may attend, 
and have the right to be heard at, the meetings of the National Defence Council. 
Article 172 
1. The Speaker of Parliament shall convene Parliament on the proposal of the National 
Defence Council. 
2. If during a state of emergency Parliament cannot be convened, the National Defence 
Council shall, save as set out in para. 3, exercise all powers of Parliament. 
3. The National Defence Council 
(a) may issue ordinances replacing statutes; its ordinances may not modify the 
Constitution and the statutes adopted by a qualified majority and may not be 
contrary to them; 
(b) may not elect the President of the Republic. 
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State of necessity 
Article 173 
1. A state of necessity shall exist when acts of violence within the country seriously 
threaten 
(a) the constitutional order and functioning of the Hungarian State; or 
(b) the life and property of the citizens. 
2. In those cases Parliament shall declare a state of necessity. 
3. A state of necessity shall be governed mutatis mutandis by the rules established 
by the Constitution for the state of defence. 
State of catastrophe 
Article 174 
1. A state of catastrophe shall exist when 
(a) a natural disaster, an industrial accident, or a natural, technical or social event 
of a mass scale gravely endangers or imperils safety of life and property, and 
(b) immediate and special administrative action by territorial or central state organs 
is needed to avert or terminate such events. 
2. The existence of a state of catastrophe shall be established by the Government, 
which shall declare in ordinance a state of catastrophe for a territorial unit of public 
administration as an area afflicted by catastrophe. 
3. During a state of catastrophe the Government may 
(a) depart, in its ordinance issued to avert or terminate a catastrophe, from provisions 
of statutes not adopted by a qualified majority; 
(b) order the employment of military and policing organs. 
Functioning of the Constitutional Court in states of emergency 
Article 175 
1. In states of emergency the Constitutional Court shall function pursuant to this 
Article. 
2. The Constitutional Court shall not examine the legal norms adopted in view of 
a state of emergency until after its termination, but may establish their unconstitutionality 
even with retroactive effect to the state of emergency. 
3. The Constitutional Court may even in a state of emergency examine and annul 
statutes and ordinances adopted to meet that situation, if they 
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(a) violate fundamental rights; 
(b) derogate from a fundamental right which shall not be subject to derogation in 
emergency situations; 
(c) were adopted in violation of the rules established for states of emergency. 
Legal regulation relating to states of emergency 
Article 176 
1. The rules applicable in states of emergency shall be defined in a statute to be 
adopted by a qualified majority which shall define 
(a) the modalities of the suspension of, or derogation from, fundamental rights; 
(b) the types of the emergency measures may be taken; 
(c) the composition and rules procedure of the National Defence Council; 
(d) the modalities of modifying the functions of State organs and the rules of 
procedure applied by them. 
2. Any ordinance of the National Defence Council or other legal norms regulating 
the state of emergency shall, but for para. 3, be deemed to be repealed upon termination 
of the state of emergency. 
3. Within fifteen days from the termination of the state of emergency Parliament may 
prolong for a limited period the validity of the ordinances issued by the National Defence 
Council and the Government applicable in the state of emergency. 
PART VI 
PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Chapter XVII 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Function and competence of the Constitutional Court 
Article 177 
1. The Constitutional Court shall guard over the observance of the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
2. The functions and competence of the Constitutional Court shall be determined by 
the Constitution. 
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3. The detailed rules on the Constitutional Court and the constitutional judges shall 
be laid down by statute requiring qualified majority. 
Article 178 
The Constitutional Court shall be competent to 
(a) decide upon the motion of the President of the Republic on the constitutionality 
of any statute [bill] adopted by Parliament not yet promulgated; 
(b) decide—upon a motion by Parliament, any of its standing committees, the 
President of the Republic or the Government—the conformity with the 
Constitution of an international treaty to be concluded; 
(c) decide of the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances or their consistency 
with international treaties upon motion by Parliament, any of its standing 
committees, the President of the Republic, the Government, the President of the 
Supreme Court, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the President of the State Audit 
Office, the parliamentary commissioners, a local self-government, the central 
self-government of a national or ethnic minority, any public authority in respect 
of legal norms applicable in a case pending before it, and any person in respect 
of legal norms applicable to a case pending before a public authority; 
(d) decide constitutional complaints lodged by any person who claims to have 
suffered a wrong in consequence of the violation of a constitutionally guaranteed 
right by the application of an unconstitutional norm of law, provided the 
complaint was lodged after the termination of the administrative procedure under 
the conditions and within the time limit set by statute; 
(e) interpret provisions of the Constitution upon a motion by Parliament, any of 
its standing committees, the President of the Republic, the Government, the 
President of the Supreme Court, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the President of 
the State Audit Office, the parliamentary commissioners, a local self-government, 
and the central self-government of a national and ethnic minority; 
(0 establish, upon motion by any person certifying her legal interest, the existence 
of an unconstitutional state of affairs resulting from a legislative omission to 
make a statute; 
(g) decide, upon a motion by the organ concerned, conflicts of competence between 
Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Government, and between any 
of these organs and, except for courts of law, another State organ or a self-
government; 
(h) decide of the legal responsibility of the President of the Republic upon motion 
by Parliament; 
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(i) examine the rejection of an initiative for a referendum upon motion by the 
organiser of the initiative; 
(j) decide—upon a motion by Parliament or its competent committee, fifty deputies, 
the President of the Republic or the Government—the conformity with the 
Constitution of an initiative for a referendum or of a referendum held. 
Procedure before the Constitutional Court 
Article 179 
1. The Constitutional Court shall proceed upon a written application by the organ 
or person entitled to initiate procedure. 
2. The Constitutional Court shall examine only questions raised in the application 
except when the unconstitutionality of a legal norm not affected by the motion necessarily 
follows from the unconstitutionality of the legal norm under consideration. 
Variant A 
3. The Constitutional Court shall forward the application to the organ which issued 
the legal norm or, in the case of a statute, to the proponent of the bill, the law-making 
body, and to the organ or person in respect of which/whom the decision of the Court 
may contain an obligation connected with the matter, and shall invite them to submit 
their views to the Court within the time limit set by statute. The omission to submit views 
shall not bar the Constitutional Court to deliver the decision. 
Variant В 
Para. 3 to be omitted. 
Article 180 
Variant A 
1. The Constitutional Court shall decide in full court or in a chamber composed of 
three constitutional judges. 
2. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or in the Statute on the Constitutional 
Court, the Court shall decide in camera by a majority of votes. 
3. The full court of the Constitutional Court shall be composed of all the constitutional 
judges. 
4. The full court shall have a quorum when at least three-fourth of the constitutional 
judges, including the President or, in the event of his incapacity to perform his duties, 
the Vice-President, are present. 
5. A chamber of three members shall have a quorum when all the three members 
are present. 
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V a r i a n t В 
The Constitutional Court shall proceed full court in the cases specified in statute; 
in any other case it shall proceed in chamber. 
Article 181 
V a r i a n t A 
1. The Constitutional Court shall decide in full court on 
(a) matters referred to in paras, (a), (b), (e) and (h) of Article 178 and, if an 
examination investigation of a statute was requested, matters covered by paras, 
(c) and (d); 
(b) matters concerning the immunity or incompatibility of a constitutional judge 
or the termination of his office; 
(c) the election of its President and Vice-President; 
(d) any matter proposed for consideration in full court by the President of the Court 
or three constitutional judges. 
2. In cases covered by para. 3 (c), the rules relative to the quorum and the majori ty 
of votes required for the adoption of decisions shall be laid down in the Statute on the 
Constitutional Court. 
3. The Constitutional Court shall decide in a chamber on any matter not reserved 
for consideration in full court. 
V a r i a n t В 
Article 181 to be omitted. 
Decisions of the Const i tut ional Cour t 
Article 182 
1. The Constitutional Court shall declare void, wholly or in part, any statute or other 
legal norm (henceforth referred to in this Chapter as legal norm) contrary to the 
Constitution, and prohibit the application of any unconstitutional rule adopted by an 
international organisation or institution, such prohibition having the same legal 
consequences as the annulment. 
V a r i a n t A 
2. A legal norm annulled shall lose effect on the day on which the decision on 
annulment is published and shall not be applicable from that day. 
3. Where so warranted by interests of legal security, the Constitutional Court may 
also exceptionally annul a legal norm with effect ex tunc or ex nunc. 
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4. Except for paras. 5 and 6, annulment shall not affect the legal relationships 
established prior to the publication of the relevant decision, nor the rights and obligations 
emanating there f rom. 
5. The Constitutional Court shall order the reopening of the criminal procedure 
concluded by a final judgement on the basis of an unconstitutional legal norm, if the person 
convicted under it has not yet been relieved from the legal prejudices resulting f rom the 
judgement, provided that the nullity of the legal norm applied in the procedure would 
have lead either to the mitigation of the punishment or the [punitive] measure, or would 
have resulted in acquittal, or would have diminished the degree of his responsibility. In 
other cases the Constitutional Court shall not review court decisions. 
6. If the Constitutional Court has allowed a constitutional complaint, the complainant 
may request a rehearing of her case under separate statute. 
Variant В 
Paras. 2 to 6 to be omitted. 
Article 183 
Variant A 
1. On the subject-matter of the application, the Constitutional Court may by [a separate] 
decision adopt an interim measure suspending the application of the legal norm under 
consideration for the period of the examination. The legal norm suspended by the interim 
measure shall not be applied from the day of publication of the order containing the interim 
measure. 
2. The conditions for adoption of interim measures shall be determined by the Statute 
on the Constitutional Court. 
Variant В 
Article 183 to be omitted. 
Article 184 
1. The Constitutional Court shall deliver its decisions in the name of the Republic 
of Hungary; it shall state the reasons for the decision. 
2. The decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be binding on everybody. 
3. Against the decisions of the Constitutional Court there shall be no appeal. 
Organisation of the Constitutional Court 
Article 185 
1. The Constitutional Court shall consist of eleven members. 
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2. The Constitutional Court shall elect, f rom among its members , a President and 
a Vice-President for a term specified by statute, who may be reelected. Reelection for 
these off ices shall not affect the tenure of office of constitutional judges. 
Const i tut ional judges 
Article 186 
Var i an t A 
1. Any Hungarian citizen having the right to vote who has completed forty-five years, 
satisfies appropriate professional standards, has a clean criminal record and bas a law 
degree may be elected constitutional judge. 
2. A person who, for four years preceding the election has been a deputy, a member 
of the Government, official of a political party, or has held a higher office in public 
administration shall not be eligible to the Constitutional Court. 
3. The election of constitutional judges shall be proposed by a selection committee 
consisting of a representative of each parliamentary group of deputies. 
4. Parliament shall elect the constitutional judges for a tenure of twelve years. Election 
shall require two-thirds of the votes cast in favour of all the deputies. 
5. Constitutional judges may not be reelected. 
Va r i an t В 
Paras. 1 to 5 to be omitted. 
Article 187 
1. Constitutional judges shall be independent and take their decisions solely on the 
basis of the Constitution and the statutes in conformity with the Constitution. 
2. A constitutional judge shall not be removed from her post without her consent 
during the tenure of her off ice, save in the cases set out in the Constitution. 
3. Constitutional judges and former constitutional judges shall enjoy the same 
immunities as the [ordinary] judges, except that any measure against them shall be subject 
to the prior consent of the Constitutional Court to be given in full court. 
4. The office of the constitutional judge shall be incompatible with any other State, 
political and economic off ice or occupation. 
5. Constitutional judges shall not engage in activities other than scholarly, educational, 
artistic, and literary activities protected by copyright law. 
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Article 188 
Variant A 
1. The tenure of office of a constitutional judge shall cease upon 
(a) expiry of the tenure of office; 
(b) completion of seventy years of age; 
(c) resignation; 
(d) release from duty; 
(e) establishment of incompatibility of the judge; 
( 0 dismissal of office; 
(g) loss of a clean criminal record; 
(h) loss of the right to vote. 
2. The detailed rules on the termination of the office of constitutional judges shall 
be laid down by statute. 
Variant В 
The cases in which the tenure of office of constitutional judges terminate shall be 
specified by statute. 
Chapter XVIII 
PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONERS FOR CITIZENS' RIGHTS 
Functions of the parliamentary commissioners for citizens' rights 
Article 189 
1. For the protection of fundamental rights, Parliament shall elect a parliamentary 
commissioner for citizens' rights and her general deputy, a parliamentary commissioner 
for rights of national and ethnic minorities, and a commissioner for data protection 
(henceforth referred to jointly as parliamentary commissioners), who shall be responsible 
solely to Parliament. 
2. The parliamentary commissioner for citizens' rights shall examine violations of 
fundamental rights, save the cases belonging to the competence of the parliamentary 
commissioners for minority rights and data protection. 
3. The parliamentary commissioner for rights of national and ethnic minorities shall 
examine any violations of these rights. 
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4. The commissioner for data protection shall examine any violations in the protection 
of personal data and in the right of citizens to access to data of public in teres t 
Election of the parliamentary commissioners 
Article 190 
1. The parliamentary commissioners shall be elected upon the proposal of the President 
of the Republic by Parliament for a term of six years. 
2. The election of parliamentary commissioners shall require two-thirds of the votes 
in favour cast of all the deputies. 
Actions taken by parliamentary commissioners 
Article 191 
1. In the cases specified by statute, action by a parliamentary commissioner may 
be initiated by anyone capable to establish his right or lawful interest in the elimination 
of a violation of fundamental rights. Parliamentary commissioners may also take action 
ex officio. 
2. The parliamentary commissioner shall examine or have examined a violation in 
connection with fundamental rights within her competence and may initiate general or 
individual measures, or request (propose) action by organs of administration to remedy 
them. 
3. The parliamentary commissioner shall not take action in respect of courts and 
shall not take action in cases pending in courts. 
4. The parliamentary commissioners shall submit an annual report on their experiences 
to Parliament; the reports shall be published subject to the rules on the protection of 
official secrets and personal data. 
5. The detailed rules relating to the functions and status of, as well as the actions 
taken by, the parliamentary commissioners shall be laid down in statute. 
Chapter XIX 
MODIFICATION O F THE CONSTITUTION 
Article 192 
1. The statute modifying the Constitution and the statute on a new Constitution 
(henceforth referred to jointly as statute modifying the Constitution) shall be adopted 
by the votes cast in favour of two-thirds of all the deputies. 
232 Kaleidoscope 
2. The President of the Republic shall not exercise his prerogatives stated in Articles 
74 and 75 with respect to a statute modifying the Constitution. 
Article 193 
Variant A 
1. The statute modifying the Constitution shall not be promulgated within sixty 
days of its adoption. During that period at least fifty deputies or 300 000 electors may 
initiate a referendum against the statute. In that case referendum shall be mandatorily 
held. 
2. The statute modifying the Constitution shall be deemed to have been adopted and 
shall be promulgated if 
(a) no referendum was initiated against it within sixty days of its adoption [by 
Parliament]; or 
(b) the referendum [against it] was invalid or without success. 
Variant В 
1. Parliament shall dissolve itself upon adoption of a statute modifying the 
Constitution. 
2. The new Parliament shall decide on ratifying the statute within sixty days of its 
assembly. Ratification shall require the votes cast in favour of two-thirds of all the 
deputies. 
3. The statute shall deemed to have been adopted and shall be promulgated if 
Parliament has ratified it with unchanged content. 
PART VII 
C O N C L U D I N G P R O V I S I O N S 
Chapter XX 
ENTRY INTO FORCE A N D EXECUTION O F THE CONSTITUTION 
Referendum on the Constitution 
Article 194 
1. The Constitution shall be promulgated and enter into force after it has been 
confirmed by a referendum. 
2. The procedure for submitting the Constitution to a referendum and the date of 
the referendum shall be determined by Parliament. 
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Entry into force 
Article 195 
The Constitution shall enter into force on the first day of the seventh month following 
its promulgation. 
Transitory provisions 
Article 196 
1. The provisions of the Constitution shall be applied to matters pending at the 
moment of its entry into force. 
2. The legal norms adopted before the entry into force of the Constitution and other 
general legal instruments issued by the organs of the State shall remain in force [unless 
and] until they have been expressly repealed. 
3. Acts-in-law performed under legal norms in force before the entry into force of 
the Constitution shall continue to be effective, and their legal consequences shall remain 
untouched. 
4. The term of office of officials elected or appointed under legal norms adopted 
before the entry into force of the Constitution shall continue until the offices have been 
filled in accordance with the Constitution or have been explicitly abolished. 
5. The tenure of the constitutional judges exercising their office at the date of the 
entry into force of the Constitution shall be prolonged for twelve years. 
Execution of the Constitution 
Article 197 
1. The execution of the Constitution shall be the responsibility of the Government. 
2. The Government shall submit to Parliament the bills necessary for the regulation 
of subject-matters specified by the Constitution. 
3. The Government shall ensure that the legal norms adopted before the entry into 
force of the Constitution and other legal instruments issued by the organs of the State 
before that date be made consistent with the Constitution. 
Legal norms losing effect 
Article 198 
The statutes, ordinances and other legal norms enumerated in the Annex to the present 
Constitution shall lose effect concurrently with the entry into force of the Constitution. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
In Memóriám Zoltán Magyary: In Three Parts 
Zoltán Magyary ( 1888-1945), who has now 
achieved almost legendary fame, stands out 
from amongst the distinguished represen-
tatives of Hungarian scholarship on public 
administration in the inter-war period. As a 
result of his scholarly work in creating a new 
School, and his educational accomplishments, 
he deserves to be ranked amongst the greats. 
His contemporary, Barna Horváth, 
writes in his memoirs that, according to his 
experience, "Mr. Magyary judges people 
and parties equally badly" [Barna Horváth, 
Forradalom és alkotmány. Önéletrajz 
1944-45-ből (Revolution and Constitution. 
Autobiography 1944-45), Budapest, 1993, 
p. 69]. To his detriment, he was not able to 
keep himself away from the temptations of 
politics, and although he did not undertake 
an active public role his name still became 
linked with certain extreme views and 
movements. In this way, Magyary involun-
tarily contributed to his own and his wife's 
tragedy. 
The national literature in recent years has 
marked out Zoltán Magyary's place in the 
pantheon of scholarship on public admin-
istration studies. This is reinforced by the 
three publications discussed below. 
I. The Master and his Disciples 
[SZANISZLÓ, József: A Magyary-iskola 
és háború utáni sorsa. Közigazgatástudo-
mány-történeti visszapillantás (The Ma-
gyary School and its Destiny after the Wan 
A study in the History of Hungarian Public 
Administration), ELTE Államigazgatási Jogi 
Tanszék, Budapest, 1993. p. 211]. 
The literature on Magyary has been enriched 
by a significant monograph. It is, at the same 
time, not to be doubted that a Magyary 
legend exists. Perhaps the most splendid 
proof of this is the feature film by Be-
reményi, A Tanítványok (The Disciples), 
produced and shown already in the mid-
1980's, which evoked a great response. 
Although the intention of the film—"to break 
through the wall of silence"—is scarcely to 
be doubted, it is still an unusual phenomenon 
in the film-world that an expert in public 
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administration studies should be placed in the 
limelight Zoltán Magyary, however, proved 
to be a good medium for the film's creators, 
and through his personality the aspirations 
of a time past were revived on the screen 
for one-and-a-half hours. Nothing better 
proves the success and effect of the film than 
that the attention of the public-and especially 
with regard to the then approaching cen-
tenary of Magyary's birth—subsequently 
became intense. Naturally, we cannot forget 
the political "thaw" which made all this 
possible. In professional circles, one was, 
however, able earlier to read and hear 
Magyary's name more often. 
József Szaniszló has come to his subject 
with a fortuitous approach (incidentally, this 
is not the first time he has dealt with the 
Magyary School), inasmuch as his style is 
readable, and thus he can expect to excite 
the interest of expert and lay public alike. 
His aim is deserving of respect: primarily, 
he wishes, with the tools of scholarship, to 
introduce the diverse professional and 
scholarly activity of the professor who 
created a School, and the internationally-
renowned and respected expert in admin-
istrative studies. At the same time, he 
attempts to peel away from Magyary's opus, 
as well as from the critiques of this, the 
layers of distortion. We believe that he has 
achieved his purpose. Some uncertainties can 
only be caused by difficulty in defining the 
genre, because József Szaniszló experiments 
with the creation of something novel—the 
forging into one work of a scholarly mo-
nograph and of a memoii^although it may 
well be that the internal proportions, 
obviously according to the author's original 
intention, enforce the monographic character 
of the work. It is also not accidental that 
a personal tone has appeared in József 
Szaniszló's work, for as a significant mem-
ber of the former intellectual workshop, and 
as one of the disciples, he obviously has 
difficulties in making his observations in 
every case from an appropriate distance. His 
work has become only more realistic and 
instructive as a result of his occasionally 
subjective and almost passionate tone. With 
the inclusion of his own experience, how-
ever, he surely enriches our knowledge. 
It is worth while, firstly, to philosophise 
on how József Szaniszló reports on the 
succession to the job which became vacant 
following the retirement in 1960 of 
Professor Károly Mártonffy—Head of the 
Department of Public Administrative Law 
at ELTE Faculty of Political and Legal 
Studies—in his significant work of 1977 on 
the history of the Department, which he 
himself cites several times, and how he 
interprets the same event in his current 
volume. [See: A közigazgatástudomány ok-
tatásának és tanszékeinek története az ELTE 
Jog- és Államtudományi Karán 1777-1977 
között (The History of the Teaching and 
Departments of Administrative Studies at 
ELTE Faculty of Law and Political Studies 
between 1777 and 1977), hereafter, Public 
Administrative Studies, Vol. 3, Budapest, 
1977, pp. 623-624; or A Magyary-iskola és 
háború utáni sorsa (The Magyary School 
and its Post-War Fate), pp. 123-124]. On 
the basis of a comparison of a section 
(which is more in reference to the Magyary 
School) from the two books the conspicuous 
change in approach is perhaps more 
apparent. As a preliminary, one should 
mention the background. The writings on 
and reviews of fascist and national-socialist 
state systems which appeared in Köz-
igazgatástudomány (Public Administrative 
Studies), a periodical published by the 
Magyary Institute between 1930 and 1944, 
although small in number, have justifiably 
Book review 237 
caught the critics', and thus also József 
Szaniszló's, attention. One of the periodi-
cal's employees, Kálmán Karay, wrote 
complimentary words in the 1943 edition 
about a volume discussing the German 
administration introduced in Nazi-occupied 
Poland. We can read the following, amongst 
other things, in Karay's review: "The most 
interesting present public administrative and 
organistorial attempt is the High Protec-
torate, as appears also from the Preface to 
the book in question written by High 
Governor Frank (...) the National Socialist 
state ethos for the first time prevails, with 
the help of a newly organised and unified 
public administration, over a territory on 
which foreign people live (Public Admin-
istrative Studies, 1943, Nos. 4-5, p. 154). 
He then continues: "The purposeful and 
planned order of the High Protectorate 
introduced in the autumn of 1939 supplied 
an experience which provides a useable 
basis for the eastern intervention of the 
German people" (Ibid, p. 154). And finally, 
a third quotation: "The extremely interesting 
study of the Secretary of State of the High 
Protectorate expounds on why it was ne-
cessary in Poland to introduce an order in 
the German sense. The Protectorate of a 
nation-he says-which was blinded by hatred 
and incapable of utilising the land and of 
organising and governing, had in its entirety 
to be put into German hands, and it was 
only possible to entrust Poles with com-
pletely mechanical execution or tasks which 
had wholly local significance. The country 
had to be covered with the iron web of 
German order and the Protectorate in order 
to insure and make useable the land for the 
Germans. This order is ensured by the unity 
of the public administration, by which every 
branch of public administration is held in 
one hand, according to the principle of 
command" (Ibid, p. 155). In his monograph 
on Departmental history, also referred to 
above—that is, in 1977—József Szaniszló 
evaluates Kálmán Karay's article as 
follows: "...such a systematic study of the 
fascist administrative systems is thought-
provoking and, intentionally or uninten-
tionally, it gives the impression that the 
author has a special affinity to fascism, and 
the related German National Socialism. It 
has to be said, however, that this is not 
only an impression, because Karay refers 
to the German administration of occupied 
Poland—in the course of one of his book-
reviews—in tones of the highest admiration. 
This statement is in itself enough to 
document that its author's immersion in 
purely fascist material, even if it had been 
undertaken with objectivity, was not acci-
dental, but is a severely censurable dec-
laration of a political stance, because it also 
brings into question the work of the editor 
in publishing the review" (József Szaniszló, 
Public Administrative Studies, Vol. II, pp. 
418-419). In his recent monograph, he could 
not likewise circumvent reference to Kálmán 
Karay: "In his book-review, Kálmán Karay 
writes with admiring words of the account 
by Freiherr Du Prel of the excellence and 
efficiency of the German administrative 
organisation introduced in Poland when 
occupied by Hitler, which the Marxist 
critique equated to an agreement with the 
actions under Hitler. However, an or-
ganisation as such—similar to nuclear 
energy—is not an ideological creation. In 
themselves, both can be excellent realities, 
and their utilisation for wrong purposes 
does not deprive them of their qualitative 
character" (The Magyary School and its 
Post-War Fate, pp. 85-86). 
We believe that the sections cited speak 
for themselves. It is difficult to understand 
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what effected the change—casting a shadow 
over his recent monograph—in József Sza-
niszló's factual and objective verdict of 
1977? Kálmán Karay's writings, that is, 
actually fulfil the criteria of an opinion 
which deserves to be stigmatised. Unfortu-
nately, József Szaniszló is mistaken when 
he suggests that only the Marxist critique 
could find something objectionable in 
Karay's writing—that is, that it is not only 
this world-view which was and is opposed 
to the ideology and practice of fascism and 
National Socialism. At the same time, we 
also cannot share his opinion that this orga-
nisation can be evaluated in itself. József 
Szaniszló's theorem might be true in gene-
ral, but in this case he is most probably 
mistaken. A laboratory creation must also 
be judged by the standards of practice, which 
is not even to mention the public admin-
istration system already tailored to the body 
of the then Polish High Protectorate. The 
public administration introduced there by the 
Nazis was intended to ensure totalitarian rule 
over the occupied territories and subjugated 
people. This "incidentally" cost the lives of 
six million Jewish citizens. The system and 
mechanism of the public administration was 
designed in order to attain these ignoble 
aims; therefore, we are not faced with a 
dysfunction in a complete and perfect 
system. For a humane and democratic so-
ciety, a civil administration where officials 
carry arms cannot be acceptable per se. 
Therefore, we find it by all means un-
necessary and erroneous that József Sza-
niszló has reviewed his previous true 
evaluation. 
The first part of the volume praises 
Zoltán Magyary's work as a public servant 
and scholarly organiser; it simultaneously 
provides an overview of the one-and-a-half 
decade long activity of the Magyary School. 
It was as a result of a trick of fate, József 
Szaniszló presumes, that the School did not 
receive appreciation in its own time, but 
rather from a power system which did 
everything following the War in order to 
cause the workshop, which remained leader-
less, to disintegrate. The unchanging nature 
of the values represented by the Magyary 
School's aspirations prove, he later writes, 
that "In the reform measures on public 
administration published in the Hungarian 
Gazette after the Second World War, and 
later in its structuring of different in-
formation, which refers to issues throughout 
public administration (...) the elements of the 
Magyary School's educational system can 
be shown in every aspect, although, it is 
true, in rather a distorted form, or with a 
different interpretation from the original' 
(The Magyary School and its Post-War Fate, 
p. 11). In the autumn of 1944 Magyary him-
self wrote distraughtly the following lines 
"My only proposal which was realised was 
the regulation and bringing into force of the 
practical public administration exam" (Ibid, 
p. 76). The possibility of realisation was, 
however, granted. Prime Minister István 
Bethlen appointed Zoltán Magyary as the 
Government Commissioner for the Prepa-
ration of the Rationalisation of Public 
Administration from 1931. Magyary was 
convinced that "we have to form our state 
organisational structure, which was be-
queathed to us by the 19th century and is, 
therefore, outdated, into a structure which 
is able to satisfy the economic and social 
demands of the 20th century; in turn, one 
of the prerequisites of this would be that"—in 
his words—"the Prime Minister's responsi-
bility for the efficiency and good working of 
the organisation and functioning of public 
administration should be clearly stated. In 
this way, public administration would receive 
Book review 239 
a chief executive" (Ibid, p. 29). One of 
Magyary's fundamental views—which is 
shared today by very few—concerns the 
predominance of the executive power: "The 
19th century pre-industrial state, based on 
the balance of different branches of po-
wer—legislature, judiciary, executive—in 
which public administration is under the 
supervision of parliament, has been, or 
should be, replaced by the 20th century post-
industrial state, built upon the actual 
predominance of public administration" 
(Ibid, p. 58). His view was realised in those 
states in which the balance between the 
branches of power was upset and govern-
ment was seized by left- or right-wing 
totalitarian forces. 
The Hungarian Institute of Public 
Administration, established in 1930, was the 
workshop which was viewed and treated by 
Magyary, József Szaniszló remarks, "as the 
future residence of the Government Com-
missioner for Rationalisation, the intellectual 
centre of his activity" (Ibid, p. 53). Professor 
Magyary and his disciples aspired to the 
assertion of complexity in their stance on 
public administration. Public administration 
is for the people, they proclaimed, and 
therefore public administration is not 
exclusively the tool and stage of exercising 
power and enforcing law; it has to be a 
structure equally satisfying people's 
economic, social, and cultural needs. As 
Magyary believed, "The quality of public 
administration depends on the officials" 
(Ibid, p. 73). 
Magyary and his circle suggested that 
the rationalising reforms must be imple-
mented from above to below; that is, the 
transformation of public administration must 
be initiated at a governmental level, and 
starting from there it has to reach to the 
lowest levels. "Magyary's ideaC—as we can 
read in Bama Horváth's memoirs cited 
above—is efficient intervention. It was self-
evident to him that efficiency meant that the 
intervention was, at the same time, correct. 
Magyary displayed a strange blindness 
towards the ultimate ends, simultaneously 
having an eagle's eye for the recognition 
of the most immediate aims and tools (...) 
There was something revolutionary in his 
merciless rationalisation" (Barna Horváth, 
Revolution and Constitution, p. 68). 
Magyary's suggestions were not put 
into practice. The government Commission 
on Rationalisation was shortly thereafter 
placed under the supervision of the Minister 
of the Interior. Seeing the failure of his 
activities as Government Commissioner, 
Magyary resigned his position in 1933. This 
failure, however, did not mean defeat. 
Retreating to his Department and Institute, 
he continued with the scholarly planning of 
his ideas, aiming at the re-shaping of the 
whole Hungarian public administration. 
During the 1930s, he undertook empirical 
research in the Tata district; subsequently, 
the creation of the Tata model district led 
to the partial realisation of scholarly ideas. 
The acceleration in the events of war, 
the tragic death of Zoltán Magyary in 1945, 
and the circumstances of the change in 
social system after the War together resulted 
in the disintegration of the School. 
The memoirs, recorded on audiotape in 
the 1970s, of István Bibó, who was also at 
home in the field of administrative studies, 
are thought-provoking: Zoltán Magyary "was 
a person of purely technocratic views, who 
was indifferent to democracy and the un-
derlying ideas of liberty and human dignity; 
he was only interested in large-scale organi-
sation (...) Despite all this, he was a 
significant critical mind, who put the whole 
anarchy, impotence, and arbitrariness of the 
240 Book review 
public administration of Horthy's Hungary 
in the stocks" [Tibor Huszár: Bibó István. 
Beszélgetések, politikai, életrajzi dokumen-
tumok (István Bibó. Discussions, political, 
biographical documents), Budapest, 1989, 
p. 107]. 
It was a paradoxical phenomenon of the 
decades following 1942, József Szaniszló 
presumes, that whilst Zoltán Magyary 's 
name was unmentionable for a long time 
some of his suggestions were realised-albeit 
without his name being used. 
The second part of József Szaniszló's 
volume briefly illuminates the lengthy age 
of silence and re-discovery. Starting at the 
beginning of the 1970s, the scholarly 
literature began to take note of the work of 
the Magyary School. We would like to refer, 
without attempting to be comprehensive, to 
the works of Aurél Ilencz, Andor Csizmadia, 
Lajos Lőrincz, and Lajos Szamel. In the 
second half of the 1980s, the partial re-
publication of the works of Zoltán Magyary 
and his circle, as well as the centenary of his 
birth in 1988, provided a good opportunity 
for re-acquaintance with the rich oeuvre. A 
new Magyary picture is starting to take 
shape. In this József Szaniszló, the author 
of the monograph, plays an undisputed and 
imperishable role. The disciple paid his 
tribute to the master. 
II. "The most influential personality 
of Hungarian public administration 
studies." 
[Közigazgatástudományi antológia, 
Második kötet (Antology of Hungarian 
Science of Public Administration, Vol. П.), 
ed.: LŐRINCZ, Lajos, Unió, Budapest, 1994. 
p. 163]. 
During the last decade a number of an-
thologies on public administrative studies 
have been published, evoking the memory 
of the eminent—but often forgotten—authors 
of the start of the century and the subsequent 
decades. The representatives of the Magyary 
School—led by Zoltán Magyary, the professor 
who founded the School—were accorded a 
prominent place in these selections. These 
breviaries, we believe, were crowned by the 
publication a few years ago of the facsimile 
edition of Magyary's main work, "Hun-
garian Public Administration", first published 
in 1942. Now, however, a further selection 
should be discussed. 
The second volume of the anthology on 
public administration studies, described as 
"study material", encompasses two themes. 
Firstly, we can read a study by Lajos Szamel 
on German public administrative scholarship. 
The analysis of Professor Szamel is followed 
by a few writings representing (modern) 
German public administration studies from 
Max Weber to Renate Mayntz. 
The second, shorter section (pp. 
121-163) traces the development of Hun-
garian scholarship on civic public admin-
istration. The introductory study, by Lajos 
Szamel, outlines the historical route which 
civic public administration studies has 
followed from its inception—that is, from the 
start of the 19th century—to its culmination, 
the disintegration of the Magyary School. 
According to Lajos Szamel, scholarship 
on public administration has developed 
tardily in Hungary for several political and 
social reasons, and its first represen-
tatives—such as Gyózó Concha-mostly, in 
undertaking it, narrowed it down to public 
administration law. "Civic Hungarian public 
administration scholarship"—as Professor 
Szamel's summary states—'"as a result of 
its German orientation has its root in legal 
studies on public administration" (p. 124). 
A further contribution to the "permanent" 
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tardiness lies in the fact that by tbe time 
public administration and legal positivism 
conquered Hungary in the first two decades 
of the 20th century, in western Europe this 
had already been surpassed by public admin-
istration scholarship. It remained, however, 
the predominant theoretical trend until the 
1920s, with eminent representatives such as 
Károly Kmetty and Ede Márffy. 
However, in addition to the legal posi-
tivism of public administration exercised as 
a theoretical study, the effect of public 
administration legal dogmatics can, as a 
result of the work of Viktor Jászi, Elek Boér, 
Móricz Tomcsányi, István Ereky, and others, 
also be demonstrated. The success of this 
conviction was, we can read, based on the 
fact that its adherents succeeded in proving 
with the tools of science that "it is not only 
criminal law and private law which have 
their own terminological system, but also 
public administration law" (p. 128). 
As a result of their professional standard 
and international recognition, the activity of 
Zoltán Magyary and his School was the 
climax of Hungarian civic public admin-
istration scholarship. Professor Szamel 
provides a to-the-point review of the 
scholarly activities of Magyary and his 
followers. Magyary, as is well-known, was 
no "armchair scholarand was not even a 
representative of theoretical studies. He 
attempted to realise in practice his theoretical 
and scholarly ideals. He came close to the 
fulfilment of this possibility at the start of the 
1930's, as the Government Commissioner 
responsible for Rationalisation. His reform 
endeavours and suggestions for rationalisation 
remained, however, for the most part on 
paper, because the government in power 
"needed a decisively suppressive public 
administration by the authorities (p. 130). 
As a result of these narrow-minded politics, 
not even the widely-accepted view that it is 
necessary to increase within the limits of the 
rule of law the effectiveness and economy 
of public administration, which had a 
comprehensive effect in public administration 
at that time, could prevail. Zoltán Magyary 
was led to this realisation through his study 
trips abroad—from the United States of 
America to tbe Soviet Union. Effectiveness 
and lawfulness: these two fundamental 
guiding principles must pervade modern 
public administration. Magyary's main work 
was the monograph entitled "Hungarian Pub-
lic Administration"—published in 1942—which 
he intended to be "a new synthesis of public 
administration studies comprising of both 
public administration law and public admin-
istration doctrine". 
Subsequently, we can read about the 
activities of the Magyary School. From 
amongst the general characteristics of the 
School, we would like to emphasise now the 
thematic richness, the utilisation of empirical 
methodology, the mode of examination based 
on an international outlook, and the results-
orientation. The field of study in which the 
authors belonging to the School worked is 
wide because their activities encompassed 
public administration law studies, public 
administration sociology, organisation 
studies, and even comparative public admin-
istration studies. The review closes with the 
survey of their activities in specific areas in 
the field, and with the mentioning of dis-
tinguished authors working in these areas, 
such as József Valló, István Kiss, and Károly 
Mártonffy. 
Hungarian civic public administration 
scholarship is illustrated by three writings 
of Zoltán Magyary. Firstly, we can read 
through a study originally published in the 
1942 volume of "Közigazgatástudomány" 
("Public Administrative Studies"), entitled, 
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"A mai közigazgatás lényege és feladatköre" 
{"The Essence and Tasks of Today's Public 
Administration"). Magyary's central thesis 
is the gauging of public administration tasks, 
with which a modern "post-industrial' state 
has necessarily to calculate. We can read 
several statements which are still today 
thought-provoking and deserving of attention, 
on the executive power, on the relationship 
between public administration and citizens, 
and on public service. We find here the work 
entitled "A jövő közigazgatás fejlődési irá-
nya" ("Developmental Direction of Future 
Public Administration"), which is the final 
chapter of Magyary's great monograph 
"Magyar Közigazgatás" ("Hungarian Public 
Administration"). "Our public administration 
needs reforms"—this is Magyary's summary. 
"The gist of this has been expressed as the 
need for a pre-industrial public admin-
istration to transform into a post-industrial 
public administration" (p. 150). The antho-
logy is brought to a close by a discussion 
entitled "Memoirs of the Crisis of Our 
Theory of State". After looking at each 
factor which has, according to him, 
principally affected and described state-
existence during the 20th century—such as, 
for example, the emergence of industrial 
conglomerates, the spread of the official 
public service, or the increase in the role of 
the executive powers—Magyary puts forward 
a critique of the Hungarian circumstances 
of his time. Hungary, like other states, has 
played its part "in the development of 
technology and in the shaping of large-scale 
capitalism" (p. 160). The Hungarian state is 
still unable to master the new requirements, 
because "Hungarian governments attempt 
to solve the problems of the 20th century 
with the tools of the 19th" (Ibid.). The tasks 
which entail a partial modification of the 
constitution can be divided into two main 
groups: the reform affects, firstly, the 
citizens' relationship with the state. As 
Magyary says, "People must be given the 
consciousness and solid trust that the state 
is, on the one hand, strong; on the other 
hand, that the state belongs to them" (p. 
161). The transformation must, secondly, 
promote the "internal perfection" of the state 
apparatus. The gist of this—also one of the 
old fundamental theses of Magyary—can be 
grasped as being that the Prime Minister 
himself should stand at the head of the 
apparatus of public administration. "The 
orchestra of the Hungarian state is led 
simultaneously by ten conductors. However, 
it is only the Prime Minister who is entitled 
to hold the conductor's baton" (p. 162). He 
finishes his expositions with a short overview 
of the functions of the "High Command of 
public administration" as an institution 
supporting the Prime Minister in public ad-
ministration. 
Anthologies with similar themes not only 
help in teaching, but also provide useful aid 
to the "non-professional" reader who wishes 
to become acquainted with the deeper 
connections within the recent past (and, in 
a transpositional sense, the present). 
III. "...we have reached the nadir...of 
our soul's affliction..." 
[In memóriám Magyary Zoltán (ed.: 
NAGY, Ferenc), MTA Könyvtára, Budapest, 
1995. p. 80]. 
Zoltán Magyary consigned these fateful 
words to paper on the 24th of March 1945, 
not long after the Soviet armies had repelled 
the Nazi forces from Tata and the surround-
ing area. Professor Zoltán Magyary and his 
wife, part-time University professor Margit 
Techert, because of the humiliations they 
were living through voluntarily ended their 
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lives on the same day. Ferenc Nagy com-
piled this small selection for the fiftieth 
anniversary of their tragic deaths, in which 
a few documents, previously unknown, 
which are in the possession of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences Library and Archive, 
were also given space. The moving farewell 
letter cited above also belongs amongst these 
documents. The lines of this letter flesh out 
the last act in the lives of two human beings 
who were bereft of hope. In the words of 
Magyary, "...my wife and I have prepared 
ourselves for the great task of ensuring that 
our unfortunate country, by recognising the 
new world, should be able properly to fit in 
with it" (p. 77). Unfortunately, this did not 
come to pass. 
Amongst the materials in the selection 
which have value as sources, the letter 
written to Kunó Klebersberg in 1929, in 
which he gives an account to the Minister 
of Culture of his experiences in England, is 
especially noteworthy. At that time Magyary, 
as a chief official of the Ministry for 
Religion and Education, began a tour of 
England in order to study the institutional 
framework there of higher education and 
research. What he saw convinced him that 
reform—even according to an English mod-
el—of university education, scientific and 
scholarly research, and the stipend system 
in Hungary was indispensable. The excerpts 
from books published in the facsimile, such 
as a few chapters from the great volume 
entitled "The Fundamentals of Hungarian 
Scientific and Scholarly Policy"—which 
was, incidentally, edited by Magyary in 
1927—recall Zoltán Magyary the educa-
tional politician. Our interest may also be 
stimulated by the note written in 1936 
concerning questions of "The International 
Character of Scholarship. International 
Competition and Co-operation". Magyary 
saw clearly that a scholarly life enclosed 
within national borders leads to isolation. 
The ability to compete internationally can 
be achieved only through reforms which 
firstly touch upon the institutional sphere 
and that of financing. "We cannot determine 
the direction and pace of international 
scholarly co-operation, neither do we dictate 
what should be the weapons of competition 
of international science and scholar-
ship"—as we can read in his clear reason-
ing—"7л cases of performances of inter-
national quality, the possibility of success 
and international prestige is, however, also 
open to Hungarian scholars and Hungarian 
scholarship" (p. 71). 
One can also read a few less interesting 
documents in this volume, such as Ma-
gyary's letter of apology from 1927, ac-
cording to which it was because of the 
inexperience and clumsiness of a ministerial 
assistant that he kept waiting Lajos Ilosvay, 
retired secretary of state, who had wished 
to visit him in his office. A place has rightly 
been given in the anthology to the facsimile 
of the external and internal title-pages of a 
volume of a collection of studies published 
in 1940 in honour of Zoltán Magyary by his 
disciples. However, the re-publication of the 
table of contents would not have been less 
interesting. 
I saw with pleasure in the collection of 
portraits the photograph of the founding 
professor of the University of Berlin's 
Hungarian Institute, Professor Róbert 
Gragger. Their relationship occurred at the 
time when Magyary was attached to the 
Ministry. This is also evidenced by their 
correspondence, which—thanks to Márta 
Schneider-has been partially researched. 
There may, however, still be a few manu-
scripts and letters by Magyary which would 
merit publication, but are, at the present 
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time, uncollated. Perhaps in the next an-
thology. 
* * * 
Zoltán Magyary's scholarly oeuvre, thanks 
to the works of recent years, has more 
fully taken shape. The 18th century German 
playwright and thinker, Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing, writes thus in his enduring piece 
Nathan the Wise: "The rare being is difficult 
to forget". It is hardly to be doubted that 
Zoltán Magyary, with his scholarly virtues 
and human errors, was one of these "rare 
beings". 
Gábor SCHWEITZER 
A Short Monograph on the Autonomy of Ost-Tirol 
Gyula GÁL: A dél-tiroli krédés (kisebbségi ada t t á r IV) [The Question of Ost-Tirol 
(Reference Book on Minorities IV)], Budapest, Teleki László Alapítvány Könyvtára, 1995. 
pp. 1-45, with documents and statistical data, pp. 47-106. 
The autonomies established in the western 
part of Europe and ensuring the coexistence 
of majority and minority populations in a 
satisfactory manner within well-settled frame-
works are of particular relevance and serve 
as examples for the Hungarian national 
communities living beyond the borders. This 
is why Gyula Gál, an architect of the science 
of space law, devotes a monograph to the 
problems of autonomy in Ost-Tirol, dedicat-
ing it to the memory of Ernö Flachbarth, his 
one-time professor, a prominent authority on 
minority law and a custodian of the rights of 
Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring 
countries. 
Gyula Gál concludes his work by stating 
that the "success formula" of Ost-Tirol's 
autonomy rests on three major factors, 
notably the will to preserve self-identity, 
political unity, and active support by the 
mother country [pp. 42 (emphasis the ori-
ginal's)]. The monograph provides several 
other important lessons in addition to these 
really crucial ones. The first such lesson 
obviously relates to territory, the signi-
ficance of the territoriality of autonomy. 
While personal autonomy may also be an 
appropriate means of meeting the needs of 
dispersed communities, a large community 
living in one block and constituting a local 
majority is in need of territorial autonomy, 
which alone is capable of guaranteeing actual 
exercise of local public administration and 
satisfying human needs like attaining the 
desire for home and the preserving the 
community's self-identity. Another lesson 
concerns the requirement of taking the time-
factor into account, since a satisfactory 
settlement can only result from a process 
often leading through pitfalls. As for the 
substance of autonomy, the ground work for 
a solution conducive to stability is laid by 
local power exercised in possession of ade-
quate material resources and involving real 
authority as well as by enjoyment of exten-
sive linguistic, cultural and educational rights. 
Present-day Italy is comprised of 20 
autonomous regions, of which 5 are accorded 
special status and 2 our of the 5—Trentino-
Alto Adige (Ost-Tirol) and Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia (environs of Triest)—are governed by 
settlement based, at least part, on international 
treaty. Consequently the autonomy of Ost-
Tirol, though it is of the fullest scope within 
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Italy, cannot be regarded as an exclusive or 
unique example even in the country. So 
Europe is not opposed to autonomy, but what 
needs to be done is „only" to act on the 
lessons formulated in or offered by Gyula 
Gál's book, namely the related political will 
should be matured in the first place. Maturity 
may result from several steps, with a no 
negligible role reserved for acquaintance with 
the achievements recorded under the positive 
arrangements, a goal which Gyula Gál's 
workhas performed a valuable service in 
pursuing. The short monograph is complete 
with important documents such as the text 
of the 1971 Statute on Autonomy. 
Gábor KARDOS 
Eckhard KNESSEL—Michael WOLLENSCHLAGER: Leitfaden zum Sozial-
versicherungsrecht (A Guide to the Social Insurance Law), Luchterhand Verlag Gmbh, 
Neuwied Kriftel, Berlin, 1996, p. 480. 
The purpose of the volume is to provide 
some guidance for university students and the 
experts interest in insurance law on this 
complex and oft-changing domain of legal 
science. The authors deal with general social 
insurance law and the related rules of 
procedure. The volume gives a detailed 
analysis of the regulations of health, accident 
and pension insurance, while discussing the 
material resources of insurance and the 
provisions relative to physicians of the so-
called Krankenkasse. 
The authors take account of the 1992 pen-
sion reform, the structural rules on health 
services, and the legislation on social benefits 
which entered into force on 1 January 1,1995. 
On the first pages of the volume they describe 
the scope of social legislation and social rights 
as well as the determinant factors of solving 
the related tasks. Also found on the opening 
pates are an unusually extensive index and 
information of the abbreviations used, serving 
to introduce the reader right from the start 
to the detailed and ample legal material and 
the studies of the problems involved. 
The first topic discussed concerns social 
legislation, the substantive law and the com-
ments thereon. The characteristics of social 
and private insurance are arranged and 
contrasted in a very expressive way. After 
the presentation of the legislative provisions 
in force and of the fundamental rules of 
social insurance, concern is taken with the 
organisational forms operated in the different 
areas of social insurance. 
The topic of the next chapter on the 
organic structure of social insurance admi-
nistration, followed by a coverage of the 
health services as provided for by law, is also 
highly interesting and graphically discussed. 
The related question include the range of 
policy holders, of persons subject to the 
compulsory scheme of insurance, the obliga-
tions of employers, and the insurance of 
pensioners. The rights and obligations 
covered by the social insurance law and the 
policy holders' right of option arc addressed 
in detail. The achievements and services of 
health insurance are shown in tables. For that 
matter, the CDU-ГОР coalition is contem-
plating measures to narrow the range of 
services provided under the health insurance 
scheme, a plan increasingly opposed by the 
trade unions in Germany. 
246 Book review 
Again, the chapter dealing with the 
legally guaranteed health services and their 
financial aspects is highly instructive as it 
underlines the key role which the State in a 
social market economy plays in raising the 
necessary finance. 
The next section of the volume describes 
the accident-related benefits due under the 
law. It points out that the efficient protection 
against industrial accidents, considerably 
reducing their frequency and the related costs, 
outlines the range of policy holders and the 
relationship between legislative provisions in 
the sphere of health and accident insurance, 
and presents real-life cases in which clients 
are or are not entitled to compensation from 
accident insurance companies. 
Last but not least, the volume discusses 
the pension insurance regulation. The right 
to pension insurance had been elaborated at 
the end of 1980s and the relevant law became 
operative as of 1 January 1992. The law 
establishment the entitlements of persons who 
have worked in different occupational cate-
gories. The volume refers to the freedom of 
insurance guaranteed by law and provides a 
list of pension insurance services and the 
activities under rehabilitation schemes that 
are due or open to insured persons in their 
own right Widows and widowers enjoying 
insurances services and the types of benefits 
to orphans are similarly covered. 
The closing section outlines legal 
protection by the social courts, which was 
regulated in Germany for the first time in 
1953. The three-degree social courts function 
with subject judges in each degree. Further-
more, the volume describes ways in which 
insured persons may defend their rights 
before the court and addresses questions of 
procedure law. 
The volume is closed which a very exten-
sive and detailed subject index. Experts 
interested in labour law and social insurance 
law can make good use of this book, which 
is marked by objectivity and a readable style 
in its presentation of the current state of 
Germany's elaborate and meticulously drafted 
social insurance law and of the future reforms 
that are likely to be effected. 
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